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Abstract 
This thesis uses dairy farming in colonial Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia as a lens to explore the 
intersection of economic, social and environmental factors in colonial agriculture from the 1890s 
until 1951, when a new regulatory framework was introduced for the industry. It examines the 
complex and fluid interactions between the colonial state and farmers (both white and black), 
and the manner in which these interactions shaped and reshaped policy within the context of the 
local political economy and the changing global economic conditions. It examines the competing 
interests of the colonial state and farmers, and how these tensions played out in the formulation 
and implementation of dairy development policy over time. This thesis demonstrates that these 
contestations profoundly affected the trajectory of an industry that started as a mere side-line to 
the beef industry until it had become a central industry in Southern Rhodesia’s agricultural 
economy by the late 1940s. Thus, besides filling a historiographical gap in existing studies of 
Southern Rhodesia’s agricultural economy, the thesis engages in broader historiographical 
conversations about settler colonial agricultural policy and the role of the state and farmers in 
commercial agriculture. Given the fractured nature of colonial administration in Southern 
Rhodesia, this study also discusses conflicts among government officials. It demonstrates how 
these differences affected policy formulation and implementation, especially regarding African 
commercial dairy production. This thesis also explores the impact of a segregationist agricultural 
policy, particularly focusing on prejudices about the “African body” and hygiene. It shows how 
this shaped the character of both African and white production trends. It demonstrates that 
Africans were unevenly affected by settler policy, as some indigenous people continued to 
compete with white farmers at a time when existing regulations were intended to exclude them 
from the colonial dairy industry. It argues that although dairy farming had grown to be a strong 
white-dominated industry by 1951, the history of dairy farming during the period under review 
was characterised by contestations between the state and both white and African farmers. 
 
Key Words: Dairy farming, African milk regimes, amasi, white farmers, African farmers, the 
colonial state, cream, butter, milk, Great Depression, Southern Rhodesia, Colonial Zimbabwe.   
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Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis gebruik suiwelboerdery in koloniale Zimbabwe/Suid-Rhodesie as ’n lens om die 
ekonomiese, sosiale en omgewingsgerigte kruispunte in koloniale landbou van omstreeks 1890 t 
1951 toe ‘n nuwe regulatoriese raamwerk vir suiwelboerdery ingestel is te, ondersoek. Die 
komplekse en vloeibare interaksies tussen die koloniale staat en boere (wit sowel as swart) en die 
wyse waarop hierdie interaksies beleid binne die konteks van die plaaslike politieke ekonomie en 
die globale ekonomiese omstandighede gevorm en hervorm het, word ondersoek. Hierbenewens 
word gelet op die spanninge tussen die belange van die koloniale staat en die boere (wit sowel as 
swart) en hoe hierdie spanning oor tyd in die formulering en implementering van suiwelbeleid 
gemanifested het. Hierdie tesis demonstreer dat diẻ spanninge en stryd ’n diepgaande uitwerking 
gehad het op ’n bedryf wat aanvanklik as ondergeskik tot die vleisbedryf begin het, naar teen die 
leat as ‘n sentrale veertigerjere bedryf in die Rhodesiëse landelike ekonomie uitgekristalliseer 
het. Benewens die feit dat die proefakrif ’n historiografiese leemte in bestaande koloniale 
Zimbabwe aangespreek, vorm dit ook deel van ’n breër historiografiese diskoers ten opsigte van 
setlaar koloniale landbou in Zimbabwe en die rol van die staat en boere in kommersiële landbou. 
Vanweё die gefragmenteerde aard van koloniale administrasie in Suid-Rhodesië, fokus die tesis 
ook op die konflikte tussen regeringsamptenare en hoe hierdie geskille veral beleidsformulering 
en implementering ten opsigte van swart kommersiële suiwelboerdery beïnvloed het. Vervolgens 
word die uitwerking van ’n landboubeleid geliasear of segragasiẻ onder die loep geneem met 
spesiale verwysing na die geskiktheid van swartmense vir kommersiële suiwelboerdery en hoe 
dit die aard en karakter van beide swart sowel as wit produksie tendense beïnvloed het. Daar 
word aangedui dat swartmense nie eenvormig deur setlaarsbeleid geraak is nie aangesien van 
hulle met wit boere meegeding het op ’n stadium toe die heersende regulasies daerop gemik was 
oin baie van hulle uit die koloniale suiwelbedryfwit te slint. Die sentrale argument is dat hoewel 
suiwelboerdery sterk wit gedomineerd was teen 1951, die geskiedenis van die bedryf gedurende 
die tydperk onder bespreking gekenmerk is deur stryd en konflite tussen die staat en wit sowel as 
swart boere. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
Dairy farming is political. Indeed, developments in the Zimbabwean dairy industry have 
attracted a lot of attention in international news during the last five years. Circumstances in 
which the country’s first lady, Grace Mugabe, has established herself as arguably the biggest 
dairy farmer in the land, and one of the major players on the processing and marketing scene 
have been as fascinating as they have been controversial. After taking over Foyle Farm in Mazoe 
(an agriculturally rich district about 48km outside the capital, Harare) at the height of the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), she established a huge dairy empire, which, at the end 
of 2012, was the largest dairy farm in the country.1 The farm was formerly owned by a white 
commercial dairy farmer and media reports suggest that she paid only 40% of its value to the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Agency (ARDA), before evicting newly resettled black 
farmers in the district to make way for her ever growing herd. She has been accused of forcing 
Nestlé, a global multi-national milk processing company, to purchase her milk.Until 2009, Nestlé 
was the biggest customer of the First Family’s Gushungo dairy farm, supplying up to 15% of all 
of Nestlé’s milk requirements. However, due to international pressure over its links with 
Mugabe’s business, Nestlé stopped buying milk from Gushungo holdings in October 2009, a 
move which nearly precipitated the forced closure of the company on allegations of championing 
a ‘regime change agenda’. Initially, members of the Affirmative Action Group (AAG)2 drove 
tanks of milk from the farm and dumped them at Nestlé’s premises. When the company still 
refused to purchase milk from Gushungo Holdings, Mugabe established a huge dairy processing 
plant – reportedly the second most sophisticated in Southern Africa. She launched her own range 
of products to directly contest Nestlé’s control of the dairy market.3 Hubristically naming her 
company “Alpha and Omega”, she launched her own brand of manufactured products including 
                                                     
1 http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-8412-Grace+Mugabe+takes+on+Nestle/news.aspx.See 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/56662/dairy-plant-for-gushungo.html. 
2
 The Affirmative Action Group is a Zimbabwean organization that was formed ostensibly as a lobby group 
agitating for the empowerment of black entrepreneurs in industry, agriculture and mining. Its leadership invariably 
has strong connections to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF), particularly 
because of its indigenization and black empowerment rhetoric. 
3
 See, http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-8412-Grace+Mugabe+takes+on+Nestle/news.aspx. 
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fresh milk, sour milk, powdered milk, ice cream and yoghurt, a development which has 
transformed the first lady’s business into the ‘udder of the nation’. Happening at a time when the 
country faced a food deficit and acute foreign currency shortages that contributed to the virtual 
collapse of the national milk procurement and marketing parastatal, the Dairibord,4 this has 
underlined the centrality of power in the dynamics of dairying5, but also highlights how far 
dairying has come from a liminal and marginal position in the political economy of Zimbabwe’s 
agrarian industry. This liminality requires a nuanced historical explanation as it is apparently 
belied by the centrality of cattle. 
 
Historically, the cattle industry has been at the centre of the country’s agro-based economy 
throughout Zimbabwean6 colonial and post-colonial history. Indeed, considering the country’s 
tropical climate, early colonial authorities concluded that Zimbabwe was essentially a cattle 
country, and that it “would be hard to over-emphasize the pre-eminent importance of the cattle 
industry as a branch of agriculture”.7 With cattle as a common denominator, the dairy and beef 
industries have generally been regarded by agriculturalists as two sides of the same coin. From 
the early 1890s, at the time of settler occupation in Southern Rhodesia, the two industries have 
shared a symbiotic, sympatric but highly asymmetrical relationship. Although the country 
initially struggled to meet local demand (as shown in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis), the dairy 
industry grew so much that by 1980, with the attainment of majority rule, Zimbabwe was one of 
the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a well-developed dairy industry. Indeed, by the 
1990s, Zimbabwe had established itself as a major player on the regional dairy and beef markets 
                                                     
4
 The Dairibord is the national parastatal responsible for the buying of milk from producers, and processing and 
marketing of dairy products to the public. As a result of diminishing dairy output due to the invasion and seizure of 
most commercial dairy farms during the Land Reform Programme and the economic meltdown which bedeviled 
Zimbabwe during the first decade of the 21st century, the Dairibord nearly collapsed, and was unable to supply dairy 
products to the public. 
5
 By her own admission, Grace Mugabe used her husband’s powerful political position to access foreign currency 
with which a modern dairy manufacturing farm was constructed at a time when the foreign currency reserves in the 
country were low. See The Herald, 30 April, 2012.  
6
 From the early 1890s to 1964, present day Zimbabwe was known as Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, after Northern 
Rhodesia’s attainment of independence, the prefix “Southern” was dropped to become Rhodesia until independence 
in 1980, when it was renamed Zimbabwe. Although the name Southern Rhodesia is used predominantly in this 
thesis to reflect the official name used during the time under review, the title includes the name “Zimbabwe” 
because it is the name used in reference to the contemporary nation-state.  
7
 The notion that Zimbabwe was (and still is) most suited to a pastoral economy has been stated (and restated) by 
many agricultural authorities during the colonial and post-colonial period. For assertions separated by a century but 
analogous in content, see Report of the Director of Agriculture, 1911, and The Chronicle, 18 August 2014. 
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at a time when the majority of African countries were struggling to satisfy internal demand.8 
After South Africa and Kenya, Zimbabwe was the highest exporter of dairy products in tropical 
Africa between the 1960s and 1980s.9 It also boasted one of “the most well developed formal 
dairy marketing systems” in sub-Saharan Africa.10 
 
These achievements, however, were reversed by the effects of the farm invasions which 
accompanied the Land Reform Programme from 2000 onwards. The number of commercial 
dairy farmers, which stood at over 500 during the 1990s, fell to just under 200 after the 
compulsory acquisition of land.11 Similarly, as many cattle were either stolen, maimed or killed 
during the farm invasions,12 the national herd fell from 104 483 milked cows in 1994 to 35 000 
in 2004, while dairy production fell from 184 000 tonnes in 1998 to a mere 86 000 in 2007.13 
This was part of widespread agrarian reverses: maize production fell from a peak of just over 2 
million tonnes in 1996 to about 700 000 tonnes in 2008, while wheat production tumbled from 
263 134 tonnes in 1996 to just 31 00 tonnes in 2008.14 Consequently, as a popular bon mot noted, 
the country went from southern Africa’s ‘bread basket’ to ‘basket case’. By 2008, Zimbabwe had 
become a net importer of all dairy products and nearly all other foodstuffs.15 
Yet, despite its changing role in national food self-sufficiency, dairy farming in Zimbabwe has 
                                                     
8
 See S. Mbogoh, Dairy development and internal marketing in sub-Saharan Africa: performance, policies and 
options, (Addis Abba: International Livestock Centre for Africa, 1984), 16. Also see, H.E. Jahnke, Livestock 
production systems and livestock development in tropical Africa, (Kieler: Wissenschaftverlag Vank, 1982), 30. 
9
 R.F. Brokken, ‘Summary and review’, in R. Brokken and S. Seyoum (eds), Dairy Marketing and development, 
(Proceedings of a symposium held at the International Livestock Centre for Africa [ILCA], Addis Ababa, 26-30 
November 1990), 19-20.  
10
 S. Mbogoh and J. Ochuanyo, ‘Kenya’s dairy industry: The marketing system and the pricing policies for fresh 
milk’, in R. Brokken and S. Seyoum (eds), Dairy Marketing and development, 41. 
11
 L. Ndlovu, ‘Livestock Research and development’, in M. Rukuni and C.K. Eicher (eds) Zimbabwe’s Agricultural 
Revolution, (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2001), 245-257. 
12
 W. Wolmer, From wilderness vision to farm invasions. Conservation and development in Zimbabwe’s south-east 
lowveld (Oxford: James Currey, 2007), 197. Also see, A. Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the state: State Interest 
groups and land reform in Zimbabwe’, PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2006, 303.  
13
 United Nations Development Programme, Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe. A discussion 
document (Harare: UNDP Zimbabwe, 2008). See also The Zimbabwe Independent, 21 April 2006.  
14
 Special Report: Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) Crop and Food 
security Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, 2010.  
15
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe was responsible for food security among the southern African 
nations under the banner of SADC, the regional bloc. By 2008, however, Zimbabwe depended on imports from 
Zambia, South Africa and overseas for the provision of virtually all of its dairy requirements, as local production fell 
dismally. See http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2014/03/17/market-comment-zimbabwe-could-go-from-
basket-case-to-breadbasket 
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been relegated to the fringes of serious scholarly inquiry. Indeed, dairy farming has been dwarfed 
by the outpouring of scholarly work focusing on cattle ranching, maize and tobacco growing.16 
This may be attributable to the fact that, for much of the colonial period, the three industries 
formed the lynchpin around which the Southern Rhodesian agrarian economy rotated. However, 
although it never competed with tobacco, maize and beef, dairy farming potentially provided the 
colony and its settlers with a steady income, and, until the 1970s, it was the fourth highest 
agricultural earner of export earnings. 17  Moreover, as demonstrated in chapter 3, the 
development of the dairy industry was initially considered by the colonial state to be of strategic 
importance in the plans to establish in Southern Rhodesia a ‘white man’s country’, a phrase used 
in state propaganda offering assurances of national food self-sufficiency to would-be settlers. 
Thus, the dairy industry offers a lens through which larger socio-economic and political 
dynamics may be examined as they evolved over time.18 
 
Scope of the study 
As with current developments, Zimbabwe’s history shows that the intersection of economics, 
national politics, state policy and the agricultural sector has been a place of many tensions and 
competing agendas.19 These tensions arose out of the often conflicting interests of farmers, both 
settler and African, consumers and the state itself which successive administrations had to 
manage, in on-going attempts to develop a viable agricultural sector. Using the dairy industry as 
a lens, this thesis analyses the social and economic imperatives that shaped the trajectory that it 
                                                     
16
 Together with maize and tobacco, there is a relatively large corpus of works focussing on beef production in 
colonial Zimbabwe. For instance, see I. Phimister, ‘Meat and monopolies: Beef cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-
1938’ Journal of African History,19, 3, (1978); V. Machingaidze, ‘The development of settler capitalist agriculture 
with particular reference to the role of the state, 1908-1980,’ PhD Thesis, University of London, 1980; N. 
Samasuwo, ‘“There is something about cattle”: Towards an economic history of the beef industry in colonial 
Zimbabwe, with special reference to the role of the state, 1939-1980’, PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2000, 
and N. Samasuwo, ‘Food production and war supplies: Rhodesia’s beef industry during the Second World War, 
1939-1945’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 29, 2, (2003). 
17
 M. Bratton, ‘The comrades and the countryside: The politics of agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe’, World Politics, 
39, 2 (1987), 332. 
18
 These three sectors of settler agriculture were, in terms of output and export performance, considered to be the 
most important for the colonial economy. At any given time during the colonial period, the three sectors contributed 
no less than 50 % of total agricultural export earnings in the country, and came to be referred to as the “three pillars 
of settler agriculture”. See Machingaidze, ‘The development of settler capitalist agriculture with particular reference 
to the role of the state, 1908-1980,’ 7-32. 
19
 See P. Mosley, The settler economies: studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 12. 
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took over time. It eschews triumphalist Whiggish narratives often deployed in telling industry 
histories from the inside, and demonstrates that it followed a non-linear and complicated 
development path. It focuses on the interaction between the state (and its shifting and often 
ambiguous interests), and producers – both white and black – which shaped and re-shaped dairy 
policy within the context of evolving socio-economic and political developments. Given 
Southern Rhodesia’s status as a British colony and the country’s participation on the external 
export markets, this study also considers the impact of the international economic system and its 
influence on the development of the local dairy industry. Policy-making itself, as shall be 
demonstrated in this thesis, was often an ad hoc, reactive and a hit and miss affair, and not 
always a product of careful planning and plotting on the part of the colonial government. 
 
Although, as already noted, the country had a relatively well developed dairy sector by 1980, 
what made the Zimbabwean case somewhat different is that whereas dairy produce was 
predominantly derived from black small-scale holders in Kenya, Zimbabwe’s formal market was 
overwhelmingly dominated by white large-scale producers, with black producers making a 
negligible contribution towards the formal sector.20 Zimbabwe’s dairy industry in particular was 
characterised by marked differences in the modes of production between white large-scale 
producers and indigenous and predominantly small-scale producers. On the one hand, by 1980, 
the large-scale sector was a more “efficient and well established commercial sector of some 525 
farmers milking exotic animals (who) produced about 250 million litres of milk per year, 
supplying the urban market.” 21  The small-scale sector, on the other hand, consisted of an 
unquantified number of small-holder farmers milking indigenous animals seasonally for home 
consumption and local sales.”22 Although such dualism pervaded the colonial agricultural sector, 
the virtual absence of African participation on the ‘formal’ dairy market in Zimbabwe was 
peculiar to the dairy industry, as Africans still marketed cattle, maize and Turkish tobacco during 
the colonial era. Thus, this thesis traces the historical factors that led to such a scenario. As will 
be demonstrated, dairy farming is peculiar for the particularly high levels of expertise, 
                                                     
20
 See B.R. Henson, ‘Dairy Farmers and markets in rural Zimbabwe’, in Brokken and Seyoum (eds), Dairy 
Marketing and development, 279-280. The author is aware of the contentious nature of the phrase ‘formal market’. 
In this context the two words are used to refer to the mainstream, government regulated marketing system, while 
‘informal’ refers to the less regulated market in which the government wields relatively less influence. 
21
 Henson, ‘Dairy Farmers and markets in rural Zimbabwe’, 279. 
22
 Henson, ‘Dairy Farmers and markets in rural Zimbabwe’, 279. 
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technology, and the significantly bigger outlay of capital needed to produce and handle dairy 
products. Produced nearly on a daily basis, milk – the primary dairy commodity – is highly 
perishable and requires high cost transportation and storage.23 This happening, as it did, in a 
context of very little state assistance profoundly affected African participation, leading to its 
eventual disappearance from the late 1940s onwards. Although focusing predominantly on the 
commercial sector, this thesis does acknowledge the informal dairy sector, and examines the 
factors that contributed to its existence and its interaction with the formal sector. 
 
This thesis explores more than shifts in the political economy or agrarian change. Given the high 
level of hygiene and sanitation that is required in the industry, dairy farming offers a useful 
window into the interface between ‘traditional’ African and western notions of cleanliness and 
the prejudices that played out between African producers and the settler community. As chapter 
4 demonstrates, dairy farming became a site of struggle as the settler community brought 
pressure to bear on the colonial state to eliminate African producers from the mainstream dairy 
market. Hence, by 1951, when the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) was established, the number 
of black farmers registered as dairy producers was negligible. This was notwithstanding the fact 
that, throughout the period under review, no legal instrument was employed explicitly outlawing 
the participation of black farmers on the market. However, while claiming to standardise the 
industry along international models, the legislative interventions that were made effectively 
eliminated African producers as they received neither the training nor the financial assistance 
that was afforded white farmers to comply with the regulations. While acknowledging that 
colonial agrarian policy was designed to develop settler agriculture with African enterprise 
playing a peripheral role,24 this thesis demonstrates that the relationship between white farmers 
and the state was often uneasy and frequently confrontational. Indeed, as will become clear in 
this thesis, although they received considerable technical assistance and subsidies, white farmers 
periodically protested that the state was not rendering adequate support to them, particularly in 
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the form of higher producer prices. While white farmers, who constituted a significant political 
constituency for political leaders, clearly received preferential treatment, it will be shown that the 
government also had other interest groups, particularly consumers, to protect for political 
reasons. As William Munroe argues, one of the principal aims of the state (both colonial and 
post-colonial) is to appease all political constituents in order to perpetuate its incumbency.25 
Thus – as this thesis will show – white farmers’ interests were neither always opposed to those of 
Africans nor inclusive with those of other white communities or the state.  
 
Moreover, government itself was not a homogeneous entity. Indeed, a study of the development 
of dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia shows that the various government departments which 
were involved with the industry often did not agree on policy and its implementation. Officials of 
the Native Affairs Department (NAD), under which African agriculture fell, frequently clashed 
with officials of the Department of Agriculture’s Dairy Division in both policy formulation and 
implementation. Diana Jeater has argued that the making of ‘native policy’ in Southern Rhodesia 
was often ambiguous, and a product of arguments, debates, and profoundly conflicting interests 
among whites – administrators, missionaries, and settlers – all of whom interacted with Africans 
with agendas of their own.26 As this thesis will show, the debates and conflicting interests among 
sections of the settler community were not limited to the making of ‘native policy’, but extended 
to policy-making and implementation in general. These differences often led to inconsistencies 
in the articulation of policy. In the same vein, farmers (both Africans and whites) did not always 
respond uniformly, nor did they always speak with the same voice. Their voice and responses 
were guided by their different socio-political, economic and spatial27 interests. 
 
The period under consideration begins in the 1890s, with the beginning of colonial occupation. 
However, in order to fully understand the impact of colonialism on African milk regimes and 
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African responses to the emergence of a market dominated system, an overview of pre-colonial 
production and consumption systems is given. The thesis closes its analysis in 1951 for three 
reasons. Firstly, to the extent that it witnessed the establishment of the DMB, which transformed 
the entire dairy regulatory and marketing system, 1952 marked a watershed year in the history of 
the dairy industry in Southern Rhodesia. The changes that came with the establishment of the 
statutory body have been examined in a separate study, and the socio-economic factors in which 
these changes occurred do merit further study.28 Secondly, the passage of the 1951 Native Land 
Husbandry Act brought with it a new regime in the African livestock sector which radically 
affected African milk production from 1951 onwards. Thirdly, the advent of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 brought with it a change in the marketing policy, since 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were now considered as part of the ‘domestic market’ which 
led to the extension of the territorial influence of the DMB.29 
Literature review 
For all their importance in most Southern African societies’ socio-economic and political 
organisations, cattle have received little historical attention. Indeed, it is surprising that a region 
with so small a percentage of arable land, compared to Europe and the United States, should 
have so little material devoted to pastoral history. In comparison with the beef industry, dairy 
farming offers, to use Beinart’s words, “a silence that echoes the stillness of the veld.”30 His 
argument that, historiographically, “South Africa’s commercial pastoral economy seems to have 
been dwarfed internationally by Australasia and Argentina, or locally by the behemoths of 
mining and maize” rings true of the Zimbabwean situation.31 Shapiro, Jesse and Foltz have 
summed up the need for more research in the southern African context more broadly thus: “the 
African development literature is relatively thin on livestock in general, but thinner still for dairy, 
and woefully inadequate for dairy marketing.”32 
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A review of Zimbabwe’s agrarian history shows that there is no in-depth historical monograph 
solely devoted to dairy farming. The most in-depth historical studies have so far focused on the 
maize, tobacco and beef industries. This is largely attributable to the fact that, for much of the 
colonial period, these sectors were considered to be the three pillars of settler agriculture. To 
date, there are only two available historical studies of dairy farming in colonial Zimbabwe. In his 
piece, Jeft Ngadze provides an insightful but, of necessity, truncated overview of the 
development of commercial dairy farming between 1908 and 1952.33 As his study is focused on 
the marketing side, particularly Southern Rhodesia’s climatic and geographical disadvantages in 
comparison with major dairying countries of the world, Ngadze’s work does not explore the 
social and economic dynamics that shaped the country’s performance on the international scene. 
Moreover, his work is largely silent on African production. My previous study focuses on the 
impact of the DMB in stabilising the production and marketing aspects of the dairy industry.34 
The study analyses the role played by the statutory board as a vehicle through which the 
government could regulate and control production and marketing amid the general shortages that 
were experienced in the post-World War Two (WWII) period. By focusing on the statutory 
board, however, the latter study does not discuss the social and political imperatives that affected 
the development trajectory that the dairy industry took over time. As in Ngadze’s study, African 
enterprise in dairy farming does not feature in any significant manner in this study. 
 
There are, however, analyses by agricultural economists, veterinary and animal scientists that 
provide useful insights into dairy farming in Zimbabwe. Writing in 1971, J. Oliver sets out the 
basic requirements for dairy production in the tropics, giving the basic principles in breeding and 
feeding of dairy cattle, rearing calves and milking methods.35 Similarly, C. Pederson and J. 
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Madson’s study on the constraints suffered by farmers in calf rearing and milk production in the 
Sanyati district offers some valuable technical information on the factors that adversely affected 
dairy farming in the country.36 Using a quantitative approach, he discusses the advantages of 
certain breeds over others in relation to the local environment of Sanyati to illustrate the 
importance of finding suitable breeds for specific environments. N. French, J. Tyrer and W. 
Hirst’s study on the productivity and morbidity of cattle on smallholder dairy farms in the 
Chikwaka communal lands gives an extensive discussion of the problems faced by black small 
scale producers in independent Zimbabwe.37 Although these studies offer valuable data about 
different factors affecting dairy farming in Zimbabwe, they are presentist in approach. By giving 
a historical account of the dairy industry, this thesis seeks to rectify this lacuna in the existing 
body of knowledge on dairy farming, in turn offering (among other points) context for further 
scientific studies. 
 
Zimbabwe’s agrarian historiography 
There is a considerable body of literature on colonial Zimbabwe’s agriculture in general on 
which this study draws, and to which it seeks to contribute. For much of the pre-1960s period, 
Zimbabwean historiography was dominated by colonialist/liberal historiography which, by 
extolling the ‘virtues of settler civilisation’, defended Southern Rhodesian colonial agrarian 
policy and settler society in general. Colonialist historiography in Southern Rhodesia, like 
Afrikaner Nationalist historiography in South Africa, was, as David Chanaiwa observed, 
“primarily written to rationalise invasions, massacres and predatoriness.”38  As settlers were 
confronting problems of self-determination in an alien and hostile environment, they “not only 
needed historians, but also a distinct historical folklore of their own”.39 While political leaders in 
South Africa went to the extent of appointing ‘official historians’ such as Theal for the Cape 
Colony, in Southern Rhodesia Marshall Hole (whose role in determining Agricultural policy 
from 1910 is discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis) was a typical example of official writers of the 
                                                     
36
 C. Pedersen and J. Madsen, ‘Constraints and opportunities for improved milk production and calf rearing in 
Sanyati, Zimbabwe’, Livestock Research for rural development Journal, 10, 1, (1998), 14-17. 
37
 N.P. French, J. Tyrer and W.M. Hirst, ‘Smallholder dairy farming in the Chikwaka communal land, Zimbabwe: 
Birth, death and demographic trends’, Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 48, (2001), 101-112.  
38
 D. Chanaiwa, ‘Historiographical traditions of Southern Africa’, Paper prepared for the international Conference 
on the Historiography of Southern Africa, (December, 1976), 12.  
39
 Chanaiwa, ‘Historiographical traditions of Southern Africa’, 14. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
11
time.40 A colonial official himself, he often wrote pieces in defence of colonial agricultural 
policy.41 
 
The earliest accounts in Southern Rhodesia were written by colonial explorers, settlers and 
officials. African methods of production are disparaged and the ‘virtues’ of settler civilisation 
extolled in these works. Perhaps the most well-known representative of this stratum is Lewis 
Gann, who defended colonial policy as having been beneficial for both African and settler 
groups. Writing in the 1960s, Gann discussed the social and economic developments during the 
early years of colonial occupation, paying particular attention to what he perceived to be the 
massive steps towards civilisation which accompanied occupation.42 Gann also defended the 
passage of the Land Apportionment Act, arguing that as ‘an essay in trusteeship’: the Act was 
fair because it ensured that some land was set aside for African occupation and offered paternal 
protection to vulnerable African communities. 43  Early colonial administrators discussed 
livestock issues, albeit tangentially: chiefly depicting their successes in conquering the ‘Dark 
Continent’. In her 1927 article, ‘Southern Rhodesia: A white man’s country in the tropics’, Ethel 
Tawse-Jollie outlines the country’s social and geographical anatomy, celebrating the land’s 
suitability for European settlement, with little regard to the interests of indigenous peoples.44 For 
these writers, primitive African methods and perceived recalcitrance to join the capitalist 
colonial market, and not land shortages and lack of state support, were the main for African 
agricultural underdevelopment during the colonial era. 
 
There have been accounts by colonial officials appearing in the Rhodesian Agricultural Journal 
(itself a vehicle for the development of settler agriculture) discussing dairy farming. John Cory 
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wrote extensively in this journal, mainly giving advice to settler farmers on successful dairy 
farming. African agriculture was either disparaged or totally ignored in most of his articles.45 As 
an official of the Dairy Division, which fell under the Department of Agriculture, Cory wrote a 
series of articles in the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal with a view to give expert technical advice 
to settler dairy farmers on matters pertaining to the industry. Although his articles are 
particularly useful insofar as they give insights into government thinking, one has to read against 
the grain in order to pick some evident prejudices towards African dairy production. 
 
A number of settler ranchers have written accounts dwelling on the “colourful frontier character 
of the new colony”.46 L.T. Tracey, C. Truepenny47, W. Robertson and D.M. Sommerville48 also 
chronicled their experiences as settler ranchers during the early days of colonial occupation. 
Tracey offered a detailed description of the colony’s geographical and ecological set up, and how 
settler farmers could gainfully utilise the regional differences in climate and physical terrain.49 In 
the same vein, Robertson, a rancher in Sinoia, gave an account depicting the life of early settler 
ranchers, their constant socio-economic struggles, and (unwittingly) also revealed their 
condescending attitudes towards African livestock practices and cattle breeds.50 He claimed that 
“the background to many years of ranching life in Rhodesia was the land itself, the twenty seven 
square miles of virgin bush, unaltered by man since the dawn of time.”51 Similarly, Sommerville 
only viewed Africans as a reservoir of cheap labour, which, he believed, was actually beneficial 
to them. He argued that, owing to the paternal intervention of the settler community, the African 
has “changed from a primitive man to a much more civilised being, with civilised wants and 
customs.”52 Although they must be read “against the grain” to counteract their racist ideology, 
such accounts are nevertheless useful in understanding the everyday experiences of settler 
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ranchers, and the complexities of settler thinking at the time. Particularly relevant to dairy 
farming is C.G. Tracy’s recent book in which he recounts his life experiences in Southern 
Rhodesia within a farming family. He describes the growth of his family’s dairy herd at their 
farm and the various challenges they faced in developing a thriving dairy enterprise.53 
 
Liberal scholarship, as espoused and exemplified by William Barber in 1961, focussed on 
colonial agricultural policy and African participation mainly as labourers. Informed by 
modernisation theory, and drawing from Arthur Lewis’s model of development theory in which 
he argues that labour was transferred from a low productivity indigenous sector to a highly 
productive capitalist economy54, Barber argued that African agriculture in Southern Rhodesia 
was inherently underdeveloped prior to colonial occupation.55 For him, the capitalist system, 
which the colonial establishment introduced, ultimately benefitted Africans to the extent that it 
enabled them to enter the money economy, which was supposedly a higher stage of development 
than the traditional sector.56 The basic tenets of this argument were later adopted by Paul Mosley 
in his studies of colonial agrarian policy in Southern Rhodesian and Kenyan settler economies.57 
He argued, rather unconvincingly, that policies of settler colonialism did not cause African rural 
economies to regress. For him, far from damaging the indigenous agricultural economies, the 
population pressures did not check, but actually stimulated, African productivity.58 
 
The colonialist/liberal view, which tended to be Whiggish and laudatory of colonial agriculture, 
was inevitably subjected to increasing criticism from the 1970s onwards. Giovanni Arrighi’s 
seminal paper, written in 1970, demolished Lewis and Barber’s postulations that African 
agriculture was essentially underdeveloped prior to colonial occupation. Writing from a Marxist 
perspective, Arrighi focused on the state’s coercive influence in the proletarianisation of the 
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African peasantry in Southern Rhodesia. 59  Arrighi also argues that, in the face of labour 
shortages, the state forcibly extracted labour from African areas because economic inducements 
had failed during the early years of occupation.60 In an earlier work, Arrighi had noted that race 
and class were in many ways linked in the colony’s socio-economic set up.61 In his book, The 
political economy of Southern Rhodesia, he traces the manner in which the British South Africa 
Company and the Responsible Government after 1923, embarked on a protracted and systematic 
process of primitive accumulation which was aimed at empowering settler agriculture. 62 
Arrighi’s views were subsequently developed and advanced by a group of scholars who focused 
on the political economy from the mid-1970s onwards. These include Ian Phimister, Duncan 
Clarke and Charles van Onselen, whose works on peasant production and underdevelopment, 
African contract and domestic labour and racial inequalities, and mine worker consciousness, 
respectively, popularised the political economy paradigm during the 1970s. 63  Particularly 
important to this thesis is Phimister’s piece which, as did Colin Bundy with the South African 
peasantry in 1979,64 explored African agriculturalists’ positive response to the market from 1890 
until the late 1900s, when African agricultural enterprise was deliberately and systematically 
curtailed to favour settler capitalist agriculture.65 In an edited book that examines the impact of 
colonial capitalism on African peasantries in Southern and Central Africa – The roots of rural 
poverty in central and Southern Africa – Robin Palmer makes a similar argument that African 
agricultural producers enjoyed significant prosperity on the colonial market during the first two 
decades of occupation.66 Chapter 2 of this thesis engages and interrogates this notion of African 
agrarian prosperity from a dairying point of view. 
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Palmer’s 1977 magnum opus on settler land alienation, eviction and racial discrimination is an 
important book in the political economy paradigm.67 He documented the political, social and 
economic processes that culminated in the domination of white farmers in agricultural 
production, noting that that the underdevelopment of African agriculture was a double edged 
sword aimed at reducing African agricultural competition and creating a ready pool of cheap 
labour for settler farmers. 68  Palmer dismissed Gann’s Eurocentric view that the Land 
Apportionment Act actually saved Africans from totally losing their land. He contended that the 
Act (and many others that followed) in fact perpetuated the impoverishment of African 
agricultural producers.69 This thesis draws from this group of scholars extensively, particularly in 
the manner in which they demonstrate the underdevelopment of the African agrarian sector. 
However, by demonstrating that neither the state nor settler farmers themselves were 
homogenous entities, this thesis seeks to go beyond the issue of race that is so often used as the 
primary lens through which state/farmer relations have been examined. 
 
Further research by Machingaidze in 1980 also focuses on the role of the state in the 
development of settler agriculture, stressing that without state support in the form of vast tracts 
of land at concessional rates, cheap labour and the provision of cheap labour, settler capitalist 
agriculture would have found it very hard to get off the ground in the first place. He adds that the 
effects of the Great Depression in the 1930s would have killed off any lingering settler 
agricultural endeavours. 70  He points to a plethora of problems faced by settlers: 
undercapitalisation, lack of expertise, market unavailability and a poor transport network which 
greeted settlers upon arrival in the colony, and then outlines state interventions in helping settlers 
establish themselves. 71  He demonstrates that, in the final analysis, the state used African 
producers to subsidise settler agriculture during hard times.  
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From a livestock viewpoint, Machingaidze’s doctoral thesis offers a critical examination of the 
state’s decisive role in assisting the Rhodesian cattle industry to overcome challenges of the pre-
WW II period.72 The major limitation with Machingaidze’s work, however, is that it focuses on 
beef farming to the exclusion of dairy farming, which constituted is grouped under the “other 
side-lines” sub-title. Using a similar Africanist viewpoint, Nhamo Samasuwo delineates the rise 
of the beef industry in war-time and post Second World War Rhodesia.73 It analyses how the 
state’s statutory marketing and pricing policies helped to develop the industry from its infancy to 
a stage where it had become a major earner of foreign currency on the export market.  
 
Taken together, Machingaidze and Samasuwo’s studies give a long historical account of the beef 
cattle industry from 1890 to 1980. The major limitation with both studies, however, is that while 
they acknowledge the exploitation of African livestock owners, they present Africans generally 
as passive victims of a colonial system. Very little is said of African agency in their responses to 
exploitative colonial policy. As will be shown in this dissertation, Africans did carve a niche 
within the colonial system through devising ways to counter exploitative policies. Since both 
works make only passing references to dairy farming, this thesis seeks to fill this gap by showing 
that dairy farming was not only an important adjunct of the cattle industry, but also that 
developments in one invariably affected the other. Moreover, Machingaidze and Samasuwo 
treated the state as largely homogeneous, with very little internal debates and differences within 
the bureaucracy. Yet, as this thesis shows, the state was wracked by contradictory and competing 
agendas, and the efficacy of policy-making and implementation was often mitigated by 
differences within the Agricultural Department, and between the Department and the Native 
Affairs Department. Nevertheless, this thesis engages many of the key debates first raised in 
Machingaidze and Samasuwo’s studies, particularly the colonial breeding policy and the impact 
of bovine diseases. 
 
Phimister and Alois Mlambo’s works on the marketing of beef offer useful insights into 
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commodity marketing in colonial Zimbabwe. Phimister’s article outlines the privileges enjoyed 
by settler ranchers such as cheap land and labour, and the availability of cheap indigenous cattle 
on which a settler herd could be built, and the factors that led to the failure of Southern 
Rhodesian beef producers to penetrate the international markets.74 Owing to the production of 
predominantly low quality beef, Southern Rhodesia was unable to attract reputable international 
beef marketing companies, leading to the establishment of the Cold Storage Commission in 
1938.75 Thus, Mlambo’s study on the role of the Cold Storage Commission focuses on the role of 
the Commissionas a statutory body through which the colonial state regulated and shaped 
developments in the beef industry between 1938 and 1968.76 Although limited to beef marketing, 
this studies offer interesting comparisons to the problems faced by creameries in marketing 
butter from the mid-1920s onwards that are discussed in chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
 
Cognate disciplines offer useful auxiliary analysis and material. Anthropological studies by 
Richard Mtetwa and Murray Steele on African livestock regimes in colonial Zimbabwe respond 
to the colonial discourse on the existence of the “cattle complex” theory – an anthropological 
view that assumed that Africans kept large herds of cattle for socio-religious purposes to the 
point of economic irrationality. They view the reluctance of Africans to sell their livestock 
necessarily as a form of resistance to the exploitative nature of the colonial market. Writing in 
1979, Mtetwa specifically states that “there has been nothing mystical about cattle (among 
Africans): they have been first and foremost an economic asset and all the socio-religious 
attitudes held by Africans are based on their economic value.”77 With regards to their perceived 
reluctance to sell cattle, Mtetwa adds that: 
Africans have always been willing and ready to sell their cattle provided the prices 
are good. Their prevailing reluctance to sell their cattle in the capitalist market is 
based on knowledge that they are being exploited: that prices are far below what 
their cattle are worth. Thus, capitalist exploitation is responsible forAfricans' 
reluctance to sell their cattle and not their traditional or irrational attitudes, as has 
been long alleged.78 
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While concurring that the premise of the cattle complex theory was flawed, Steele gives a further 
dimension by focussing on the economic value of cattle outside the market. He argues that by 
preferring to keep their livestock and resisting de-stocking measures, Africans kept their cattle 
for their utility value.79 While scholarship on colonial livestock policy and African responses has 
been actively engaged on the cattle complex theory, very little attention has been paid to African 
milk usage and response to the colonial market in Southern Rhodesia. Hence, engaging existing 
historical and anthropological studies undertaken in east Africa and South Africa,80 this thesis 
seeks to fill this gaping lacuna on colonial Zimbabwe’s livestock history.81 
 
Nationalist/patriotic history, agrarian reform and post-colonial narratives 
Nationalist historiography emerged during the 1960s, partly motivated by rising African 
nationalism across the African continent and the euphoria of independence in neighbouring 
countries. It gained further currency during the 1970s, and was adopted by the post-colonial state 
for its Africanist rhetoric.82 In Southern Rhodesia this was propelled by Terence Ranger’s Revolt 
in Southern Rhodesia83 and African Voice in Southern Rhodesia in 1970.84 Attempts were made 
to reconstruct the development of pre-colonial modes of production and African resistance to 
colonial encroachment. This nationalist approach was adopted by a few historians in independent 
Zimbabwe, whose work was, to use Preben Kaarsholm’s words, “just as mythologically oriented 
as its colonial precedent”.85 
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Moyo’s post-1990 works on post-colonial land policy became increasingly nationalist in outlook 
in the way he, as Angus Selby observes, took an “increasingly sympathetic stance towards the 
ruling party” and the latter’s propensity to exploit that in its rhetoric.86 Indeed, Moyo views the 
farm invasions that preceded the FTLRP as “fundamentally progressive”, notwithstanding the 
chaos and food insecurity that followed both the invasions and the FTLRP.87 While presenting 
the white farming community in Zimbabwe as homogeneous, Moyo’s analyses blamed farmers 
for their reluctance to allow for land transfers which would upset their privileged position in 
commercial agriculture.88 This nationalist/patriotic history has, however, been challenged by 
some scholars. Scholars such as Amanda Hammar, Jocelyn Alexander and Joan McGregor, Eric 
Worby, Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya have uncovered the destructive nature of land 
reform in the manner in which it was undertaken and the politics of patronage underpinning it.89 
While acknowledging the privileged position of the white farming community, they also reveal 
the post-colonial government’s politics of patronage and exhausted nationalism. Although the 
scope of this thesis does not cover this period, it draws from the manner in which the state and its 
interests play out in the country’s agricultural political economy. 
 
Another rich vein of work arose during the post-colonial period, focusing on African resistance, 
agency and their role in shaping colonial policy. Following on Ranger’s work on peasant 
consciousness and resistance in Southern Rhodesia,90  more recent scholars such as Jocelyn 
Alexander have used oral sources to illuminate individual experiences of African peasants to 
chip away at the colonial and post-colonial state’s overbearing influence on socio-economic life. 
Writing in 2003, Alexander traces the continuous remapping of agrarian landscapes of settlement 
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and dispossession, production and punishment, authority and resistance, from the arrival of white 
settlers in the 1890s to the eviction of white farmers alongside farm workers in early 2000.91 Pius 
Nyambara’s analyses state policy which aimed at increasing African production of cotton in 
order to satisfy British needs, and peasant resistance between 1904 and 1953. 92  He pays 
particular attention to African farmers’ reluctance to enter into cotton production due to the low 
profitability of the exercise and domestic food insecurity which often accompanied over-
indulgence in cash-crop production.93 
 
There has also been a recent rise in scholarship that explores the colonial state and its 
relationship with African farmers. In his studies of the economic conditions that existed as a 
consequence of the colonial land policies, Ian Scoones examine state policy and its shortcomings 
in the making of ‘native policy’. In showing state misconceptions of African agrarian systems,94 
he illustrates that cattle population density was not always directly responsible for soil erosion in 
many areas, as the colonial authorities always argued.95 Allison Shutt has added a significant 
dimension to studies on the interaction between the colonial state and African cattle owners in 
Southern Rhodesia. In her 2002 examination of the 1938 cattle culling and sales in Gutu and 
Victoria reserves, Shutt exposes some of the loose assumptions made by the Native Affairs 
Department in their views towards African cattle owners.96 Shutt, in the final analysis, reveals 
the tensions that existed within the settler community itself, particularly when it came to African 
affairs.  
 
These works are useful not only in explaining state/African farmer relations, but also in 
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exploring the heterogeneity of opinion within different arms of the state and how they shaped 
state/ farmer relations. As shown in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, differences among state actors 
gave Africans an opportunity to contravene and ultimately reshape policy. Like Shutt, 
Drinkwater also explores fractures within the state in the formulation and implementation of 
agricultural policies. He explains that coercive agrarian policies were produced and reproduced 
within state bureaucracies despite their repeated failures, arguing that the state was often unable 
to understand the working of African agriculture, and instead sought to “impose technical 
solutions that failed in their own terms and met with repeated resistance.”97 These studies are 
informative in the examination of African production of dairy products, and how they responded 
to colonial policy towards dairy farming, the commercial aspect of which was tailored by the 
state to develop as an exclusive settler enterprise. The major limitations with these studies, 
however, is that they do not show change, in both policy and farmer responses, over time. This 
thesis seeks a longer understanding of the imperatives that influenced change and continuity in 
policy using the dairy industry, itself a neglected area in Zimbabwe’s agrarian historiography. 
 
The position of the white farming community in post-colonial Zimbabwe has received significant 
scholarly attention. Selby’s doctoral thesis demonstrates that the influence of the white farming 
community during the 1980s was overestimated, while emphasizing that the farmers themselves 
were not a homogeneous political group.98 While his study illuminates the relations between 
white farmers and the post-colonial state from an organisational point of view, this thesis 
explores colonial state/farmer relations from an industrial perspective. Rory Pilosoff has recently 
written a moving historical account of white farmers’ voices in Zimbabwe within the context of 
the constantly shifting socio-economic and political dispensations between the 1970s and 2005.99 
Pilosoff captures the nature of white farmer voices together with the social and political 
imperatives that shaped them. This thesis seeks to add to this body of literature by examining 
farmers’ (both white and black) interactions within a particular industry and how this interaction 
shaped policy within the local political economy and the international economic system. 
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The international dairy context 
In the absence of many historical works on colonial Zimbabwe’s dairy industry, and with the 
desire to eschew an ersatz sense of exceptionalism, this thesis draws on comparative 
international studies, particularly from African and commonwealth countries. In his article on 
Kenyan dairy cattle development W.T. Conelly focuses on colonial era livestock policy in 
Kenya, especially the introduction of improved dairy cattle in high-potential African farming 
areas.100 In outlining state efforts to import European breeds for cross-breeding purposes during 
the 1950s and the problems which arose out of this programme such as high on-farm mortality 
rates due to disease and poor nutrition, lack of veterinary and extension services, he argues that 
the post-colonial Kenyan dairy cattle policy did not learn from mistakes of the colonial era.101 
F.E. Ogbimi and A.A. Oyawale make a similar argument with regards to south-western Nigeria, 
describing the indiscriminate importation of animals into the country after independence, 
regardless of the lessons of a similar colonial policy which led to high cattle losses to diseases 
and poor feeding. 102  The two case-studies offer illuminating comparisons with Southern 
Rhodesia on colonial breeding policy. As chapter 3 demonstrates, Southern Rhodesian dairy 
breeding policy was predicated on the use of both imported stock and local breeds. 
 
Bert Theunissen’s studies on cattle breeding cultures in the Netherlands give useful insights into 
the dynamics that shaped dairy cattle breeding systems in that country. Theunissen traces dairy 
cattle breeding culture in the Netherlands, which he argues was more an art than a science 
because of farmers’ disregard of genetics in preference of physical appearance. He argues that 
the development of the ‘modern Friesland’ until the 1940s was an attempt by breeders and 
farmers to hold on to the high yielding breed while making it less susceptible to bovine 
tuberculosis. 103  However, Theunissen observes that the struggle between the “traditional 
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approach” of using cows’ physical appearance, and the use of genetics to cattle breeding came to 
a deadlock from the 1940s to the 1960s owing to stagnating milk yields. It was not until the 
1970s that Dutch farmers abandoned the use of physical appearance and embraced the American 
Holstein – a cross bred ‘cousin’ of the traditional Dutch Friesian. Consequently, milk yields 
began to rise after 1970.104 However, as happened in the Netherlands itself, this breed began to 
succumb to bovine tuberculosis in most countries that imported it.105 These works are vital to the 
development of colonial dairy cattle breeding policy in colonial Zimbabwe in that the Friesian 
developed to be the most popular dairy breed in Southern Rhodesia, due in part to its high milk 
yielding capabilities, and largely owing to its perceived compatibility with Rhodesian 
environmental conditions. These changes, as noted in chapter 6, provide a platform on which to 
critique Southern Rhodesian breeding policy during the immediate post-Second World War 
period, when the country desperately needed to expand local dairy production. 
 
On the development of the dairy industry during the early years of colonial occupation, Lilian 
Mafela’s monograph focusing on colonial Botswana’s dairy sector advance fascinating parallels 
with the development of dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia. Outlining the development 
trajectory of the dairy industry colonial policy, she argues that the cattle industry in colonial 
Botswana was almost completely dominated by beef production, and that “the dairy industry 
arose in Bechuanaland primarily as an alternative to beef production inresponse to South Africa's 
restrictions on the import of cattle from the Protectorate”, and the decline of dairy production in 
the later colonial period can be attributed to “the revival of beef exporting, which undercut the 
Administration's already limited interest.”106 As this thesis illustrates in chapters 2 and 3, the 
development of settler dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia during the early years was intricately 
linked to developments in the beef industry. Although Southern Rhodesian colonial policy in 
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general drew much from neighbouring South Africa, it is rather surprising that published 
material on the history of dairy farming is lamentably thin.107 
 
Besides African case studies, this study draws on concepts from commonwealth states. This is 
vital because, like other British settler colonies, Southern Rhodesia was one of the few territories 
that were ear-marked for European settlement. M.A. Gilmore's doctoral thesis on the causes and 
effects of government policy on initial development and establishment of agricultural industries, 
particularly the dairying, maize and tobacco sectors, on the Atherton Tablelands of Australia is 
important in this respect. 108  She examines the role of the state in the establishment and 
sustenance of initially unviable industries through the introduction of a regulated marketing 
system and the various support mechanisms which led to the development of the three industries. 
Her work is particularly important for this study in that, like Southern Rhodesia, the 
establishment of Australia as a British colony and agriculture in particular was predicated on an 
anticipated huge influx of settler immigrants. Also, as this thesis shows, the Southern Rhodesian 
government often modelled dairy regulation along Australian legislation.  
 
Equally informative are David Taylor’s studies on the development and structural changes in the 
English dairy industry between 1860 and 1930 – a period when the industry made the greatest 
strides in the country. Taylor illustrates the great strides that were made in the English dairy 
industry during the period under review as result of the changes made from the Shorthorn, a dual 
purpose breed that also produces beef, to the Friesian, a specialist dairy breed imported from 
Holland at the turn of the 18th century mentioned above.109 In a separate work, Taylor employs 
quantitative evidence to illustrate the changes that occurred in the proportion of milk that was 
converted into cheese, butter and other milk by-products. He argues that, as the industrial 
revolution gathered momentum, more milk was converted, and this necessitated the change from 
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the low yielding dual purpose shorthorns to the high yielding Friesian breed.110 As Southern 
Rhodesia experienced a similar structural change – from butter towards milk from 1939 onwards 
– these studies provide helpful comparisons to the local case, particular as the country was a late-
comer onto the industry. 
 
Research questions and analytical framework 
Whereas there is a considerable number of understandably ahistorical studies by agricultural 
scientists, the literature review above shows that the history of dairy farming in Zimbabwe has 
not been explored in the context of economic and social change. In general, it confirms Shapiro, 
Jesse, and Foltz’s observation that existing historical literature on dairying is currently 
inadequate.111 This thesis focuses on the interactions between the colonial state, white dairy 
farmers and African producers, and how these shaped the trajectory the industry took within the 
context of local socio-economic changes and the vicissitudes of the international market 
conditions. By using the dairy industry as window of analysis, this thesis offers a novel direction 
both empirically and historiographically as very few academics have utilized the material 
generated by the colonial dairy officials and dairy farmers themselves. 
 
Thus, this thesis seeks to find answers to questions that have not hitherto been answered or even 
asked: What were the economic and social factors driving the establishment of the dairy industry 
in Southern Rhodesia? How did dairy farming fit into the overall cattle industry, and the 
agricultural policy in general? What environmental and economic challenges (both locally and 
internationally) stood in the way of state and farmers’ efforts to embark on dairy farming, and 
how were these tackled? How did the state and white farmers interact, and with what impact on 
policy and the general direction of the industry over time? How did settler attitudes (both farmers 
and consumers) towards African dairying shape dairy policy, and with what consequences? How 
did African milk producers respond to overall policy and with what effects on the structure of the 
dairy industry in general? 
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As this thesis explores the intersection of agricultural, environmental and socio-economic issues 
through the lens of the Zimbabwean dairy industry, it is not limited to one grand overarching 
theory. It draws upon ideas from John Wanna and Patrick’s Weller’s “settler-state 
developmentalism” model. In their study of Australian traditions of governance, they held that 
the concept “grew out of the necessity to populate the vast continent and to provide the necessary 
infrastructure and services, and to protect the livelihoods of those who pioneered settlement.”112 
Owing to this obligation, which necessarily meant the subjugation of indigenous peoples’ socio-
economic and political interests, successive Australian administrations from the 19th century not 
only provided publicly funded infrastructure, but also adopted a social and economic system that 
protected farmers from the vagaries of the open market, both locally and internationally.113 This 
interpretation proved helpful for this thesis. As chapter 3 of this thesis demonstrates, dairy 
farming was initially identified as a central industry to the colony’s white settlement plan. 
Throughout the period under review, the state was under pressure not only to provide better 
farming conditions, but to eliminate African dairy marketing due to long held prejudices about 
African suitability for such an undertaking. 
 
This thesis also draws from the concept of the settler culture model, which is closely related to 
settler developmentalism. Fronted by Anna Johnson and Alan Lawson, this concept examines 
settler attitudes towards indigenous people with whom they related and the new environment into 
which they settled. As delineated in chapter 4 and 5, settler attitudes and prejudices towards 
African notions of cleanliness and hygiene (which Timothy Burke has discussed in depth)114 
were responsible for the pressure they brought to bear on the state to eliminate African dairy 
producers from the market. As Johnston and Lawson have explained, there were basically two 
types of colonies: colonies of occupation and colonies of settlement.115 Together with Kenya, 
South Africa and Algeria, Southern Rhodesia is one of the few colonies that were earmarked for 
physical white settlement. Indeed, the immigration of white settlers into Southern Rhodesia from 
all over the commonwealth, especially Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, was 
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viewed by the state as vitally important if the desire to create a ‘white man’s country’ was to 
materialise.116 Although, in some British settler colonies such as Australia, the desire to subdue 
the indigenous peoples in demographic terms was realised, as Mlambo notes, this was never 
accomplished in Southern Rhodesia, with the consequence that the settler and indigenous 
populations (with their different cultural and socio-economic backgrounds) had to co-exist 
within the country.117 In fact, while the former dominated the political and economic spheres of 
the country, at no time during the history of the country did their numbers threaten to equal the 
indigenous population.  
 
Notwithstanding the settler state’s failure to outnumber the local people,both the settler 
developmentalism and settler culture theories apply to Southern Rhodesia to the extent that 
settlers displaced local inhabitants and established a parallel and supposedly higher socio-
economic system. Indeed, a similarity between Southern Rhodesia and Australia may be seen in 
the way settlers often viewed the land they occupied. In Australia they viewed the land as terra 
nullius – land with no owner.118 In line with Sara Berry’s point that the coloniser viewed African 
land as ‘vacant and ownerless”119, Whittlesey, a white farmer himself, contended that many 
whites have affiliated themselves with the land rather than with surrounding societies”.120 Indeed, 
many settler ranchers and dairymen identified themselves with their land and livestock, rather 
than Africans, whom they viewed as nothing more than a source of labour. Accounts by farmers 
both during the colonial and post-colonial period reveal their connection with the land. 121 
Pilossof has observed that farmers mistakenly exonerated themselves of any historical culpability 
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and for having never identified themselves with black Zimbabweans.122 This thesis thus analyses 
how settler developmentalism influenced colonial state policy and settler culture shaped settler 
attitudes of social and cultural superiority towards African producers played out within a dairy 
industry that generally requires a high level of hygiene and cleanliness.  
 
Although this thesis predominantly focuses on the ‘formal’ dairy market from which African 
participation had, by the early 1950s, been curtailed, it demonstrates African responses to 
exclusionary policies within the colonial market. In doing so, it is informed by Subaltern studies, 
which explore the history of marginalized groups on account of their ‘inferior’ class, race or 
gender. In particular, it draws from James Scott’s anthropological studies of the everyday 
struggles of South East Asian peasant communities in view of their marginal socio-economic and 
political position in society.123 This approach, which looks at history from below, is a helpful 
tool for analyzing farmers’ responses to an overbearing colonial state that, although seeking to 
develop the dairy industry, had interests that did not always dovetail with those of settler farmers. 
As Munroe argues, besides seeking to maintain social balance within society, the colonial state 
also sought to generate revenue for itself from farmers as well as to maintain its incumbency in 
power through placating groups it considered as key political constituencies. 124  This 
epistemology will be particularly helpful in understanding the colonial experience of both white 
and African farmers as they related with the state and responded to dairy policy as it evolved. 
Indeed, this thesis disentangles the state and the white farming community, noting that although 
the latter was often at the end of deliberate state patronage, it also often felt short-changed by the 
state in many ways. Although not focusing on the dynamics that played out in the ‘informal’ 
sector in which most African milk trade occurred, this thesis seeks to understand how Africans 
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“flouted, reconstructed, repudiated and remade European life-ways” in their responses to what 
they perceived to be unfavourable policies on dairy production and marketing.125 
 
Methodology 
This dissertation relied mainly on documentary evidence, particulary archival sources and 
secondary sources. Largely because of the dearth in extensive historical works focusing on dairy 
farming in Zimbabwe, my initial focus was centered on analysing existing secondary sources on 
Zimbabwe’s livestock history and agricultural history in general. These included published 
books, dissertations, published articles and unpublished papers. In this way, I was able to identify 
gaps in existing historiography and to ask new questions on the history of Zimbabwe’s livestock 
industry which this thesis seeks to answer. 
 
Archival sources formed the bedrock of this thesis, however. Predominantly gathered from the 
National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), the material included correspondence between 
government officials and white farmers’ organisations and, in some cases, individual farmers. 
This enabled me to understand the nature of the state/farmer interaction and its impact on the 
unfolding development trajectory of the dairy industry during the period under review. Intra-
government correspondence between officials of different government departments concerned 
with dairy farming such as the Department of Agriculture, Department of Native Affairs and the 
the Department of Health. This was particularly useful in understanding the differences in 
opinion and attitude within different state actors and how this played out in the dairy industry. 
Reports of various Committees of Enquiry that were commissioned during the period under 
review and the evidence that was used in arriving at the reports played a vital role in this thesis. 
While the reports gave useful insight into the factors that determined policy, the evidence given 
to the committees was crucial in capturing the voices of farmers, and the extent to which these 
voices shaped development in the dairy industry. This thesis also made extensive use of minutes 
of meetings, memoranda from both the Department of Agriculture and the Dairy Division, which 
offered valuable information on debates within government structures concerning dairy 
development in the country. 
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Whilst archival data from NAZ played an important role in this thesis, it is equally important to 
note that the nature of the colonial archive is inherently problematic. As James Hevia has noted, 
colonial records “report the elaborate colonial attempt to record local space, local property and 
local ideas into imperial terms.” 126  While white farmers’ voices were captured, mainly in 
correspondence mention earlier, this is also limited. However, by reading against the grain, I was 
able to pick out some inconsistences and racial prejudices. As Louise White contends, the 
colonial state’s inability to “fully recode and reterritorialise is revealed in colonial archives and 
teasing out African voices suggests layers of domination that can be stripped away to reveal a 
colonial subject beneath the colonial project Indeed, by reading ‘against the grain’ of the archive, 
I was able to detect occlusions and distortions caused by racial bias, as well as distinguish policy 
inconsistences and even locate some African responses.127 Where the archive is largely silent on 
the African contribution (both rebellious or conformist, or the gamut of responses between these 
two poles), oral interviews were used to capture African thinking and past initiatives. Moreover, 
although the NAZ has a relatively wealthy repository of hitherto unused material on settler dairy 
farming from the post 1923 period onwards, material on the earlier period is relatively thin. 
While this is because dairy farming during this period was less developed as an industry, I had to 
depend on accounts by transport riders, missionaries for the 1890s period (themselves an 
interesting and less biased source on African milk regimes), and reports of the Department of 
Agriculture to gather information. I encountered further restrictions on the use of NAZ 
documents. Given the limited time within which I had to complete the fieldwork process, I made 
efforts to use the institution’s photographing and scanning services. However, as I did not have 
funding specifically for research, I only made partial use of these services on account of the 
highly prohibitive costs associated with the services. 
 
While I attempted to access institutional records, particularly those of the Commercial Farmers’ 
Union which houses all historical data on the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (RNFU) under 
which commodity marketing organisations fell, these efforts were not successful. As a result of 
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the volatile political situation at the time (prior to and shortly after the 2013 national election), 
and the general persecution which the CFU underwent at the hands of the state since the early 
2000s, access to farmers’ documents was denied on account of fears and suspicion that the 
researcher could be a state agent. I am, however, grateful to Eddie Cross, who served within the 
Dairy Committee of the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) during the 1970s, for 
connecting me to former white farmers’ representatives who still had personal files from which I 
could draw. Sadly, a considerable number of such officials and farmers are no longer available 
either due to their demise or emigration. 
 
The other source of primary data was oral interviews. In-depth individual interviews were used 
for their advantage in giving researchers access to “people’s ideas, thoughts and memories in 
their own world”.128 These were used primarily to get the African experience in the production, 
consumption and marketing of dairy products over time. Indeed, the accounts given by the 
predominantly elderly men and women gave an interesting dimension to African beliefs, 
practices and responses to the circumstances obtaining on the dairy market. Admittedly, the 
number of surviving people who could recount their experiences is quite low. Nevertheless, the 
few I was able to locate provided useful information, which was able to give a refreshingly 
different dimension from the colonial narrative. For the 1890s period, however, I was able to 
gain information from informants through oral tradition, information passed from one generation 
to the other.129 Working to my advantage was my ability to converse in both the Shona and 
siNdebele language, since most of these elderly black people could not communicate in the 
English language. In this way, they felt more comfortable. As Hesse-Biber and Leavy observed, 
interviewees who speak their own language and within their environment are better able to 
express “their ideas, thoughts and memories in their own world.”130 
 
Newspapers were also used as a source through which the voices of farmers and government 
could be captured. In particular, the Rhodesia Herald and The Chronicle were useful forums in 
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which public debates played out. White farmers often wrote letters to the editors and occasional 
articles in which they expressed their views. Similarly, officials of the Dairy Division such as 
Cory often authored articles through these newspapers giving advice to farmers and articulating 
government policy. The major problem with these media, however, is the editorial bias which 
often pervades the press leading to misrepresentations and inaccuracies. In the main, state 
newspapers were used to prop the colonial regime and its prejudicial policies against Africans. 
Again, the researcher resorted to reading against the grain to attain a measure of historical 
objectivity and balance.  
 
Structure and layout 
The study is divided into seven chapters, five of which follow the chronological contours of 
colonial Zimbabwean historiography. This chapter has introduced the thesis, giving the scope 
and focus of the study. It has reviewed the existing literature on Zimbabwe’s agrarian history and 
the international dairy industries. It further discussed the analytical framework of the study and 
the research methods employed in carrying out the study. Chapter 2 gives a background to the 
emergence of a colonial dairy industry in Southern Rhodesia. Engaging scholarship on milk on 
the cultural, social and economic symbols of milk production on the African continent outside 
the colonial market system, it focuses on African milk production in some parts of Southern 
Rhodesia, and the manner in which indigenous people positively responded to the advent of the 
colonial market during the 1890s. In discussing the emergence of the colonial dairy market, 
chapter 2 engages existing historiography on the extent to which Africans prospered during the 
first two decades of occupation. It argues that in terms of milk production, African prosperity 
was very short-lived as a result of huge cattle losses that accompanied conquest and bovine 
diseases, with the latter also delaying the development of settler dairying endeavours. It 
illustrates that by 1908, neither the settler nor the African sector had prospered in dairy 
production. 
 
The third chapter discusses the BSAC’s efforts to establish a settler dominated dairy industry 
within the context of the White Agricultural Policy that was espoused in 1908. Using dairy herds 
as a focus, this chapter joins the scholarly debate on Southern Rhodesian cattle breeding policy, 
arguing that scientific issues were more important determinants than racial prejudice in 
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determining breeding policy. The chapter also discusses the environmental, climatic, financial 
and technical factors that impeded the development of settler dairy farming despite the espousal 
of an agricultural policy that was decidedly tailored to benefit settler capitalist agriculture. In the 
main, it argues that the growth in butter and milk output witnessed by 1923 was largely a result 
of the fall in beef prices which pushed cattle ranchers to dabble in dairy production in order to 
boost their income. There were very few dairy cows in the country, and most of the dairy 
products produced during this time were derived from beef herds. The chapter also examines the 
impact of the White Agricultural Policy on African dairy production and marketing, 
demonstrating that African participation on the colonial dairy market between 1908 and 1923 
was further diminished by the displacements that took place after the institution of the Private 
Locations Ordinance and the introduction of increased rents on unalienated lands. However, not 
all African producers were removed from the market, as some who had managed to purchase 
land still provided competition to settler farmers on the market.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the trajectory that dairy farming – both settler and African – took during the 
first decade of self-rule, from 1924 until the mid-1930s. It illustrates that the expansion in butter 
production explained in chapter 3 continued so much that by 1924 Southern Rhodesia was forced 
to dispose surplus butter on external markets at a loss due to the production of predominantly 
low grade butter. Further, this chapter also examines the interventions, particularly the 1925 
legislation and the Milk Recording Scheme, that were taken in the 1920s in order to stem the 
country’s failure to profitably participate on the export market. It demonstrates that the 
legislative intervention, imported as it was from Australian dairy regulations, primarily focused 
on improving the processing and manufacturing side of the industry. Settler assumptions and 
prejudices on African hygiene and suitability for commercial dairying are explored in this 
chapter, since African producers were often blamed for producing low grade products. The over-
arching argument in this chapter is that the state’s inability to regulate settler production 
methods, focusing instead on calls for African exclusion and the manufacturing processes at 
creameries meant that the legislative interventions did not yield the desired results. Longstanding 
problems of inadequate dairy infrastructure, lack of proper dairy cows remained unattended 
throughout the 1920s to the mid-1930s. 
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Whereas chapter 4 discusses the impact of the Dairy Produce Act in stabilising the industry in 
light of the exportation of low quality butter, chapter 5 examines developments in the dairy 
industry during the 1930s within the context of the Great Depression and its aftermath. It 
engages existing scholarship which has examined the general impact of the Great Depression on 
Southern Rhodesia’s agricultural economy by giving a case study of a hitherto unexamined 
industry. It also gives a comparative angle to existing works on interventions that were made in 
the beef and maize industries during the 1930s. It discusses the circumstances leading to the 
formation of the Dairy Industry Control Act (DICB) in 1931 and the passage of the Dairy Act in 
1937. It examines the impact of the DICB, arguing that while it somewhat succeeded in 
cushioning farmers from the impact of the depression, it was unable to improve the quality of 
butter being produced on the farms, hence the interaction between the state and settler farmers 
which led to the passage of the Dairy Act in 1937. The Dairy Act, as this chapter demonstrates, 
marked a momentous event in the history of the dairy industry to the extent that it sought to 
eliminate dilettantes from the industry by ushering in increased control on farm operations. 
Further, the legislation virtually outlawed African producers since they were not aided in 
adhering to the stipulations of the legislation. The chapter concludes by examining farmers’ 
responses to the increased control, arguing that in some cases it only served to give life to the 
emergence of an informal and often illegal dairy market. 
 
The sixth chapter examines the outbreak of war, its aftermath and the consequent change in the 
structure and disposal pattern of the dairy industry. Drawing from studies on the impact of the 
Second World War on the food industry locally, on regional and international dairy industries, 
this chapter outlines the impact of increased demand for food supplies from Britain as well as the 
ever expanding local demand for dairy products.  It makes the point that although the Southern 
Rhodesian government and white farmers desired to assist in the imperial war effort through 
exporting butter and cheese to Britain during the war, this proved nearly impossible because of 
the difficulties of exporting during the war and, more importantly, the expanding local demand 
for dairy products which actually resulted in shortages. The chapter also examines the various 
war and post-war interventions that were made to avert shortages. It contends that although some 
ad hoc measures were taken to increase production, the war proved to be a blessing in disguise to 
the extent that the reform process that had been initiated in 1937 had to be intensified in order to 
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meet the new conditions of the war. Moreover, this chapter has also argued that the war-time and 
post war period was characterised by the further underdevelopment of the African milk sector 
through the de-stocking measures that were undertaken in order to boost beef supplies. Finally, 
the chapter outlines the factors that led to the formation of the Dairy Marketing Board during the 
post-war period.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and ties together the major arguments developed throughout. It 
suggests that an understanding of the history of the dairy industry is vital if Zimbabwe is to have 
a stable livestock industry and successfully return to its erstwhile position as a net exporter of 
dairy produce in Southern Africa and beyond. It further argues that ongoing efforts to strengthen 
the small-scale dairy sector, which was neglected duringthe colonial period, may yield better 
results if policy makers learn from mistakes and achievements of the past. Further, it explores the 
need for further research on the dairy industry, particularly on the role of gender in the dairy 
industry, and how the dynamics of labour affected dairy farming. It, finally, points to the need 
for more studies on the 1951 to 1980 period, together with the post-colonial dairy policy and its 
impact. The conclusion to the thesis shows that, as with current developments in the industry, 
dairy farming has moved from periphery to centre, and offers a lens into understanding shifts in 
the country’s agrarian political economy over time. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“This is a land of honey – no milk, bar sour!” African milk regimes and the 
emergence of a colonial order in Southern Rhodesia, c.1890 – 1907 
 
Introduction 
The advent of colonial occupation in Zimbabwe had a profound impact on African livestock 
regimes. While African cattle owners had long been accustomed to predominantly pre-capitalist 
regimes, the emergence of a largely exploitative capitalist system set the stage for intriguing 
encounters between the colonial establishment, the emerging settler community and African 
livestock owners. With much of existing scholarly analysis focusing on the development of the 
colonial beef industry and the role of the indigenous producer,131 very little attention has been 
paid to the dynamics African milk production and consumption and its role in shaping the dairy 
industry from the early days of occupation. This chapter focuses on traditional 132  African 
attitudes and practices with milk, and their response to the emergence of a hegemonic colonial 
order, with its exploitative and prejudicial tendencies. In relation to other African societies, an 
exposition of some African customs and idioms in Zimbabwe shall be made.  
 
Engaging existing scholarship on African peasant prosperity during the early years of colonial 
occupation, this chapter also examines African production and participation on the colonial milk 
market.133 It shall be illustrated that, notwithstanding their eagerness, African milk producers’ 
participation on the early colonial market had become markedly less active by 1908 when 
compared to grain producers. This situation arose mainly as a result of huge cattle losses – to 
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colonial expropriation and livestock diseases – which had a deleterious effect on African milk 
production. The confiscation of African cattle by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), on 
behalf of settlers and on its own behalf, was done in an effort to launch a settler cattle industry 
from the mid-1890s onwards. However, successive livestock diseases, which affected both the 
settler herd and African livestock, made the establishment of an early and robust cattle industry 
impossible.  
 
A historiographical overview of cattle and milk regimes in African societies 
The accumulation of cattle in most African societies has been regarded as key to any family’s 
socio-economic, and in some instances, political standing. In as much as cattle had a symbolic 
value, there also existed customs and symbols associated with milk production and consumption. 
This section makes an examination of the subsistence and symbolic role of milk in the social and 
economic milieu of traditional African life. In the absence of any substantial archival holdings or 
in-depth published historical material on indigenous milk traditions on pre-colonial and colonial 
Zimbabwe, oral interviews provided much of the information.  
 
As the social and economic place of cattle generally, and milk in particular in African societies 
has generated intense discussion and debate among historians and anthropologists, there are 
several case studies on which this study draws. The debates were inspired by Melville 
Herskovits’ pioneering work on east and southern African societies’ relationships with cattle. 
Writing in 1926, he argued that the value of cattle was viewed mainly in religious and cultural 
terms.134 As he described it, this ‘cattle complex’ consisted of a strong attachment to cattle which 
manifested in the general reluctance among people to slaughter them except for ritual purposes 
(which also meant a reluctance to sell them on the new settler markets or regulate them in 
accordance with colonial policy).135 
 
Following up on Herskovits’ views, a number of anthropological studies emerged focusing on 
the existence of the ‘cattle complex’ in individual societies. Studies by Frankel and Moss on east 
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African societies, the Maasai and Bahaya respectively, offer support to Herskovits’ model.136 
With reference to colonial Zimbabwe, Holleman argued that cattle among both the Ndebele and 
the Mashona, were considered to be of almost equal importance with humans, as they could be 
used in exchange for wives or for the payment of restitution in cases of murder and other social 
crimes.137 Indeed, such views gained currency among scholars, colonial authorities and settlers 
as they sought to explain African resistance in disposing of their cattle during the colonial 
period. In fact, some of the scholars also acted as officials in the colonial establishment. For 
instance, shortly after retiring from his position as Chief Native Commissioner in Southern 
Rhodesia, the aptly named Bullock penned a scathing attack on Africans for accumulating 
livestock to the point of what he perceived to be economic irrationality. He stated that “the 
religious and social significance” attached to cattle by  Africans was not “in accord with our 
view that cattle are kept simply to supply us with milk and meat, and to these ends, purchase and 
sale should be untrammelled by any clogs on trade.”138 
 
This view, however, has come under increasing attack from mid century by some scholars for its 
prejudicial stance against African livestock regimes. In his 1957 ethnographic study of the Pakot 
of Kenya, Harold Schneider argued that “more extensive subsistence and exchange use of cattle 
is evident than is usually acknowledged” by the proponents of the ‘cattle complex’ theory.139 In a 
more recent study, John and Jean Comaroff, adopting the Marxist commodity and capital model, 
posited that cattle among theTshidi Barolong, a Tswana people, were commodities which acted 
as a form of currency in the exchange of goods. In their words, cattle were “a medium of 
transformation, in a total economy of signs and practices, between a material economy of things 
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and a moral economy of persons.”140 For them, cattle were a form of capital which could be used 
to access other scarce commodities. In a study of South Africa’s Transkei region during the 
1960s, Gibert Rutman and David Werner argue that livestock accumulation was profitable to 
individuals insofar as cattle purchases were Africans’ most readily available investment 
opportunity.141 In his materialist study of pre-colonial and colonial African cattle regimes in 
Southern Rhodesia, Mtetwa dismisses the cattle complex theory as a myth, arguing that 
Africans’ reluctance to sell their cattle on the colonial exchange market owed to the 
exploitatively low prices the system offered to indigenous sellers.142 
 
Some scholars have shown that although cattle were used in ritual life of traditional societies,143 
the main value which was attached to cattle was economic. Beach, whose study stretches back to 
the Mutapa and Torwa states’ cattle economies from the16th century, notes that cattle were not 
accumulated only for their social importance, but were equally important both for their value in 
the provision of labour, meat and milk. He adds that cattle were useful as a medium of exchange, 
particularly in lobola (marriage) negotiations as well as in the acquisition of grain during 
droughts and other goods from traders during the 19th century.144 J. Holleman has discussed the 
role of cattle in Shona customary practices, elaborating the role of the steer and the cow in 
marriage ceremonies. 145  Similarly, H. Aschwanden has also illustrated the role of cattle, 
particularly the bull in funeral customs and rites and in ancestral worship.146 
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The Ndebele have been categorised as pastoralists, although like the Shona-speaking 
Changamire Rozvi state, which influenced them in many ways, they were also agriculturists.147 
Cattle were also regarded as an important asset, and the king had ultimate control of all cattle in 
the kingdom, and all the spoils gained from raiding excursions were similarly surrendered to 
him. Palmer states that although beef was a part of the Ndebele diet, cattle were not regularly 
slaughtered, except on ceremonial occasions.148 However, the fact that the cow was a treasured 
possession whose disposal for whatever purpose was discouraged should not be misconstrued to 
mean that its supposed mystic value outweighed its subsistence value.  
 
Cattle thus assumed a very important but varied socio-economic status in most societies in the 
country, and, concomitantly, one who acquired more cattle assumed a high status. Indeed, among 
both the Shona and Ndebele “if you have a kraal of cattle, you can say that you have all 
power.”149 This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the reluctance by African 
societies to part with their livestock suggests some form of a religious or socio-cultural complex. 
In the absence of money as a form of currency, cattle were stored as a form of economic capital, 
which could be relied on to purchase other goods which could not be produced locally. When 
economic circumstances made it necessary, cattle were disposed of in order to meet certain 
economic demands. Indeed, both the Shona and the Ndebele did exchange some of their cattle 
for grain during years of crop failure, hence, in the last resort, the cow was an insurance against 
crop failure.150 P. Stigger has shown that cattle were bartered to missionaries and traders prior to 
1890, and to newly settled settlers after 1890. 
 
African milk complex? 
Although little has been written on the milk culture in the traditional sector of Zimbabwe, a 
considerable amount of literature on other African countries exists. In his anthropological study 
of the customs Beja people in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Seligmann outlines the customs pertaining 
to the milking processes, preservation and consumption of milk and its by-products among the 
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Beja people.151 Christopher Taylor’s work on Rwanda, which makes an exposition of social and 
even therapeutic uses of milk in traditional (pre-colonial) Rwandan society, argues that milk 
motifs are central to Rwandan myths among nearly all its ethnic groups.152  Drawing from 
Taylor’s study, Paul Bjerk’s recently published work focuses on the role of milk in the Zulu 
political philosophy under King Shaka.153 Drawing evidence from the Stuart Archive where a 
number of experienced informants volunteered information, Bjerk argues that the “pattern of 
symbolism ...surrounding the meaning of milk points to an equation between milk and power”, 
and that the political uses of milk were intimately related to similar uses for semen. This suggests 
that these substances had some ritual equivalency.”154 For Bjerk, the equation of milk with 
power correlates with the logic in Herskovits ‘cattle complex’.155 Kag Arhem’s study on the food 
symbolism among Kenya’s Maasai people also focuses on the cultural connotations of milk, 
meat, and blood among the pastoralist societies, positing that, beyond its dietary value, the 
consumption of milk was steeped in deep socio-cultural symbolism.156 
 
Notwithstanding the useful insights they give on the workings of milk in African societies, the 
proponents of the ‘milk complex’ argument do little to show the economic and dietary uses of 
milk in society’s quotidian life. The net effect of this has been the over-mystification of milk and 
subsequent relegation of its material and practical importance outside its symbolic meaning to 
the fringes. Schneider’s study of the Pakot society in Kenya, however, offers some refreshing 
balance on the place of milk in African society. While he acknowledges that there existed 
“various taboos surrounding milk, and that there were certain sacred qualities associated with 
milk and ritual meat157, he concludes that most of the milk from cows and goats was consumed 
without ritual or any other complications. The overall impression given was that milk production 
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was largely important for subsistence purposes.158 By focusing on the symbolic and economic 
uses of milk in traditional Zimbabwean society, this study seeks to go beyond the polarising and 
increasingly unproductive debates that view milk either as a mystical resource whose 
consumption was laden with many symbolisms, or merely as a vital foodstuff whose prime value 
was found in its nutritional and economic value.  
 
It is important to understand that, like culture in general, patterns of milk production and 
consumption were neither static nor generalised geographically. Indeed, they were as varied as 
the ethnic groups in the country, and, in response to the shifting socio-cultural and economic 
circumstances, they mutated periodically. 19th century Southern Africa was characterised by 
huge population movements mainly as a result of the Mfecane. Two groups of people, the 
Ndebele and Shangaan, fleeing Shaka, settled in the area of Southern Rhodesia, and another, the 
Ngoni, passed through the region.159 These population movements increased African interaction, 
not only with European explorers and missionaries from the 1850s, but also among African 
societies themselves. The migration of Mzilikazi from Shaka’s Zulu kingdom in the 1840s and 
the subsequent establishment of his Matabele kingdom in the south western parts of present day 
Zimbabwe altered the socio-economic and political dynamics in surrounding societies. There can 
be little doubt that it resulted in the cross-pollination of ideas which helped to reshape local cattle 
culture and practices. While the impact of these migrations may not be quantified owing to the 
paucity of reliably quantifiable data, it is clear that the establishment of the Ndebele kingdom 
facilitated the dissemination of some elements of the Zulu cattle culture among the Ndebele and 
those groups that were absorbed into the kingdom. This chapter will focus on the Ndebele 
regimes and nearby Karanga societies. 
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Idioms of milk production and consumption in the African sector 
The value of cattle derived from its many utility uses, and, together with beef, milk was one of 
the important benefits of keeping cows. A mature cow, whose average life expectancy ranged 
between sixteen and twenty, could calve every year from the time she was three years of age.160 
This meant that to cattle owners, milk was available virtually every year. Largely because of its 
dietary vitality, milk was viewed as a ‘complete’ and ‘pure’ liquid that was important for its 
nutritional value. With milk being the first food a newly born baby is fed on exclusively, the 
image of milk as both complete and pure seems to have been projected onto milk from the cow. 
This has been captured in some Shona and Ndebele proverbs and idioms. For instance, the Shona 
proverb ‘chakanaka chakanaka mukaka haurungwi’, which metaphorically mean that some 
things are so perfect they need no spicing, literally evoke the image of milk – both in its natural 
taste and nutritional qualities – as being so pure and  complete that it needs no artificial 
spicing.161 Similarly, the Ndebele imagined milk as a precious substance that was as pure as it 
was life giving. This may be captured in popular Ndebele adages: ‘ugeza ngochago’ which, 
when literally translated, mean that ‘one bathes in milk’, but metaphorically connotes that one is 
living in abundance.162 In the same vein, when a bad incident spoiled a good event or experience 
it was quite common for people to say ‘impukane iwele echagweni’ (a fly has fallen into a glass 
of milk).163 
 
The role of milk in the incwala ceremony reveals some interesting aspects of Ndebele 
imagination of milk. 164  Held annually during the time of the first fruits, the feast was an 
important occasion within the Kingdom during the 19th century. Thomas Morgan Thomas, a 
Welsh missionary who spent considerable time observing the Ndebele way of life from the 
king’s palace, noted that izunduna (the king’s aides) poured fresh milk for consumption by 
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young boys. After a period of three days, hot fresh milk mixed with charcoal was splashed onto 
the young boys’ mouths and limbs, to “invigorate their knees.”165 In this way, milk prepared at 
the king’s palace was used to ‘strengthen’ young men for life and, more importantly, the defence 
of the kingdom. This dovetails with Bjerk’s analysis of the Zulu kingdom, where milk was a 
symbol of power, and whose distribution symbolised the flow of power from the king to his 
subjects.  
 
Just as Taylor has shown for Rwandan pre-colonial society, milk was also used for therapeutic 
purposes among the Karanga and Ndebele during the pre-colonial era. Largely because of its 
supposed purity, milk was regarded as a cleansing agent – one that could rid the human body of 
physical and spiritual impurity and infirmity. It was not uncommon for a person suffering from a 
stomach ailment to drink fresh milk, as it was believed that fresh milk had a cleansing effect on 
human bowels. This belief was partly derived from human experience, as well as the observation 
that, due to the high levels of lactic acid in recently calved cows, young calves developing 
diarrhoea shortly after a sustained intake of milk. Further, drinking of donkey milk was, and still 
is, believed to be an effective remedy for measles, while goat milk was believed to heal 
tuberculosis.166 Traditional healers, and, later, syncretic African independent churches use milk 
as part of concoctions for cleansing purposes to banish bad luck and to reverse curses. In fact, 
there are many therapeutic uses to which milk, from any source other than the cow were used. In 
this case, as in pre-colonial Rwanda, one may state that besides its dietary value, milk was 
considered a life giving force. For this study, however, particular attention shall be paid to 
bovine milk, and the material and symbolic connotations in its consumption.  
 
Although the milking process, owing to different cultures, may have differed from society to 
society, and indeed, from family to family, it was usually done inside the kraal – a practice that 
was disparaged by colonial officials as unhygienic. Milking itself was done by herd boys or male 
members of the family, while the processing and preservation of the same was done by women. 
In very rare circumstances were women and girls allowed to milk cows. Indeed, the assumption 
was that herd boys and other male members of the family best understood the individual cows’ 
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behaviour.167 Thomas observed that the milking process within the king’s palace was exclusively 
done by herd boys, who skilfully ‘charmed’ the cow into releasing milk, before surrendering the 
milk to the king’s female children for preservation and preparation of amasi.168 
 
In most cases, milking was done in the morning, just before the cattle were released for the 
pastures. The calves, which were separated from their mothers in the evening and spent the night 
in a separate kraal for cattle, were allowed back to their mother just before the milking process. 
Since cows were known to exercise agency – being able to withhold milk to reserve it for their 
calves – the cows were allowed to suckle briefly, and the milker would start milking onto a 
container when he felt the cow had begun to ‘release’ the milk. When the milk began to dry, the 
calf would be summoned again to suckle, only to be stopped when it was felt that the cow had 
begun to yield, the process would be repeated: 
The calf is led to its mother and allowed to draw the milk, when the boy beating it 
away stoops down under the cow, and placing a wooden vessel between his knees, 
he milks, while a smaller boy keeps the disappointed calf away. Should the cow 
refuse to give her milk, the calf is allowed a drop more, and again driven away, the 
milker in the mean time whistling and vociferating in the most indescribable 
manner, to charm the cow.169 
This method of milking was consistent with what Stanely Hyatt, a trader who moved from Natal 
to Mashonaland towards the end of the 19th century had observed among Zulu cattle keepers. 
Upon observing milking patterns in Mashonaland, Hyatt remembered seeing similar milking 
techniques in South Africa.170 He could not comprehend the manner in which the African milker 
related with the cow and the calf in ‘bargaining’ for more milk. Bemused by the behaviour of 
both the milker and the milked, he stated:  
for some extraordinary reason, the cattle in South Africa will not yield milk, unless 
the calf has first had a suck. Really, the man is far more to blame than the beast. 
The custom is a native one, but, as usually happens, the Afrikanders have adopted it 
slavishly, and now regard it as one of their own. They never try to break through it, 
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in any way, and the cattle, with some sense of the foolish habit bred in them, expect 
to have it observed.171 
Interestingly, some cows were known to be ‘liberal’ in giving the milker, while others, called 
izigqala in siNdebele, were know to be ‘conservative’ in the manner in which they withheld milk 
for the offspring, regardless of how many times they were milked.172 
 
It was not uncommon for herd boys to milk cows during the day in the bush where they herded 
cattle in an act the Ndebele called ukuhleza (milking into the mouth). In many cases, herd boys 
by-passed the use of a container squirting milk directly into their mouths. 173  This mostly 
occurred without the knowledge and permission of elders, as (if done excessively) it led to the 
malnutrition of calves. An interesting scenario emerges out of the interaction between the cattle 
owners, herd boys and the cow: while the cows were still within the homestead, before being 
released to the pastures, the milk they carried belonged to the family (even calves would not 
have access to the cows), and after their release in the morning, whatever milk they produced 
was reserved for the calf. As shown above, cows were not passive respondents while humans did 
the milk ‘budget’; they had the capacity to hold on to their milk. For the herd boys, however, the 
milking of cows at pasture, although considered uncouth, was one of the professional benefits of 
spending days with cattle.174 Feeling left out of the distribution process of milk, they found 
subtle means of accessing a resource in which they felt they had a stake. They thus deployed 
James Scott’s ‘Hidden Transcripts’ in the manner in which powerless members of society chip at 
the hegemony of the powerful through everyday acts of deviance.175 Hence, while the drinking 
of milk by Maasai herders and warriors was a public ritual which had its own symbolism, it was 
not recognised as a permissible practice among the Ndebele and Karanga people.176 
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A gendered division of labour existed in the milking and processing of milk during the pre-
colonial period. Whereas milking was a preserve of male members of the family, the processing 
and preparation was almost invariably done by women. Although most of the milk was 
fermented, fresh milk could also be used in the preparation of certain agricultural products. For 
instance, fresh milk was added to soften as well as to add flavour to pumpkins 
(amajodo/manhanga).177 However, the proportion of milk used for this purpose was quite low. 
Traditionally, fermented milk (amasi/mukaka wakakodzekwa)178 was the most important type of 
milk consumed among both the Shona and Ndebele. As the interviewees noted, although these 
traditions dated back to pre-colonial times, they continued to be practiced throughout the 
colonial and post-colonial periods.  
 
Fermenting was a vital form of food preservation in the African traditional sector. These 
included non-alcoholic cereal-based beverages (mahewu, tobwa and mangisi), alcoholic 
beverages from sorghum or millet malt (doro/utshwala and chikokiyana) distilled spirits 
(kachasu) and fermented fruit mashes (mukumbi). Indeed, a growing body of scientific literature 
focussing on the role of fermented foods in traditional African societies has emerged. For 
instance, in scientific analyses of different types of fermented foods are produced in Zimbabwe’s 
rural sector, Gadaga, Mutukumira, Narvhus and Feresu show how traditional fermenting 
methods are effective in preserving perishable foodstuffs.179 In a separate study of the chemical 
properties of amasi, Mutukumira argues that the traditional systems, through the use of clayey or 
wooden containers, help preserve ferment milk better than the industrial use of metal 
containers.180 E. Karenzi, A. Mashaku, A. Nshimiyimana, B. Munyanganizi, and P. Thonart, 
which focus on the production of fermented milk in Rwanda shows the changes that have come 
with the preparation of  fermented milk (locally referred to as kuvuguto) in modern dairies using 
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‘modern’ handling facilities and non-indigenous breeds.181 Although these scientific studies laud 
the importance of the use of modern methods of fermenting foods, they nevertheless 
acknowledge that traditional means, which are also characterised by the accumulation of 
microbial metabolic products like lactic acid, ethyl alcohol among others, are also effective 
means of preserving food, particularly milk.182 
 
The making amasi was a protracted process, often lasting up to four days. The first stage 
involved pouring raw milk onto a clay container and leaving it to partially ferment overnight. 
The partially fermented milk would have cream removed from it the next day. The partially 
fermented milk, named zifa in the Karanga dialect, was steered using a musika (steering spoon). 
It would then be poured into a special clay pot (chingo), where it was kept under high 
temperatures for three or four days.183 On each of these days, a residual liquid drawn from 
fermented milk (mutuvi/umlaza in Shona and siNdebele respectively) was drained from the 
fermenting milk while the zifa drawn from the previous day was added onto the fermenting 
milk.184 After a period of about four days, the fermented milk, which would have become semi-
solid by this time, was deemed ready for consumption. 
 
This milk could be consumed in a number of ways. Most commonly, it was consumed with 
maize meal (sadza), which was, and still is, the staple food in most Zimbabwean communities. 
Amasi was mixed with cooked sorghum meal, to make a meal called mavhuvegwa.185 Sorghum 
meal was first mixed with boiling water, after which milk would be added onto the mixture, to 
form a thick dough, which would be further heated and steered until a fine mixture was obtained. 
Amasi could also be eaten as it was after the consumption of a staple, hence acting as a type of 
dessert. This meal, however, was generally prepared for elderly family members. 
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While fermented food generally tends to develop a sour taste, amasi186 could only be considered 
good if it did not develop a lingering sour taste. Although early white traders and later, settlers 
often referred to amasi as ‘sour milk’, the milk did not develop a sour taste when properly 
prepared. Sourness was viewed as a sign of a process gone wrong. Given the painstaking nature 
of preparing amasi, cases of sour or watery milk were not uncommon. Indeed, some women 
developed a reputation of preparing solid, tasty milk, while others were notorious for being bad 
‘brewers’ of amasi.187 The result of this was that a woman’s ability or otherwise to prepare good 
amasi became associated with her social capital and her status as a “good wife”. Sthabisiwe 
Ngwenya, an elderly woman from the Mbembesi area just outside Bulawayo, stated that: 
              Growing up as a young girl [in the 1930s], preparing amasi was one of the first 
things my mother and aunts taught from a young age. In addition to preparing 
istshwala and good meat, I was told to watch closely when they prepared amasi. 
They often told me that the preparation of good amasi was one sure sign of 
determining a girl’s preparedness for marriage or her social background.188 
Ngwenya’s narrative, however, becomes easier to understand when one considers the fact that a 
girl who had not mastered the art of preparing staple dishes was invariably deemed as 
unprepared for marriage. Once a girl married into a family, it was expected that she would be 
able to manage a kitchen in which she prepared meals for her spouse, children and the extended 
family. 189  Preparing amasi was such a difficult task that it was used as a proxy for the 
measurement of overall wifely competence. 
 
Another important issue raised in Ngwenya’s narrative, in addition to the importance of a 
woman’s ability to prepare food generally, and amasi in particular, is the constructed relationship 
between a woman’s inability or ability to prepare good milk and her economic background. As 
indicated earlier in this section, cattle were an important form of wealth and indicator of one’s 
socio-economic position in society. Thus, to the extent that cattle were not evenly distributed 
among families with the politically and materially powerful in society enjoying a virtual 
monopoly over cattle ownership, the availability of milk and its by-products also followed a 
                                                     
186
 The term amasi is used both in the siNdebele and Zulu languages.  
187
 Interview with Sthabisiwe Ngwenya, born 1930, Bulawayo, 23 July 2013. 
188
 Interview with Sthabisiwe Ngwenya, born 1930, Bulawayo, 23 July 2013. 
189
 Interview with Sthabisiwe Ngwenya, born 1930, Bulawayo, 23 July 2013. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
50
similar pattern. Powerful cattle-owning families accessed milk much more easily than poor 
families who owned few or no cattle.  Under the old system whereby wealthier families loaned 
cattle to poor families for temporary use, which the Karanga called kuronzera, the beneficiary 
was allowed to milk the cows for family use, in addition to utilising cattle for manure and 
draught power.190 Hence, as in the Zulu kingdom, the flow of milk in society became a symbol 
through which social and political power could be flexed and distributed by powerful individuals 
in society. Bjerk has argued that, the control of the flow of milk through Zulu society was the 
preserve of the chief, who was the in charge of all cattle, and through his patronage system 
“trickled down to among his attendants, wives, and officers, and the rest carried out into the 
society through the cattle, first to the boys of the amabutho and the rest into the homesteads.”191 
While the control and flow in the Zulu kingdom began with the king, in traditional Southern 
Rhodesian societies the transfer was largely in the hands of wealthy and politically powerful 
individuals who controlled cattle in society. 
 
Amasi was not easily accessible to everyone in society. Although no rules existed concerning 
restrictions regarding who could and who could not partake of it, it was often reserved for adults, 
particularly husbands or given as special gifts to sons-in-law.192 This practice was particularly 
common among the Ndebele speaking people and the Karanga people whose language and 
culture somewhat borrowed syncretically from nearby Ndebele communities.193 Most Ndebele-
speaking elderly women interviewed concurred that amasi was a special delicacy which was 
mostly served to spouses and important relatives. For instance, Skhangele Mkandla, from the 
Filabusi district of Matabeleland, noted: 
Dating back to the times of our ancestors, before the arrival of the whites, amasi has 
been an important element of our Ndebele diet. Although it was common for all 
cattle-owning families to prepare it, not everyone had regular access to it. It was 
often served to spouses, important visitors, sons-in law and neighbours with whom 
we shared close mutual relations. In many cases, amasi was seen as a way of 
strengthening relations among closely related people in society.194 
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This system was to be found in societies in Mberengwa, a Karanga speaking people whose 
language and culture has, however, been heavily influenced by its proximity to Matabeleland. 
Musaengana Machita, for, example, explained that fermented milk was hardly sold among 
families in exchange of any commodity, but was distributed by those who possessed enough 
cattle to produce sufficient milk for their own needs to those families with whom they shared 
close social relations either through kinship or friendship.195 A closer analysis of the importance 
of amasi in the gift economy among in-laws reveals some interesting dynamics. The common 
system where amasi was presented as gift to a son-in-law or his parents was, in effect, a 
reciprocal gesture aimed at showing gratitude for the payment of lobola (bride price), which was 
generally charged in the form of steers and cows.196 Difford Sibanda explained it thus:  
In the old days, before money was a factor in negotiations, lobola was charged in 
the form of beasts, and at least one of the beasts had to be a cow. If a son-in-law 
had paid a significant portion of the bride price, then we would often present him 
with amasi each time he visited, or we would often send it to his family, with the 
fact that he would have contributed to enlarging our head at the back of our 
minds. Younger generations still do it, but they do not know the real essence of 
sending amasi to the son-in-laws’ families. In fact, it was common for elders to 
offer to look after a son-in-law’s children if he had paid the bride price, because it 
was known that they would be nourished by milk from their father’s cattle.197 
 
Similarly, it was considered a taboo for a relatively new son-in-law to accept amasi form his in-
laws. Culturally, he was obliged to refuse that milk until such a time when he was sufficiently 
‘acquainted’ with his in-laws through a ceremony called ukukhululwa ibhatshi (literally 
translated to have one’s jacket removed), which was often done after he had fully serviced his 
bride price debt. 198  By declining amasi before the ceremony, the son-in-law would be 
acknowledging his lobola debt, which precluded him from consuming milk from in-laws.199 
Thus, the flow of fermented milk in society was important in cementing social ties and kinship. 
This has comparative resonance in other African societies, fitting with Taylor’s ethnographic 
study of the role of fluids such as milk, blood and water in traditional Rwandan society. He 
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postulates that bodily fluids (blood, semen and maternal milk) and social fluids (cow’s milk, 
sorghum, beer and porridge) were metaphorically linked with the traditional Rwandan economy, 
which was characterised by a constant circulation of gifts, including beer and bride wealth.200 In 
this way, the flow of milk was important in the creation and perpetuation of social, and in some 
cases political camaraderie. As in Rwanda, the Ndebele and Karanga constructed social 
relationships through the exchange of milk in celebration of ties, hospitality, and ordinary social 
interaction. 
 
Besides amasi, milk was also consumed in other forms. For instance, the residual flavoured 
liquid (mutuvi/umlaza) that was drained from fermenting milk during the preparation of amasi 
was generally despised, and was reserved for young boys and herd boys. They would collect this 
liquid, which was either yellowish or cream in colour; mix it with fresh milk just drawn from the 
cow at the kraal.201 In addition to its sour taste, this liquid was not deemed useful from a 
nutritional point of view. This type of milk was seldom consumed by humans within the home; it 
was often mixed with food reserved for the feeding of cats and dogs.202 The cream separated 
from fermenting milk was, however, used for a couple of purposes in the homestead. It was 
either used to add flavour in the cooking of vegetables, or the separated cream was dried into a 
semi-liquid, which was used as a body ointment lotion.203 
 
There also existed a number of practices associated with a recently calved cow and its milk. 
Although it is richest in colostrums at this stage, milk from a recently calved cow was considered 
unclean, and was thus prohibited from the homestead. For the first week after calving, the cow’s 
milk was reserved for the herd boys and other young boys in the family. Yellowish in colour and 
dense in texture, this milk was prohibited from entering the homestead, and instead, was boiled 
at the kraal by the herd boys to make a semi-solid substance termed mahlaka (amahlaka in 
siNdebele).204 This would be consumed at the kraal or in some cases, at the pastures while 
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herding cattle. The prohibition of milk into the homestead would last for the first week and a half 
of the calf’s birth.  
 
However, the method of handling such milk differed after a week. Although it would still be 
processed and consumed by the herd boys at the kraal, this time it would be mixed with maize 
meal and boiled, to make dough called mudzamba in Shona (sathiyana in siNdebele). 205 
Although this particular handling of a cow’s early milk could have easily been interpreted as a 
custom that was steeped in superstition, elders knew that this milk was not yet ready for family 
consumption during the first few days of the calf’s life. As mentioned earlier, this kind of milk 
contains a high level of lactic acid, which is too acidic and may thus lead to diarrhoea. In fact, 
the calf itself is easily susceptible to diarrhoea during the first weeks of its life, and cattle owners 
took measures to ensure its intake of milk was regulated.206 
 
Accounts of travellers who arrived just before the colonial occupation of what was to become 
Southern Rhodesia, demonstrate the extent to which African societies had developed systematic 
ways of preparing and utilising milk within their socio-economic circumstances. Adrian Darter, a 
white trader who arrived in Southern Rhodesia a few years before the arrival of the Pioneer 
Column and lived among Africans, acknowledged that milk was predominantly consumed in its 
fermented state, and that amasi was “excellent diet for the sick.”207 Thus, Africans possessed a 
thriving milk economy that was not only based on its social and cultural value, but also by the 
prevailing economic circumstances in a largely pre-capitalist system. Although milk had a high 
cultural value, its importance in the diet, and, as the next section demonstrates, in African 
economies should not be underestimated.  
 
Towards a market-oriented milk economy 
Although pre-colonial African agricultural production was largely subsistence oriented, trade – 
both internal and external – did play a role in local economies. Beach has shown that the pre-
capitalist Shona economy depended on trade – exogenously and endogenously – with merchants 
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and among themselves to satisfy local shortages.208 Eira Kramer has shown that, on the eve of 
colonial occupation, indigenous populations were producing for exchange and traded with 
neighbouring people as well as itinerant merchants with whom they came into increasing contact 
during the last half of the 19th century.209 However, African participation in exchange during the 
pre-colonial phase, unlike the colonial period, was relatively small scale and thus did not 
interfere with pre-colonial agricultural practice.210 This section focuses on the manner in which 
indigenous milk producers were brought into increasingly frequent contact with market forces at 
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. It examines the impact of key 
political and socio-economic factors which defined African participation in the colonially 
induced milk exchange economy. Early efforts by the British South Africa Company and settlers 
to establish a settler herd, from which a dairy industry could be developed, will also be 
examined. 
 
African response to trade, particularly to agricultural market opportunities in the years leading to, 
and immediately after, colonial occupation has been subjected to intense historiographical 
debate. Liberal scholarship, as espoused in William Barber’s The Economy of British Central 
Africa, focussed on African agrarian systems facing the demands of colonial occupation and 
capitalism. Influenced by Lewis’s model of development theory which argues that labour was 
transferred from a low productivity subsistence or indigenous sector to a high productivity 
capitalist or money economy 211 , Barber conceived African agriculture prior to colonial 
occupation as naturally underdeveloped, with Africans being trapped in their old ‘primitive’ pre-
capitalist systems which inhibited them from producing for exchange. For him, the capitalist 
system which the colonial establishment espoused was an ultimately beneficial process, 
spontaneously induced by market forces (rather than imposed by the colonial state).212 For him, 
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increased African movement away from the traditional ‘subsistence’ sector towards the capitalist 
labour market was voluntary. 
 
Lewis and Barber’s theses have been discredited. First was Giovanni Arrighi’s 1970 study of the 
development of Southern Rhodesian colonial political economy, whose focus on labour supplies 
challenged Barber’s conception of “the underdevelopment of the African peoples as an original 
state which the development of a capitalist sector gradually eliminates”.213  Writing from a 
Marxist perspective, Arrighi illustrated that, Africans had begun to respond positively to market 
conditions by producing surplus agricultural goods for exchange by the turn of the 19th century. 
Instead, he emphasized political processes, which often entailed land expropriation, 
expropriation of rents, coerced labour as being responsible for increased African participation on 
the labour market.214 
 
Following up on this were studies by Palmer and Phimister, which illustrated African economic 
enterprise shortly before and during the first two decades of colonialism, only to be curtailed by 
the colonial state’s efforts at promoting European agriculture.215 Phimister argues that, given 
their ‘extensive experience’ in pre-colonial trade, both the Shona and the Ndebele were not only 
receptive to, but actually thrived in the exchange economy during the early 1890s.216 Indeed, 
with the settler community largely preoccupied with mineral exploitation at the expense of 
agricultural activity, African producers positively responded to the burgeoning demand for their 
produce in sprouting towns and mines by increasing their own agrarian activity. While the 
general argument in Arrighi, Palmer and Phimister’s is compelling, they did not disaggregate the 
extent of this prosperity to individual agricultural enterprises. This and the next section will 
demonstrate that, while Africans initially participated on the milk market actively, this was short-
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lived as they lost their livestock to expropriation from 1983 onwards, while the scourge of 
bovine diseases reversed both African and settler attempts to build a strong herd.  
 
From the point of view of dairy production and marketing, African producers indeed attempted 
to defy the impact of colonial land disenfranchisement and positively responded to the market 
opportunities shortly prior to and during the first two decades of occupation. The existence of 
symbolic values in the manner milk was produced, distributed and consumed in the traditional 
socio-economic system, did not prevent Africans from actively participating on the milk 
exchange economy when opportunities arose. Indeed, there is evidence that Africans marketed 
milk to European merchants and transport riders during the late 1880s and early 1890s. When 
compared to the production of grain crops, however, active African milk marketing was short-
lived – lasting only a few years before succumbing to the cattle losses which followed the 1893 
war and cattle diseases from the late 1980s onwards. Consequently, the period between 1890 and 
1908 – generally considered to have been an ‘era of peasant prosperity’ – was not similarly 
successful for milk producers.  
 
When orchestrating the occupation of Southern Rhodesia in 1890, the BSAC, under the 
leadership of Cecil John Rhodes, was driven by the hopes of finding rich mineral deposits, 
especially gold, of the same magnitude as found in South Africa. Richard Hodder-Williams has 
said that white settlement in Southern Rhodesia was originally fired not by any sense of imperial 
mission, but by the prospect of a second Rand developing out of the mineral concessions Rhodes 
had negotiated with Lobengula, the Paramount Chief of the Ndebele.217 The fabled ‘Second 
Rand’ would in turn generate new funds to finance further development, so that farming took a 
back seat. Rochford Maguire, one of the Company’s directors aptly captured the situation in 
1891 thus: “when cattle and gold were in competition, nobody thought of cattle.”218 
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Without any regard for existing African rights and agricultural needs, huge tracts of African 
occupied land were pegged and alienated by the Company and sold to many companies and 
individual settlers at concessional rates. Each member of the Pioneer Column, for instance, 
became entitled to a farm of 1 500 morgen (about 3 000 acres).219 Accompanied by hostile 
administrative ordinances and practices, the alienation of land disturbed African agricultural 
systems, precipitating bitter frustration among Africans. The invasion of Matabeleland by the 
Pioneers in 1893 led to the outbreak of a brief war between the Ndebele and Company agents. 
Shortly after the war, in which the Ndebele were vanquished, a Land Commission was set up by 
the Company to find a solution to the conflicting interests of Africans and Europeans. Pursuant 
to the Commission’s recommendations, the BSAC, through the 1894 Order in Council, allocated 
to the Ndebele two large tracts of land, the Gwaai and Shangani reserves, which covered an area 
of over two million acres.220 Consisting mainly of poorly watered, infertile and Tsetse-infested 
lands, Ndebele themselves had long referred to the two areas as Amagusu Amnyama (Dark 
Forests), where only outcasts and witches could live.221 Like the Maasai in colonial Kenya, the 
Ndebele were cognisant of the environmental dangers associated with their new homelands, and 
they interpreted their banishment to these areas as a ploy to ensure that they lose their livestock 
to diseases.222 The implementation of the 1898 Order in Council, after the 1897 and 1898 Shona 
and Ndebele uprising, saw the creation of reserves in Mashonaland. By the end of 1899, about 16 
reserves, covering about 24 800 000 acres had been established.223 This meant that a significant 
number of Africans, and their livestock were moved onto new environments. 
 
Despite the unimpressive returns accruing from gold mining (as dscribed in chapter 3), the 
BSAC proceeded to establish an administrative system inspired by Victorian industrial principles 
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and values which mirrored settler interests. 224  However, under pressure from the British 
government, which insisted on the preservation of African interests, a separate Native Affairs 
Department (NAD) was established to deal with African issues, and its supervision of African 
affairs lasted nearly 60 years.225 The ensuing governmental system created separate agencies for 
European and African agriculture, European and African education, European and African 
housing, and so on.226 Murray argues that safeguarding African interests involved “maintaining a 
framework of ‘traditional life’ or rather maintaining such features of it as were permissible given 
the context of a settled colony.”227 This sowed the seeds of a dual agricultural system, which, as 
shall become clear in this thesis, had a huge bearing on the fate of African commercial dairy 
farming. 
 
Native Commissioners,who were appointed to superintend all facets of indigenous African 
affairs from 1894 onwards at district level, were asked to demarcate areas ‘suitable’ for African 
habitation throughout Southern Rhodesia. As African administrators, it should be said, Native 
Commissioners, and the NAD in general, often found themselves traversing a tight 
administrative line of balancing what they perceived to be the interests of African producers on 
the one hand, and the demands of both the state and settler community on the other.228 The 
creation of separate administrative units for Europeans and Africans into non-competing groups, 
which was reinforced by the division of land into separate African and European areas, sowed 
the seeds of a dual and conflicted economic system. Diana Jeater has argued persuasively that 
Southern Rhodesian ‘native policy was the product of arguments, debates, and profoundly 
conflicting interests among whites – administrators, missionaries, and settlers – who interacted 
with Africans on a daily basis.229 As shall emerge throughout this thesis, rarely did state officials 
agree on the formulation and implementation of any African dairy policy. 
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In spite of the loss of land, however, developments in the colony within the first two decades 
allowed many Africans not only to continue in their old agrarian systems, but also to increase 
production for the emergent settler markets. After losing their land rights in the 1890s, a 
considerable number of Africans did not move onto the lands reserved for their occupation, 
however. They opted to remain on their ancestral lands either as rent paying tenants or share 
croppers (on European owned land). Those living on as yet unalienated land had to pay hut tax to 
the Company.230 Christopher Youé contended that this phenomenon was a pronounced feature of 
early 20th century settler societies.231 Southern Rhodesian officials reasoned that it would be “a 
very short-sighted policy to remove these natives to the Reserves, as their services may be of 
great value to European occupants.” 232  With very few settlers utilising their land for any 
agricultural purposes, the position of these ‘squatters’ was legally acknowledged through the 
1908 Private Locations Ordinance which regulated the terms of African occupation of European 
land.  
 
The Company and the early settlers’ obsession with the realisation of a highly anticipated but 
elusive fortune from gold mining, their consequent lack of genuine interest in farming and 
continued African occupation of alienated land, coupled with the slow removal from alienated 
land of its traditional occupants, gave Africans a window of agricultural opportunity. Given such 
a scenario, Africans chose to relate to the new economy as peasants rather than as wage 
labourers because, as Arrighi has demonstrated, the effort price of eking out a living as labourers 
on Europeans mines was higher than when they participated as producers.233 Hence, rather than 
gain the income they needed for the payment of taxes and other cash demands exerted upon them 
by the establishment, they swiftly took advantage of emergent local markets and began 
producing a surplus. They sold their produce to white traders and transport riders, who 
themselves had followed the Pioneer Column into the country but had neither ventured into 
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mining nor agriculture. These traders would resell, often at huge profits, the produce on 
European settlements and mines. Himself a trader, Percy Fitzpatrick described the Shona people 
he met in 1891 as: 
              Anxious to barter and quicker to trade and more eager for business than any native 
I have seen. So keen are they on business, and so quick to perceive an opening, 
that they have broken up fresh ground, and planted double crops this year, in order 
to supply the rush of the white men.234 
The Ndebele in the south-western part of the country were equally enterprising, disposing of 
their cattle and sheep in return for cash or some desired consumer goods such as cloth and salt.235 
As the list of their consumer needs increased, Africans looked forward to selling more of their 
produce for cash or in return for such goods as blankets, salt and beads. The Native 
Commissioner for Chilimanzi in 1899 reported that “every year they (Africans) look forward to 
the trading season eagerly for the disposing of their surplus and for the satisfying of the different 
wants.”236 
 
Milk marketing was quite common during the early 1890s. A transport rider, Stanley Hyatt 
recalled visiting African villages from where, in addition to grain and eggs, they could ‘get 
plenty of sour milk.”237 The availability of sour milk for sale is echoed in the account of Darter, a 
trader who operated in the Mashonaland area between 1890 and the mid-1900s. He observed that 
the locals who came to their camp were “anxious to trade”, bringing with them cattle, gallons of 
sour milk and fowls, among other goods.238 He gave a long list of goods which they purchased 
from African producers: 
Natives along our route swarmed the camp, anxious to trade. They brought 
pumpkins, beans, rice, mealie meal, millet meal kaffir corn, kaffir beer, tobacco, 
honey, monkey nuts, gourds, bark-bags, bark-rope, bark string, fowls, eggs, sour 
milk and sweet potatoes.239 
Due to its highly perishable nature, fresh milk was less common on the market; it was first 
fermented and marketed as sour milk. The ultimate consumers of sour milk were African 
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labourers to whom it was distributed by mining capital after purchase from traders, European 
settlers or the traders themselves.  
 
The nature of the trade, it should be underscored, was decidedly aimed at short-changing African 
producers. Indeed, as Phimister argues, traders represented institutionalised raiding of peasant 
produce for the ultimate benefit of the capitalist sector.240 Accounts by European traders reveal 
how they often attempted to manipulate Africans on the market with a view to fleecing them of 
their produce. They often avoided cash transactions, preferring to offer goods of less value in 
exchange. Darter’s account of the relations between Europeans traders and African producers is 
particularly revealing; “money they did not know the value of, not that we had much, neither did 
we care. We bartered with bouilli-beef tins, cartridge-cases, salt sugar and old kit we wanted to 
discard, also copper wire and beads.”241 It was not only market forces at play, the system was 
accompanied by naked violence. As Hyatt recalled of his trading trips: 
               At first the local heathen asked us outrageous prices for the stuff we wanted to 
buy from them. It is the way of the Mashona to be insolent until he is taught the 
danger of that course. They held out for cash at first, and when we offered trading 
goods, demanded a wholly unreasonable measure. However, they soon came to 
their senses….our reputation with the fear of the sjambok spread very quickly, 
and, after a day or so, we had no trouble at all.242 
It would not be correct, however, to imply that African milk producers were simply passive 
victims of European traders’ chicanery and violence. Although, as noted earlier, African 
producers in general were eager to trade, they were also quick to discern and respond to market 
dynamics. Producers would withhold the bulk of their milk from their market, until market 
conditions became favourable. For instance, a European trader stated that Africans would hide 
milk and mealies before sampling the obtaining prices. He added that: 
               If (the producer) finds there is a lively demand for food and milk, he will return to 
the bush, call his caretaker from his hiding place and part with all he has. If his 
supply is greater than our demands, he will go home and consume his produce in 
his own house, returning with more when the milk and mealie market improves.243 
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White aversion to African success on the market, as shall be illustrated throughout this thesis 
was persisted throughout the pre-Second World period, leading to the eventual elimination of 
African participation on the colonial dairy market, as delineated in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Although 
African cattle-owners in some areas responded to the milk market, this did not last long. The 
next section examines the impact of cattle losses and stock diseases. 
 
Decline of African milk marketing and early efforts to build a settler herd, 1893 – 1907 
Although very little was done to promote settler capitalist agriculture during the early 1890s, the 
Company, both on behalf of itself and settlers, had begun to build a sizeable cattle herd by the 
mid-1890s.244The settler herd from which dairy farming emerged was largely founded upon the 
indigenous African cattle breeds. Partly because of lack of the requisite capital to import exotic 
breeds from South Africa and overseas, and largely because of the strength of the indigenous 
breeds in withstanding local conditions, the Company sought to use the indigenous breeds as a 
basis upon which to build the settler herd. Indeed, BSAC reports for the years 1892 to 1894 
confirmed this policy thus: 
That this country is good for cattle is proved by the large herds which were owned 
by King Lobengula, and attention to breeding is all that is required to improve the 
quality of the stock.245 
 
A few years later, the Company reported that, in addition to cheap land with abundant grazing 
lands, “in the native herds there is a good foundation stock available at cheap prices.”246 
 
The building of a settler herd for dairy and beef purposes that began from this period was then 
achieved through processes that led to a depletion of African herds. The observation by the 
Company that indigenous cattle could be obtained for “cheap prices” should not be misconstrued 
to mean that African cattle owners were prepared to dispose of their cattle cheaply. Instead, it 
was a declaration of intent by the Company to acquire African livestock at little or no cost, 
through whatever means possible. Indeed, coercion and brute force were often employed to 
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deprive Africans of their livestock. As noted in the previous section, the sjambok was used to 
force stock owners to ‘sell’ their livestock at low prices.  Samasuwo argues that the settler cattle 
herd was developed as a result of a “protracted and violent process of primitive accumulation” in 
which cattle were forcibly taken from Africans by the BSAC and settler farmers.247 He regards 
the process of occupation itself that began in 1890, and particularly the 1893 War of 
Dispossession that led to the ousting of Lobengula as having been followed by the expropriation 
of cattle from Africans. Once Lobengula had been vanquished in 1893, all cattle were 
expropriated by the Company and distributed either to volunteer troops or settler farmers in both 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland.248 Indeed, H. Weinmann has observed that: 
             It (is often) assumed that they (European farmers) purchased such cattle from the 
Africans but, in addition, considerable numbers of native cattle were acquired by 
European settlers as a result of the defeat of King Lobengula in 1893, and it should 
be mentioned in this connection that the volunteers of the Matabele War were 
promised an equal share of half of the ‘loot’, ie, Lobengula’s 30 000 cattle.249 
 
The 1894 Land Commission declared that all cattle in the hands of Africans (including the 
offspring) before 1893 now belonged to the Company.250 Weinrich has estimated that upwards of 
150 000 head of African-owned cattle were confiscated by the BSAC during the period between 
1893 and 1904.251 Besides cattle given to volunteers, virtually all livestock acquired in this way 
by the Company eventually ended in the hands of settler farmers. A Government Notice in 1895 
announced that the Company intended to sell cattle to bona fide settler farmers at a 
concessionary rate of 50s per head, payable in four instalments over 18 months.252 Most of the 
volunteer troops opted to sell their livestock to big companies or to individuals who wished to 
venture into livestock raising.253 Although some livestock was purchased from the Bamangwato 
in neighbouring Bechuanaland (mainly the Mangwato breed and others such as the Tuli and 
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Nkone) the majority of the cattle in settler herds were of the MaShona and Matabele stock.254 
The ultimate corollary of Company attempts to use the indigenous breeds to build the settler herd 
was the near destruction of African capacity to participate on the milk market.  
 
While a small number of Hereford, Shorthorn, Angus and Friesland bulls had been brought into 
the country from South African territories by 1895, an acute shortage of funds on the part of 
settlers and the high incidence of diseases in neighbouring territories limited the extent to which 
more could be imported.255 The outbreak of redwater and lungsickness in the South African 
provinces of the Orange Free State, Transvaal and the Cape Colony from the late 1890s onwards 
hampered cattle importation from those provinces, while the existence of East Coast Fever in 
Natal led to the total stoppage of importations.256 Restrictions were imposed under the Lung 
Sickness Ordinance of 1900, which provided for the mandatory quarantine, testing and 
inoculation process for all cattle coming from the affected provinces. Further regulations were 
introduced in 1901, and the main import of these was to ensure “the better regulating and 
restricting the movement of cattle with a view to prevent the spread of diseases, and the 
declaration of certain districts to be infected or quarantined areas.” 257  The situation was 
aggravated by the fact that similar disease outbreaks were reported from her Northern and 
Eastern neighbours, from whom she had hoped to import breeding stock. The Agricultural 
Department was in 1905 forced to extend the restrictions on the importation of cattle from 
Portuguese East Africa and Northern Rhodesia to “prevent the introduction of cattle susceptible 
to African Coast Fever, and which might cause a recrudescence of and feed the disease on 
infected areas.”258 
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While the outbreak of diseases in neighbouring territories such as Northern Rhodesia and the 
Union of South Africa inhibited the importation of cattle, the outbreak of diseases locally 
decimated the national herd. First, the outbreak of Rinderpest that swept through the country 
from 1896 onwards dealt a heavy blow to both African and settler cattle owners. 259  This 
outbreak, which first appeared in the north-eastern parts of the Bulawayo district in February 
1896, and spread “with fearful rapidity through the large herds of cattle in Matabeleland”, had by 
the end of 1896 accounted for at least 40 000 cattle.260 In addition to running an inoculation 
programme, the Company adopted a policy of slaughtering all beasts that were suspected of 
carrying the disease. This set the stage for clashes between the Company and African cattle 
owners who did not understand the logic of slaughtering seemingly healthy cattle.261 As a result 
of deaths, due both to effects of the disease and slaughter of cattle that had been exposed to the 
disease, African-owned herds fell from over 100 000 to just under 14 000 by the end of 1897.262 
 
Commenting on the impact of the cattle losses on dairy production, the Civil Commissioner for 
Melsetter stated that the disease had “had a deleterious effect of milk and butter supplies, both on 
white settlements and among the natives of this territory”.263 From the late 1890s onwards, 
African milk was no longer readily available to traders and on mining settlements. Reflecting on 
the late 1890s, Darter observed: 
               In enumerating the commodities obtained from the natives I have come to honey, 
and we get quantities of honey. This is a land of honey – no milk, bar sour.  Sour 
milk is excellent diet for the sick, but you will secure kaffir beer with greater 
facility than sour milk. That is on account of the scarcity of their cattle. 
[emphasis mine]264 
Meanwhile, Company and settler efforts to build a herd from which a dairy and beef industry 
could emerge continued. With the scourge of Rinderpest subsiding, the United Goldfields 
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Company, working together with the BSAC, initiated a scheme in which considerable numbers 
of cattle for breeding purposes as well as for transport and slaughter were imported into the 
country from the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Bechuanaland and Northern 
Rhodesia (in strict compliance with the quarantine and inoculation provisions of the 
Lungsickness Ordinance). These cattle were distributed at cost price and easy terms of 
payment. 265  Further, BSAC’s successful suppression of the Angoni in Northern Rhodesia 
resulted in the capture of over 10 000 head, 1 500 of which were brought to Southern Rhodesia 
and sold to farmers on a two years instalment plan at £7 per head.266 These cattle, which were 
described by the Agricultural Department as “eminently good milkers for their size and 
hardiness”, were cross-bred with imported Short-horn stock. 
 
However, efforts to rebuild the settler herd were undone by the outbreak of yet another deadly 
cattle disease in 1901 – East Coast Fever.267 With its origins in Dar-es-Salaam and transmitted 
through Beira in Portuguese East Africa, the disease, became a major stumbling block to the 
development of the cattle industry until the 1920s.268 The disease first appeared when the BSAC 
imported cattle from Australia through the Beira Port, from where the cattle picked the disease 
and later spread it first in Umtali before it became spread across the whole country. Within the 
first two years of its detection, the disease had claimed upwards of 19 000 cattle.269 In 1903, the 
Department of Agriculture, painted a rather gloomy picture on the effects of East Coast Fever on 
the cattle industry in Rhodesia: 
The cattle disease which had made its appearance during last year gradually 
increased its violence and spread through the country with disastrous results, 
practically decimating the districts of Melsetter, Umtali, Charter, Gwelo, Selukwe, 
and that portion of the Bulawayo District along the main transport roads from 
Gwelo, and within a radius of twenty miles of the Bulawayo Township – 40% of 
draught cattle, and 60 % of breeding stock within the infected area falling victims 
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and succumbing to the disease. As a consequence, all branches of trade have 
suffered seriously, and the present outlook is far from hopeful... 270 
The disease’s ravages were felt more among imported European breeds than on indigenous 
herds. By 1903, it had become evident that “Central or East African and native cattle have 
resisted or become immune to the African Coast Fever to a much larger degree than the Colonial 
or imported stock, or their progeny – the percentage being about 25%, as against 10% 
respectively.”271 Under pressure from farmers, the BSAC passed Regulations under the Animals 
Diseases Consolidated Ordinance in 1904, which sought to regulate both the importation and 
movement of cattle in Southern Rhodesia.272 Under these Regulations, the movement of cattle 
from one area to another was prohibited, unless the cattle were certified to be disease-free by the 
Veterinary Department.  
 
The promulgation of the 1904 Ordinance, coupled with the losses that accompanied the disease 
outbreak, dealt a heavy blow to the development of commercial dairying in Southern Rhodesia. 
With the South African provinces virtually blocked as a source of breeding cattle owing to the 
fear of Lungsickness and Rinderpest, and cattle already in the country prohibited from moving 
from one district to another, the number of cattle that could be milked was drastically reduced. 
Long term planning, especially in the importation of pedigree stock, could not be implemented 
as long as the disease was not eradicated in the country. With initial efforts to combat the 
epidemic initially appearing to bear fruit by 1907, the following statement by the Department of 
Agriculture in 1907 sums up the impact of African Coast Fever, and perhaps all bovine diseases 
during the first two decades of colonial occupation on commercial dairying: 
The losses and restrictions incidental to the ravages of Coast Fever have merely had 
the effect of postponing the organisation of a dairy industry on sound commercial 
lines. The need for such a system, as essential to securing the best returns from our 
stock, has never been lost sight of, and with the virtual suppression of the disease, 
owners are already endeavouring to make good their losses and further strengthen their 
mobs against the time when it may be possible to support creameries at every centre of 
consumption.273 
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Although the Department looked forward to an immediately rosy future for the cattle sector, 
actually very little headway was made in the following years. This was because of the re-
emergence of East African Fever soon after 1907 and other factors that shall be discussed in the 
next chapter. The inevitable consequence of the situation was that by 1908, when commercial 
agriculture was given a new impetus after the adoption of the White Agricultural Policy and the 
re-organisation of the Agriculture Department, milk production in the country was quite low. 
Indeed, owing to the parlous state of dairying by 1907, Southern Rhodesia depended on imports 
to meet local demand for milk and other dairy products. The graphs below shows import figures 
for dairy products for 1906 and 1907. 
 
Graph 2: Schedule of Dairy produce imported into Southern Rhodesia during the two years ending 31st December 
1907.274 
Owing to the low levels of local milk production by both settler and African cattle-owners, very 
little had been achieved in the establishment of an organised marketing system by 1908. Settler 
farmers were delivering small quantities of milk and farm butter to privately owned dairies, 
while state aid remained low and ineffectual. For reasons discussed earlier, African involvement 
on the market at this time had been reduced significantly, although no government policy 
specifically precluding them from the market had been formulated. Because of the difficulties of 
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transporting fresh milk to dairies, the few that continued to produce a surplus sold sour milk to 
itinerant traders, who re-sold sour milk on the mine compounds. Hyatt bemoaned the dwindling 
amount milk traders could get from African producers during the early 1900s, stating that they 
could only acquire about seven to eight pints of milk a day, and lamented that such a situation 
had arisen because the “Rhodesian veld does not seem to lend itself to the production of 
milk.”275 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various idioms and customs surrounding milk production and 
consumption among some societies outside the commercial sector. Exploring the existence of a 
milk complex in some African societies, it has demonstrated that despite the existence of cultural 
and social symbols in the production and consumption of milk in Southern Rhodesian indigenous 
societies, this did not amount to a complex. Indeed, Africans positively responded to market 
opportunities on the milk market. However, in comparison with other agricultural sectors, 
African success on the milk market was less apparent and was generally short-lived. Milk 
producers had ceased to prosper on the market by the mid-1890s as a result of cattle losses to 
colonial conquest and successive livestock diseases that ravaged the country at least for the first 
two decades after occupation.  
 
The chapter also traced Company and settler efforts to establish a settler cattle industry during 
the period under review, particularly dairy farming, and the challenges such efforts faced. Firstly, 
Company fixation with gold mining during the period under review meant that very little 
agricultural development took place. Although, the Company did make efforts to help settlers to 
build a settler herd predominantly with indigenous herds and a few imported breeds, successive 
bovine epidemics in Southern Rhodesia and regional territories rendered such efforts futile. With 
neither Africans nor the settler farmers prospering in the milk trade, the first two decades of 
occupation were thus a period of milk scarcity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Laying the foundations of a settler-dominated dairy farming in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1908 – 1923 
 
Introduction 
After nearly two decades of Company and settler fixation with the elusive gold-inspired fortune, 
the period after 1908 witnessed deliberate attempts by the BSAC to diversify the Southern 
Rhodesian economy from mining towards settler agriculture. By the mid-1900s, it had become 
evident that Southern Rhodesia was not an Eldorado; its mineral wealth had been overestimated. 
From this period, the Company began to take a more active role in encouraging settler capitalist 
agriculture, leading to the adoption of what came to be known as the White Agricultural Policy 
(WAP) – a policy that acknowledged that settler agriculture would form the basis of the colony’s 
economy and would thus receive sustained government support.276 
 
If, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the development of a strong settler dairy sector 
during the first two decades of occupation was hampered by the dominance of mining, stock 
diseases and lack of capital and government support, did the espousal of WAP in 1908 mark a 
positive change in the fortunes of settler dairy farming? If African milk producers responded to 
market opportunities and marketed surplus milk before they lost their stock to settler 
expropriation and bovine diseases between 1893 and 1907, how did the implementation of WAP 
affect their production levels and participation on the colonial market? Focussing on the role of 
the state, and the attitudes of farmers, both settler and African, this chapter focuses on the 
dynamics that shaped the development of dairy farming in the country from 1908 until the end of 
the Company’s reign in 1923. Given the fact that WAP explicitly declared that settler – and not 
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African – agriculture would drive the economic development of the colony,277  this chapter 
explores the efforts of the Company and settlers to lay the foundation of the colonial agricultural 
economy, particularly dairy farming. Engaging existing historiography on colonial breeding 
policy, this chapter discusses early colonial dairy breeding policy and its impact on dairy 
farming, and the cattle industry in general. Other challenges that stood in the way of successful 
dairy farming, such as climatic realities, undercapitalisation, lack of expertise and the dominance 
of beef production will also be discussed. It will be shown that, although output increased so 
much that the country had become self-sufficient in butter and milk by 1923, this growth was 
premised on a shallow and flimsy foundation. The implications of the new agrarian policy on 
African milk production and marketing are also delineated in this chapter, arguing that the 
assault on African agrarian prosperity effectively set in motion the process of eliminating 
African participation on the colonial dairy market. 
 
Background: Towards a White Agricultural Policy (WAP) 
Although agriculture was a commercial option that was considered by the Company and the 
pioneer settlers from the early days of occupation, white agriculture was not considered to be as 
important as mining. The BSAC and the majority of the settlers that came into the country during 
the first few years had hopes of making a quick fortune from the anticipated huge gold deposit 
on the Zimbabwean plateau. As noted in the previous chapter, prospects of a gold-inspired 
mineral revolution had been the major driver of the BSAC’s occupation of Southern Rhodesia.  
 
Although considerable tracts of land were pegged and alienated by the British South Africa 
Company and sold to many companies and individual settlers at concessional rates, much of the 
land was retained for speculative purposes. Companies and settlers held onto the land in the hope 
of selling it off when land values had gone up. By the turn of the century, as it became 
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increasingly evident that the colony’s mineral wealth had been exaggerated, and as they began to 
struggle to sustain themselves, many members of the Pioneer Column and early settlers sold their 
land claims to big companies.278 Indeed, by 1900, many settlers had fallen into debt, and could 
only extricate themselves from the financial quagmire by relinquishing their claims for a fee. 
Companies such as Willoughby’s Consolidated, Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia Ltd, 
London and Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (LONRHO) and the British South Africa 
Company itself had established considerable mining and ranching properties by 1914.279 These 
companies speculatively purchased land “as an investment for mineral finds when 
communications improved and development became widespread.”280 
 
There were very few settlers on the land, and, for many, farming “meant only cutting down trees 
and selling the wood, or cultivating a small patch of mealies.”281 Although huge tracts of land 
were taken up in the first five years of occupation, most of it remained untilled. Although some 
pioneers accepted the hardships of farming and built homesteads, land changed hands too 
frequently during this time to enable a steady development of the farms.282 Further, many pieces 
of farm land that had been purchased remained unoccupied as owners held on to them for 
speculative purposes. For example, in Marandellas, a rich agricultural district in eastern 
Mashonaland, “(it) may have seemed well occupied to the cartographer, but on the ground there 
were barely 10 white residents.”283 As the majority of the settlers who came into Southern 
Rhodesia after 1890 were not men and women of sound financial and professional standing, 
most farmers were possessed neither the capital nor the agricultural expertise to venture into 
commercial agriculture. Hodder-Williams described this group of settlers as merely “store-
keepers or small time prospectors” who could not develop their land for commercial agricultural 
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production.284 The growing settler community, in fact, depended on African producers for the 
provision of agricultural products during the first two decades of occupation.285 
 
By the turn of the century, however, questions had begun to arise concerning the sustainability of 
the ‘Second Rand’ dream. Apart from over-estimation of the colony’s wealth, several other 
factors impeded the new colony’s economic progress by 1905. First, the Ndebele uprising of 
1893, which was followed by the Ndebele War of Dispossession in the same year, diverted the 
BSAC’S attention from mining and agricultural development towards safe guarding its grip and 
control of the territory.286 This was followed by the Jameson Raid, a military onslaught on Paul 
Kruger’s Transvaal Republic in South Africa led by Leander Starr Jameson, the Company 
administrator.287 The raid, which began on 29 December 1895 and ended on 2 January 1896, 
presented the Shona and the Ndebele with an opportune moment to rise against Company 
administration as most of its troops and armaments had been committed to fighting the Transvaal 
Republic.288 The net impact of the raid and the risings, which ended in October 1897, was that 
the colony’s infant mining industry was left on the verge of collapse. The impact was also felt on 
the London Stock exchange where share values of 22 Rhodesian mining companies plummeted 
between 1895 and 1898. 289  The South African War of 1899-1902, and the rail crisis that 
followed it, caused another body blow to the fledgling Southern Rhodesian economy.290 
 
These crises eroded the embryonic profitability of Rhodesian mining enterprises. Another 
collapse of the London market for the colony’s mining shares in 1903 prompted the Company 
government not only to restructure the mining industry,291 but also to begin to look to settler 
agriculture as an economic alternative. The Company’s Directors turned to the land which, it was 
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widely believed, the Company could dispose of as it wished.292 From this period onwards, the 
BSAC systematically began to shift its focus away from mining towards promoting settler 
agriculture. Settlers with money and skills were sought to develop the land and thus enhance the 
value of unsold acres owned by the Company. Thus, a series of events occured between 1905 
and 1908, leading to the unveiling of the ‘White Agricultural Policy’ in 1907, and the subsequent 
re-organisation of the Agricultural Department under Nobbs’ Directorship the following year. 
 
A Land Settlement Committee was established in London in 1905 with Charles D. Wise 
appointed Director of Land Settlement in Southern Rhodesia. Himself an experienced British 
agriculturalist, Wise arrived in Southern Rhodesia in October, 1905, with instructions from the 
board “to report upon current and future prospects of the agricultural industry, the opportunities 
for new settlers, and the methods by which cultivating owners could best be established upon the 
soil.”293 The following year, Wise wrote a glowing report pertaining to the country’s agricultural 
potential, particularly in cattle raising, maize and tobacco production. He recommended that it 
should be the aim of the BSAC: 
to dispose of their land at low but fair rate, according to the market value of the land in 
the country today, reserving, however, alternate blocks (to be sold later when prices 
had risen): they should assist these men as far as possible within reason, without 
spoon-feeding and make them successful as their success will mean the success of land 
settlement and the development of the country.294 
The Company adopted this recommendation, and began selling land to prospective settlers for as 
little as 1/6 per morgen. A commission of Directors of the BSAC visited the country in 1907, and 
emphasized the recommendations made by Wise. The commission insisted that the aim of the 
Company to “stimulate in every possible way the opening up and steady development of the 
mineral and agricultural resources of the country.”295 
 
This new emphasis on promoting settler agriculture found its strongest expression through the re-
organisation of the Agricultural Department in 1908 under the Directorship of Dr Eric Nobbs, an 
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agricultural scientist who had been an agricultural assistant in the Cape Department of 
Agriculture.296 His efforts revolutionised the Department, as agriculture began to take a leading 
role in the development of Rhodesia’s fledgling economy. It was recognised that a number of 
specialists in various scientific discipline was required to give advice to incoming settlers and “to 
conduct research on all problems which had to be solved to put agriculture in a new country and 
environment on a sound basis.”297 However, owing to limited financial resources and the scarcity 
of experts, the appointment of specialists was done gradually.  
 
The first appointment was made in 1909, when an entomologist, R.W. Jack, was appointed, 
followed in 1910 by agricultural engineer, W.M. Matt and J.W. Lewis the tobacco expert. In 
1912, R.C. Simmons was appointed Chief of the Animals Branch, under which dairy farming 
fell.298 His stay, however, was short-lived as he left the Department at the end of the First World 
War. He was never replaced. The first dairy expert, J.B. Fisher, was only appointed in 1918, at 
the end of the War, and was replaced by Thomas Hamilton the following year. By 1922, the 
Department had an established staff compliment of 36 technical officers and 24 administrative 
and clerical officers.299 State annual expenditure on agriculture increased from £8 729 in 1904 to 
£41 168 by 1923.300 The staff of the Department was mandated to conduct experiments and 
disseminate information to farmers. They regularly visited farms to give on-the-spot advice to 
settler farmers. These visits, according to Nobbs, were effective in the provision of support and 
guidance to farmers in a country “with a population so largely composed of newcomers, many of 
them without any agricultural experience.”301 
 
Settler farmers themselves were fully aware of their limited knowledge and experience in 
farming. For instance, at the Rhodesia Agricultural Union Congress in 1909 they recommended 
that government establish a school of agriculture for training purposes. 302  The government 
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embarked on a programme aimed at establishing institutions exclusively for white settler 
farmers. The first two experimental farms, also referred to as Central Farms, were established at 
Marandellas and Salisbury Commonage. 303  In 1909 the Salisbury and Gwebi Agricultural 
colleges were established for experimental and demonstration work, while three estates – the 
Rhodes, Inyanga and Matopos – were opened in 1917. Municipal experimental stations at 
Bulawayo and Gwelo became operational in 1921 and 1923 respectively.304 Focusing only on 
settler agriculture, these experimental and demonstration farms became the vehicles through 
which settler agriculture could be developed. Results of research and knowledge were published 
in the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, itself a settler agricultural mouthpiece that was run by the 
Rhodesia Agricultural Union. 
 
Establishing a settler dairy industry, 1908 – 1923  
The Company’s new focus on commercial agriculture was followed by renewed efforts aimed at 
injecting life into settler dairy farming. However, the first challenge faced by a potentially viable 
dairying industry concerned the ecological and climatic constraints in the country relative to 
major dairying countries. Regarding the country’s ecological and climatic conditions, Nobbs 
asserted in 1909 that: 
Arable farming must rank below stock-farming in importance, profitable and useful as 
it is. Cattle raising requires more capital and a longer time before profits accrue, but 
ultimately yields a higher return, whilst crop growing yields a more regular and an 
earlier return – a more vital consideration to the newcomer and the man of limited 
means. Ranching, or at least cattle-farming  on extensive lines, is a growing feature of 
the times, so far with a very promising measure of success, the one general want as yet 
being numbers.305 
The notion that Southern Rhodesia, particularly the south-western region of the country, was 
generally better suited to a pastoral economy than arable farming was derived from the belief 
that the country’s topography, soils and climate were generally not suited to intensive arable 
farming. With only about 40% receiving an average annual rainfall of more than 28 inches, 
which is considered to be the minimum annual rainfall required for most of the staple grains, 
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arable farming was a risky venture in most parts of the country.306 Only the eastern parts of the 
country could sustain intensive crop production.307 
 
Yet, despite propaganda by colonial authorities, Southern Rhodesia’s climate did not compare 
favourably with the major dairy producing countries in theworld. Generally speaking, the 
minimum natural requirements for successful dairy farming are a fairly cool climate, well 
pastured grasslands, and an average rainfall of at least 635mm (24 inches) per annum. 308 
Southern Rhodesia had a highly seasonal and erratic rainfall pattern, with the average for over 
half of the country being less than 635mm per annum. As a result, the natural pasturage was 
inadequate for the maintenance of milk production for more than half the year. Pasturage was 
available mainly between November and March, when the country received rains.309The map 
below, which illustrates the country’s ecological zones, shows that arable farming was clearly 
unviable owing to low rainfall (less than 28 inches annually) and poor soils in the south-western 
parts of the country, these areas could only sustain dairy industry with great difficulty and at 
considerable cost. 
  
 
 
 
 
Map 1: The natural farming regions of Southern Rhodesia. 310 
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Southern Rhodesia’s relatively difficult conditions may be understood by considering the fact 
that its maximum carrying capacity before 1950 was no more than a cow per two acres of land, 
while New Zealand’s capacity stood at one cow per acre, and in some places reached two cows 
for three acres.311 New Zealand, Canada and Denmark had lower average temperatures than 
Southern Rhodesia. The result of this was that Southern Rhodesian farmers required 
supplementary feed for cattle during the dry months of the year, at a considerably higher cost, at 
a time when their counterparts in other Commonwealth countries depended on natural pasturage 
for longer periods of the year. However, despite this relative disadvantage, the country could still 
sustain a successful dairy industry if other variables were in place. In fact, some countries with 
generally similar climates such as Argentina and Australia had, by the beginning of the 20th 
century, developed successful dairy industries.  
 
Despite the climatic challenge, the Southern Rhodesian colonial government was determined to 
develop settler dairy farming. As was the case on Australia’s Atherton Tablelands, colonial 
officials viewed dairying as ‘key’ to their stated goal of creating a white man’s country in 
Southern Rhodesia. Gilmore argues that the Australian state’s active involvement in commercial 
dairying despite adverse economic and climatic realities “grew out of the necessity to populate 
the vast continent and to provide necessary infrastructure and services, and to protect the 
livelihoods of those who pioneered settlement.”312 The Dairy Expert, Hamilton (who would later 
become Chief Dairy Officer), captured the envisaged position of settler dairying thus: 
                    The dairy industry is of great national importance and...on its success the 
success of land settlement in this colony largely depends. It is essentially a key 
industry...[and] any scheme, therefore, which can be put forward to improve the 
status of the dairy industry should necessarily receive the support of  the 
government.313 
Further pushing the cause for the speedy establishment of a strong dairy industry was the amount 
of money that was expended on importing butter and cheese. R.J. Moore, a British expert, who 
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was invited by the BSAC to give advice on agricultural matters in1906, intimated that the 
country was wasting valuable resources importing products that could be made locally.314 With 
disappointment, he reported: 
Your imports of (b)utter and (c)heese, amounting to £20 000 yearly, will continue 
until such time as you organise for production. The very countries that you are 
importing from prove this to be the case. You are sending money out of the country 
which requires but a little education and energy on the part of the farmers to be kept 
at home. Importing an inferior article at ruinous prices is certainly not to the 
interests of the country and the economic position created while production at home 
is at such a low ebb, must be such as to keep out the moderately poor man and the 
small farmer out of production...315 
The first official attempt to stimulate some interest in dairy farming among farmers in Southern 
Rhodesia took place in the 1910 when the BSAC arranged for E.A.Maidment, a Dairy 
Instructress at Dushaw County Dairy School, England to visit Rhodesia for a few months and to 
give a series of lectures and demonstrations at various centres, on milk production methods, milk 
testing, the manufacture of cheese and butter and so forth.316 In addition to individual farms, she 
visited 17 centres throughout the country and lecturing and demonstrating to more than 570 
farmers. “From what I have seen from experience of a practical nature,” the instructress 
commented at the end of her brief engagement with the country’s dairy farming, “Rhodesia is a 
country in which dairying can be successfully developed with advantage to its people and to its 
revenue”.317 The country’s potential notwithstanding, Maidment expressed disappointment that 
dairy farming was still undeveloped, hence the huge import bill, which in 1910 stood at £35 000. 
In explaining the difference in the rate of development between dairy farming and beef 
production Maidment explained: 
The reason probably that up to the present dairying has not been more largely 
developed is that when people were settling, there was very little railway 
accommodation and also knowledge of how to prepare milk for distribution in a sub-
tropical climate was very little understood. Further, dairying involves rather more 
capital, organisation, care and attention than the farmer is prepared for in the early 
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days (the country is even still very young), and has to be content with cattle raising for 
beef and transport, maize growing, poultry keeping, and perhaps later, tobacco 
growing.318 
Maidment’s statement that dairy farming requires more capital and organisation is quite 
instructive. As milk is a highly perishable commodity that is produced on a daily basis, it poses 
serious handling challenges. First, as it is an excellent medium for bacterial growth, milk should 
be cooled immediately after the milking process to temperatures below the survival of bacteria 
(below 10 degrees Celsius).319 Secondly, milk requires high-cost transportation, on a daily basis 
to markets before it loses its keeping qualities. Thirdly, and as a consequent of the first two 
factors, the handling and processing of milk requires trained and hygiene-conscious workers and 
relatively more sophisticated apparatus such as coolers, cans, and buckets.320 
The above-mentioned factors led to a generally apathetic attitude by settlers towards commercial 
dairying. Although her visit was aimed at stimulating some interest among settlers to take up 
dairy farming as a viable agricultural enterprise, Maidment’s visit was fated to meet with limited 
results as long as settler farmers “earned more money by engaging themselves in the less 
exacting branches of agriculture like cattle ranching, maize and tobacco growing.”321 As shall be 
shown later in this chapter, the dominance of beef cattle ranching meant that dairy farming 
initially emerged as merely a side line. 
 
Cattle breeding policy 
With the incidence of disease reduced by 1908, the Company sought to re-stock the settler herd 
with a view to kick-starting the dairy and beef industries. The Company sought to import pure-
bred stock from the Union of South Africa, the Northern Territories, Britain and Australia for 
distribution, on easy payment terms, to aspiring and practising ranchers. However, as the low 
capitalisation of most settler farming enterprises ruled out large-scale importations of European 
cattle breeds, settlers and ranching companies in Southern Rhodesia depended on indigenous 
cattle as a foundation upon which the settler herd could be established. Charles Murray, a ranch 
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owner who served in the Agricultural Department acknowledged that “the old native cow 
provided the foundation, because she put blood in the foundation, and whatever cattle were 
brought from South Africa or Scotland, were merely for gradation.”322 Thus, initial breeding 
policy in the cattle industry was based on cross-breeding imported stock with indigenous herds. 
 
There has been a great deal of debate focusing particularly on the advantages and disadvantages 
of indigenous cattle breeds in comparison to the exotic breeds that were imported into the 
country by the BSAC for settlers. Phimister has argued that one of the disadvantages of the 
Rhodesian cattle industry in comparison with North and South American and Australia, where 
the industry was started and built upon cattle imported from Europe, was the “poor beef qualities 
of the indigenous cattle”, which formed the foundation stock.323  He posited that, against a 
background of an acute of shortage of capital with which to purchase pure-breeds for cross 
breeding, the use of such indigenous breeds was sensible, hence the cattle industry struggled on 
the international markets.324 Phimister’s assertion has been challenged, however. In his 1980 
thesis, Machingaidze argues – contraPhimister – that the notion that indigenous cattle were 
inherently of poor qualities is only partially correct and needs rigorous analysis, lest historians 
fall victim to the very same prejudices (and ignorance) which led to settler mistakes. 325 
Machingaidze notes that the ‘Home methods mentality’ – which led the BSAC and the settlers to 
quickly and indiscriminately import European breeds for cross-breeding with local breeds with 
little regard to local climatic and ecological considerations – created problems for the beef 
industry. He argues that the policy which saw many exotic breeds being imported into the 
country for use in the ‘upgrading’ of the Mashona, Matabele and Tuli breeds was based on 
misplaced prejudices that local breeds were not suitable for both commercial dairy and beef 
production.326 
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Building on Machingaidze’s Africanist position, Wesley Mwatwara has recently argued that the 
differences between local and imported breeds were, by and large, imaginary: the distinction 
made by colonial officials was thick on racial prejudice and thin on biological or scientific 
substance.327 He asserts that “the value of cattle depended more on whose possession they were 
rather than their biological traits.”328 While there can be no doubt about the racial currents that 
dominated the socio-economic and political discourse of the time, the argument that the 
biological differences between indigenous breeds and imported cattle was “perceived” rather 
than real finds little support from available evidence. Scientific studies on both local and 
European breeds showed that, owing to the different environments in which they were nurtured, 
respective breeds did develop certain traits to suit their circumstances. 329  D. Holness, an 
agricultural scientist in Zimbabwe during the 1990s asserted that although the Mashona cattle 
had adapted to the local environment over hundreds of years, research also showed that they had 
smaller masses than imported breeds.330 Although the fact that the settler herd for both beef and 
dairy purposes was initially founded on indigenous breeds can be attributed to a lack of financial 
resources necessary to import foreign breeds during the early period of occupation, it is also true 
that the continued crossing of European breeds with local breeds was in recognition of the 
qualities that both breeds brought into the cross-breds. 
 
In his scientific study of The Native Cattle of Rhodesia in 1927, Nobbs distinguished three main 
indigenous breeds in Southern Rhodesia, namely the Mashona, Matabele and the Tuli (with its 
origin in Bechuanaland). The Mashona cattle were the predominant type, even in Matabeleland 
districts such as Gwanda, parts of Insiza and Matopos. Stocky, hardy and resistant to major 
diseases, Nobbs identified two vital qualities of the Mashona cow: their hardiness and resistance 
to disease, and also the ability to withstand the barren winters and humid summers. He candidly 
admitted that: 
It is extra-ordinary how they can retain their condition during adverse spells. The crude 
native method of handling proves how handy the breed must be… they certainly 
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appear to suffer less than improved cattle from redwater and gall sickness, and 
epizootics seem to acquire immunity to introduced diseases more rapidly than do 
cross-breeds or foreign breeds.331 
Regarding milk production, Nobbs further acknowledged that the Mashona cow calved more 
frequently, and enjoyed better longevity, than imported dairy cows. He observed that the Shona 
cow “lived remarkably longer than imported breeds, and that the heifers could give their first 
calves before they reached three years of age, and could continue doing so until they were 16 
years old.” He stated that: 
Authenticated cases are recorded of cows giving 18 and even 25 calves in their life-
times. As regular and persistent breeders, the Mashona cow cannot be surpassed. The 
cows are very prolific and normally give calves regularly every 10 to 11 months…. A 
safe calving average would be over 80% and in many cases 100% would be 
achieved.332 
These qualities, Nobbs’ study revealed, were also present in the Matabele and Tuli breeds, with 
the only difference being that these other breeds, especially the Tuli, had larger frames and could 
attain greater weights under poor management.333 Despite these advantages, local breeds could 
not match imported cows, particularly the Friesland, in milk productivity. Relying on findings 
from experiments on research stations such as Makaholi, Matopos and Grasslands, John Barrett 
argued that although the Mashona were good milkers, their lactations rarely lasted 150 days, 
which is lower than the Friesland breed.334 
 
A study of colonial breeding regimes shows that the breeding policy for dairy farming was 
subordinated to the larger cattle breeding policy which recognised the weaknesses of indigenous 
breeds for commercial purposes, while adopting their positive physical attributes, particularly 
their ability to withstand long dry seasons and strength against local diseases. George N. 
Blackshaw, the Agricultural Chemist in 1911 noted that while the three indigenous breeds could, 
owing to their smaller frames and slower growth, not viably compete with exotic breeds such as 
the Devon and Shorthorn on the beef market, their milking qualities were good. This was after he 
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made an examination of the quality of the milk yielded by two indigenous breeds: the Mashona 
and the German East African types. The results of the investigation, which constituted “the first 
evidence recorded regarding the percentage amount of fat in the milk two of our native types, 
showed that the milk of these animals is of very rich quality.”335 However, he added that the 
volumes of milk produced were relatively low, and that the lactation period was short.  
 
In order to maximise milk yields while at the same time retaining the better immunity to local 
diseases that the local breeds possessed, the indigenous breeds were cross-bred with imports, 
particularly the Friesland, Coates Shorthorn (dairy type), Lincoln Red Shorthorn, Norfolk Red 
Polls and Ayrshires which possessed better beef and milking qualities. In her report, Maidment 
remarked that the “very few farmers will be able to establish herds of pure bred stock, and must 
be content to improve cattle of the country by importing good animals from England for 
crossing.” 336  She recommended that the Lincoln Red and Coates Shorthorn (dairy type), 
Ayrshire, Friesland and Norfolk Red Polls be imported for cross-breeding with local breeds. To 
this end, the Company embarked on a cattle importation program. Her point was further 
supported by Simmons, the Chief of the Animal Industries, who gave a breakdown of the 
suitability of each dairy breed to different areas of the country in 1912 thus: 
The breeds of cattle chiefly maintained for dairy purposes, or for the improvement of 
dairy stock, are Friesland, Coates Shorthorn (dairy type), Lincoln Red Shorthorn, a few 
Norfolk Red Polls and Ayrshires. So far one may judge at present, the Friesland breed 
appears more suited to the lower altitudes than to the higher and rather sour veld on the 
watershed of Mashonaland. Shorthorns are finding favour on good-sheltered and well 
watered farms, where irrigation on a reasonable scale makes the provision of winter 
feed always possible.337 
Given the tropical climate of the country which consists of long, humid summers with a short 
rainy season, few parts of the country were “good-sheltered and well watered”. Consequently, 
the Lincoln Red Shorthorn, Norfolk Red Polls and Ayrshires, which produced the best milk for 
the manufacture of butter and cheese, could not be imported in huge numbers. Friesland cattle, 
which, according to Maidment, “give such a poor quality of milk and butter that they are not to 
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be recommended”, 338  grew to become the main dairy breed in the country because of its 
relatively better suitability to the general environmental conditions. This, as shall be seen in later 
sections of this study, played a major role in the poor quality of milk, butter and cheese that was 
manufactured in the country.  
 
It is in this light that the BSAC initiated a scheme in which it arranged for the importation of 
breeding stock from the Union of South Africa on behalf of cattle breeders and ranchers. By the 
end of 1911, for instance, £4 345 had been expended on the importation of cattle, and between 
1911 and 1913, 16 000 bulls and heifers of the Shorthorn, Hereford, Sussex, Friesland, Devon 
and Africander breeds were imported into the country by the Company.339 These animals after 
being immunised to redwater, or “tick fever”, by inoculation, were sold at cost price on easy 
terms of repayment to bona fide breeders and ranchers throughout the country. Writing in 1913, 
the Chief of the Animal Industries Branch reported that: 
With a view to assisting farmers to obtain cattle, the Government has for some years 
past followed a policy of purchase of stock from the south and from overseas for 
individuals. The system has proved popular and helpful, on account of the easy terms of 
payment, to many who could not otherwise have procured cattle. During the twelve 
months under report there has been a notable increase in the number of cattle 
imported…340 
The importation of cattle was, however, negatively affected by the outbreak of the First World 
War in 1914. The rise in sea freights made it more expensive for the BSAC to import stud cattle 
for the distribution to farmers. In 1914 Nobbs reported that: 
The development of agriculture in Rhodesia during the past year has, of necessity, 
been affected by the conditions [brought about] by the war. Those conditions have 
been entirely adverse to progress, for the high war prices, which have benefitted 
farmers in Britain, have in this country been more than counter-balanced by an 
excessive rise in sea freights. Therefore, in making any comparison with previous 
years, these unfavourable circumstances must be taken into account.341 
For as long as the war continued, the BSAC depended on the Union of South Africa for the 
provision of pure-bred stock. This source, however, was not entirely trusted by the settler 
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community. In addition to the fear of disease discussed earlier, it was generally believed that “the 
class of the bull available in the Union, with the exception of perhaps Friesland and Africander, 
is not, as a rule, all that could be desired.”342 The formation of a Cattle Owners’ Association of 
Rhodesia in 1918, with the primary object of promoting and safe-guarding the cattle industry and 
to bring together all who have the common interest of raising cattle in Rhodesia, should be 
viewed in light of the difficulties that were encountered in importing stock during the war.  
 
The BSAC, on behalf of the Cattle Breeders Association, forged an agreement with the Friesland 
Breeders’ Association of South Africa in 1915 that led to increased importations of dairy stock 
from the Union. In a letter to the Director of Agriculture, the chairman of the Cattle Breeders 
Association stated that the  
          agreement with the Union Friesland Breeders Association, itself a tangible indication of 
confidence, has resulted in the significant increase in the Friesland herd in the country. 
This should enhance the development of dairy farming in this country, an industry that 
has hitherto been neglected for so long.”343 
 
This arrangement between the Cattle Breeders Association and the South African Friesland 
Breeders Association was in operation until 1939, when the outbreak of war disturbed trade 
between the two countries.  
 
Despite the existence of cattle trade between the BSAC and the Friesland Breeders Association, 
it should be stated that first priority seemed to be put on the importation of beef cattle. Largely as 
a result of the preference by farmers for the less exacting beef cattle production, many farmers 
were more interested in beef breeds such as Devon, Hereford and Shorthorn and Africander. 
Although a considerable number of dairy cattle were purchased, an examination of the number of 
cattle imported during the period under review will show that most of the cattle imported were of 
a beef strain. For instance, of the 461 bulls imported from the Union of South Africa in 1914, 
only 18 were pure dairy breeds. Similarly, only 80 Friesland heifers were among the 4 950 
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heifers that were imported in 1918.344 Nobbs himself gave a list, in order of importance, of the 
Government’s priority in terms of cattle imports thus: 
The various breeds imported have been represented in order of preponderance as 
follows:- Bulls: Shorthorn, Africander, Hereford, North Devon, Polled Angus, Sussex, 
Friesland Red Poll and Cross-breds. Heifers: Cross-bred, Africander, Friesland, 
Shorthorn, Hereford, Red Poll, North Devon, Polled Angus and Sussex. The cross-bred 
heifers form by far the greater portion of these.345 
This trend continued beyond the First World War. The number, according to statistical returns at 
the end of 1922 showed that 4 684 cattle were imported into the country, and were made up of 
the following breeds:- Shorthorns and Red Lincolns, 1 736; Devon, 775; Frieslands, 690; 
Herefords, 673; Aberdeen Angus, 405; Sussex, 215; together with a few South Devons, Ayrshire, 
Red Polls and Jerseys.  The prioritisation of beef cattle may also be seen in the fact that the dairy 
cows that were kept at the Gwebi Experimental Farm346, where they were kept for experimental 
and demonstration purposes were disposed of. As Nobbs reported in 1918: 
The Friesland cattle at the Gwebi were purchased five years ago out of advances, not 
out of administrative funds, and the decision was reached during the year to dispose of 
them in the hope of replacing them by a beef breed, Hereford, Devon, or Berdeen 
Angus, for any of which there is a very keen demand for bulls. Accordingly, the herd 
was dispersed by auction sale, very satisfactory prices being realised. The original herd 
was selected at the dispersal sale of Mr. Maclaurin’s Friesland herd in 1913, and no 
additions by purchase were made.347 
Despite the importation of many exotic breeds for breeding and cross-breeding with local types, 
it should be understood that the demand (for both beef and dairy cattle) was at no time during 
this period satisfied. Largely because of shortage of funds, both on the part of settlers and the 
BSAC, the number of cattle imported during the era of Company rule were never adequate. The 
chairman of the Rhodesian Landowners and Farmers Association (Bulawayo) lamented in 1923 
that: 
Notwithstanding the numbers of stud stock introduced into Rhodesia, there is yet a 
large unsatisfied demand for pure-bred bulls, chiefly of the following breeds: 
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Shorthorn, Friesland, North Devon, Hereford, Sussex and Afrikander; indeed, bulls are 
the chief need of the Rhodesian cattle breeder today.348 
 
Stock diseases 
It has been shown in the previous chapter that the major stumbling block to the development of 
the cattle industry during the early years, besides the BSAC’s largely futile fixation with the 
Second Rand dream, was the high prevalence of livestock disease. The new focus on agriculture 
and the cattle industry in particular led to the Veterinary Department’s making more concerted 
efforts to deal with stock diseases, particularly East Coast Fever and lung-sickness. This section 
discuses the impact of stock diseases on dairy farming between 1908 and 1923, particularly the 
recession in incidence of diseases. It demonstrates that although farmers felt that government 
controls were too stringent, the imposition of disease control restrictions played a crucial role in 
the growth of the national herd. Weinmann has noted that from 1908, the development of the 
industry suffered no major outbreaks of diseases among cattle for a number of years, which 
created “a sense of security based on the knowledge that any such outbreaks could now be dealt 
with effectively.”349 Incidences of diseases, both locally and in neighbouring countries, became 
fewer and further apart and thus farmers became confident enough to make long term 
investments in the cattle industry. Writing at the end of 1908, the Director of Agriculture 
optimistically noted: 
A great impetus has also been given to the industry by the modification of the 
restrictions placed on the movement of cattle, made possible by the absence of disease, 
and the fact that the areas regarded as still infected with East Coast Fever were 
gradually but surely being cleansed. Farmers were able to get on to their farms the 
draught and breeding stock necessary for the proper working of their land.350 
As a means of combating East Coast Fever and other tick-bone diseases voluntary dipping was 
introduced in the country in 1910, and about 100 dip tanks, including 23 constructed by the 
Government, were used in the country.351 The dipping of cattle was made compulsory by the 
proclamation of the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance in 1914, and it rendered dipping on the 
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commonages of towns and villages mandatory.352 By 1917, there were more than 1 000 dipping 
tanks, covering approximately 78% of European areas, and “including numerous tanks 
constructed, with the encouragement of the Native Department, by natives who showed a 
“remarkable willingness to adopt the practice of universal dipping.”353 The 1914 Ordinance was 
replaced by the Cattle Cleansing Ordinance, 1918, which provided for compulsory dipping 
weekly.This development helped in curbing stock diseases between 1908 and 1918. 
 
While this legislative intervention, contributed in reducing cases of diseases, Coast Fever made 
frequent re-appearances in the country throughout the period under review. In fact, as 
Machingaidze shows, at no time during the period under review was the country entirely free 
from East Coast Fever.354  Although Lung-sickness and Contagious Abortion re-appeared in 
some parts of the country, particularly in the Umtali district, such cases became less frequent. It 
was the recession in East Coast Fever, however, that boosted the cattle industry. Imports could 
be made with confidence that the cattle would not all perish due to the disease.  
 
The reduced incidence of disease in the Northern territories, Cape, Transvaal, and the Orange 
Free State made importation of breeding cattle much easier too. The prohibition against the 
importation of cattle from North-Western Rhodesia, which had been in force since the turn of the 
century, was withdrawn early in 1908. The result was that very large numbers of breeding cattle 
were brought into the territory by local owners, “who for years have been awaiting the removal 
of the prohibition.”355 However, importation was allowed subject to the issuance of a permit 
from the Veterinary Department; branding of all cattle with the letters of identification; a six 
weeks’ period of quarantine, north of the Gwaai River; segregation for 12 months on the owner’s 
land after release from quarantine after veterinary inspection.356 
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With regards to cattle imported from the Cape and Transvaal, certificates signed by exporters 
guaranteed that the stock in question had been bred on the farm from which they were exported. 
Exporters also needed to confirm that the imported cattle had no history of having contracted 
lung-sickness. 357  Imports from Natal, however, were accepted when moved to some other 
province of the Union under Union regulations. Natal cattle could only be accepted in Southern 
Rhodesia if they had completed 30 days quarantine at Volksrust or same period of quarantine on 
a tanked and fenced farm in some part of the Union.358 The result was that pedigree stock could 
only be brought into the country at great difficulty. 
 
These regulations, however, led to clashes between cattle exporters from the Union, local 
breeders, and the government. Exporters from southern territories complained about the 
conditions under which their cattle were admitted in Southern Rhodesia, arguing that the 
conditions were rather too prohibitive. Exporters from the Union felt that the imposition of such 
restrictions were aimed at limiting the amount of business they could get from Southern 
Rhodesia, while local stock-breeders felt that the policy, coming as it did when incidences of 
disease were receding in both countries, was detrimental to Southern Rhodesia’s re-stocking 
programme. Even louder were complaints from local stock-breeders, who argued that the policy 
of only accepting quarantined animals from Natal was no longer justified by veterinary 
circumstances. In a meeting with the Southern Rhodesian Cattle Industry Committee, they 
argued that since cattle from Natal were subjected to quarantine when they arrived in 
Johannesburg, it was no longer necessary for them to undergo a further period of quarantine. 
They contend that if Natal cattle were fit to go to another place within the Union, it should also 
be safe to send them to Rhodesia.359  This view, however, was not shared by the Southern 
Rhodesian authorities, who felt that there existed a real danger of East Coast Fever and Lung-
sickness from Natal province. Writing to the Director of Agriculture, the Chief Veterinary 
Officer stated that: 
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It is perfectly obvious from the nature of this condition that that there is a real danger 
of Coast Fever and Lung-sickness being carried from Natal. As long as Coast Fever 
infection here is restricted to two areas, and as long as the conditions in Natal are such 
as to justify this condition in regard to cattle going to other parts of the Union, I would 
like to emphasize my position – from a veterinary point of view I do not think it is 
advisable to alter the existing regulations in regard to cattle from Natal. 360 
 
Animals imported from overseas were obliged to be immunised to redwater, or “tick fever”, by 
inoculation, were sold at cost price on easy terms of repayment to bona fide breeders and 
ranchers throughout the country. Most of the bulls were distributed to farmers, and the female 
stock retained for breeding purposes, and for the perpetuation of the pure bulls bred in 
Rhodesia.361 However, most of the England-imported breeds were easily susceptible to disease. 
Most of the bulls succumbed to redwater, notwithstanding the application of preventive 
inoculation administered onto them.362 Most of the stock died whilst still in the hands of the 
Agricultural Department. In 1923, the Chief Veterinary Officer lamented that: 
An unusually large percentage of imported cattle, particularly among those from 
overseas, have succumbed to redwater, notwithstanding the application of preventive 
inoculation. Ten selected bulls of the Friesland, Shorthorn, Devon and Red Lincoln 
Shorthorn breeds were imported by the Department for distribution to farmers on easy 
terms of payment. Unfortunately, several of these succumbed to redwater during the 
process of immunisation. 363 
The death of imported breeds notwithstanding, the importation programme, coupled with the 
receding disease prevalence levels, led to a rise in the cattle population in Southern Rhodesia. 
While the cattle population in 1905 was approximated to be slightly above 100 000, with just 
over 30 000 in the hands of settlers, the number had by 1912 increased to 600 000 head, of which 
350 000 were in the hands of Africans.364 A cattle census held in 1919 showed that the national 
herd had increased to 1 326 000, with the settler herd standing at about 673 431, which, for the 
first time, was higher than the African herd. While these figures paint a glowing picture 
concerning the success of the re-stocking exercise after the ravages of Rinderpest and East Coast 
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Fever, they conceal a vital fact: the great majority of the increase came through natural increase, 
and thus the herd was predominantly indigenous. Indeed, the number of pure-bred cattle stood at 
a measly 4 934 in 1919. The cattle census conducted at the end of 1923 showed that more than 
1 000 000 cattle, which constituted about 85% of the entire herd, was made up of indigenous 
cattle. Indeed, by 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, both the beef and dairy industries 
were largely dominated by the indigenous hard Mashona and Matabele breeds.365 The Director 
of Agriculture lamented that “notwithstanding the numbers of stud stock introduced into 
Rhodesia, there is yet a large unsatisfied demand for pure-bred bulls”.366 
Production trends  
For much of the pre-1920 period, milk and butter production figures remained low, with the 
country having to rely on imports to supplement local production. While Southern Rhodesia in 
1907 imported 239 498 lb. of butter valued at £12 947, 349 384 lb., valued at £24 056 were 
imported in 1915. Similarly, while cheese imports in 1907 amounted to17 095 lb., valued at 
£12 947, the figure had reached 20 078 lb., valued at £18 585 in 1916.367 Commenting on this 
state of affairs in 1920, Hamilton, the Dairy Officer mourned that a “considerable amount of 
money is passing out of the country which might be well retained here.”368 The reasons behind 
the low production of butter and cheese, however, were largely a result of the fact that there were 
very few genuine dairy farmers in the country. John Richmond Cory, a man whose involvement 
in the dairy industry in Southern Rhodesia dates back to 1925, when he was engaged as an 
Assistant Dairy Expert, observed that “the bulk of the cream reaching the butter factories (was) 
derived from dairy-ranching, a system under which ranch cows – or others of a non dairy-type – 
were milked for a few months of the years, depending on the nature of the season, the milk 
separated and the cream sent to the creamery for conversion into butter.”369 Speaking in 1939, 
Cory expressed the opinion that dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia had grown out of necessity, 
with little signs of organised effort. “Fourteen years ago when I came to the country, I found the 
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dairy industry was really in its infancy and it had been established on quite a wrong foundation,” 
said Cory, before adding: 
In many cases, particularly in Matabeleland, the creameries were dependent for their 
supplies on herds which were not originally bought for dairying purposes. They were 
ranching cattle and owing to the outbreak of various diseases, particularly East Coast 
Fever, which had locked these up in quarantine for a number of years, the farmers were 
forced to start milking them because they could not be sold as live cattle. 370 
To the extent that they could obtain an extra monthly cheque, especially when they could not sell 
their cattle profitably, ranchers found it was a tremendous advantage for them to milk their ranch 
cows. This scenario, which was prevalent until the outbreak of the Second World in 1939, meant 
that white commercial dairy farming only emerged as a side-line to cattle ranching.  
Indeed, an examination of the butter production patterns during the tenure of the BSAC will 
show that, as in Bechuanaland where dairy production was belatedly stimulated during the 1930s 
primarily as an alternative to beef production in response to South Africa’s restrictions on the 
import of cattle,371 commercial dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia was heavily reliant on the 
fortunes of the beef industry. Butter production, which had been quite low for much of the period 
before 1914, received a boost at the outbreak of the First World War. The War led to the 
disturbance of the flow of trade with overseas markets. With cattle exports initially disturbed by 
the outbreak of war, most ranchers began to look to milk and butter production for the local 
market as a remedy. Consequently, butter production, which stood at 151 916 lb. in 1914, soared 
to 294 568 lb. the following year. However, as cattle, maize and tobacco exports began to 
increase due to increased demand overseas from 1916 until the end of the war, butter production 
began to fall from the 1915 peak, reaching 209 439 lb. in 1918.372 Happening at a time when the 
demand for beef increased at the end of the War, the decline in butter production after 1915 was 
undoubtedly a result of ranchers stopping to milk their cows to focus on their core business. 
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The war-time cattle demand, which had helped cattle owners build up an export trade gave way 
to a depression in prices by 1921/1922. Inevitably, the 1921/1922 depression in cattle and maize 
prices saw many ranchers milking their cattle to supplement their incomes. In 1921 Nobbs 
reported that the dairy industry has received a “considerable stimulus not only from the gradual 
opening of overseas markets, but also from the low prices of maize and the difficulties foreseen 
in the way of finding markets for beef cattle.”373 Not unexpectedly, butter production figures, 
which had begun to fall from 1916 onwards, received an impetus from 1922, and record levels 
were achieved successively in 1923 and 1924 when 338 343 lb. and 425 018 lb. respectively 
were manufactured on farms.374 The inverse relationship between the beef and dairy industries 
indicates that the cattle that were used for beef production were, indeed, the same that were used 
for the production of dairy products. Although Southern Rhodesia still relied on imports for her 
cheese requirements, by 1923, the country had become self sufficient in milk and butter. While 
the increase in milk, cheese and butter production, both on farms and at creameries might point 
to the steady development of commercial dairying by 1923, and thus paint a glowing picture of 
the industry, it hides the fact that this growth was premised, as Cory observed, on a “wrong 
foundation”.375 
 
By 1923, Southern Rhodesia had begun to export cheese to South Africa in summer, when 
supply outstripped demand. Although these developments point to an encouraging improvement 
in the dairy industry, particularly in the marketing system, a lot needed to be done to ensure that 
creameries and cheese factories operated smoothly. While lauding these developments, the 
Director of Agriculture in 1923 warned that “those engaged in this work are largely novices with 
little experience, they still require technical education, and there is need for such personal visits 
on the part of our expert. There is, of course, much room for improvement.”376 As chapter 4 
demonstrates, the effect of the parlous state of both handling and marketing processes at a time 
when milk and butter figures were soaring from the early 1920s badly hurt the dairy industry at a 
time when the industry was beginning to look to entering the export market.  
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Handling and marketing of milk and butter 
This section focuses on the handling and marketing systems that were developed prior to 1923. It 
illustrates that the foundation of commercial dairying as a side-line to beef cattle ranching had a 
negative impact on the handling and processing of milk and butter fat on the farms. It also 
outlines the move by government towards playing a more central role in the marketing of butter, 
particularly with the construction of creameries. Many ranchers did not possess the requisite 
infrastructure and equipment to handle dairy products, hence the low quality milk and butter fat 
that was produced on many farms. Unable to purchase fences for the creation of paddocks, many 
ranchers kraaled their cattle at night and grazed them only during daytime, a system they adopted 
from the indigenous people. After touring many farms in the country Maidment complained that 
cattle were only allowed grazing during the day, and were trapped into unhealthy kraals at night. 
She complained the kraals “are no protection as they are simply pieces of ground, with either 
walls built round or thick bush fences. Sometimes there are posts in the ground inside the kraal to 
which the cows are secured with much persuasion for the milking process.”377 For hygienic 
purposes, the instructress recommended that cow houses be built, as milking cows would do 
better if sheltered during the cold nights. 
 
With regards to the milking process, the Instructress bemoaned that cows were not trained to 
give off their milk in the presence of their calves.378 Drawing from indigenous milking methods 
discussed in the previous chapter, farmers practised the habit of separating the calves from the 
cows only overnight, and the calves were allowed to feed interchangeably with the milking 
process, in an attempt to coerce the cow to give off more milk. This system, the instructress said, 
was unnecessary because cows could be trained to release milk even in the absence of the calf, 
and crucially, it led to diseases for both the cow and the calf through infection of the udders. In a 
veiled attack on the ‘old fashioned’ system, Maidment said: 
The milking process both in Matabelaland and Mashonaland, I must say it was the 
funniest thing I ever saw in my life, and I have yet to be convinced that a cow could 
not be trained to give her milk, if properly managed, after the first calf. Under the 
present system it is impossible to milk cows properly, and both cows and calves suffer. 
If the calves were taken away and reared separately, and the cows, which are now kept 
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for dairy purposes, were thoroughly milked, we should hear less of swollen and 
diseased udders and calf sickness, and there would be a very much larger quantity of 
milk yielded by the cows.379 
Maidment also recommended that technical education and training be introduced for both stock-
owners and farm workers, the majority of whom were Africans, in the handling of milk and 
production of farm butter. These calls, however, together with many other recommendations 
concerning the care of dairy stock were not heeded. Besides lack of capital, which acutely 
affected them, the majority of ranchers were unwilling to invest significantly in an industry they 
viewed as an aside to the main business of beef cattle production. For as long as the milk, butter 
and cheese produced was generally consumed within the territory, this scenario did not pose 
many problems. However, when more butter and cheese was produced over and above local 
requirements from about 1923 onwards, and Southern Rhodesia entered the international markets 
for butter and cheese, the challenges associated with the foundation of dairy farming on such a 
base were more strongly felt. 
 
On the marketing side, neither the government nor producers were directly involved in the 
establishment of creameries and dairies prior to 1908. These lay in the hands of private 
enterprise.380 For the first four years after the announcement of the White Agricultural Policy, 
creameries continued to be solely in the hands of private enterprises, with farmers having limited 
say in their running. Given the high perishability of dairy products, however, the long distance, 
and the lack of swift transport for the movement of milk and cream from farms to creameries 
compromised the quality of the milk and cream that was delivered to creameries. Cory noted that 
in some instances the cream had to travel considerable distances by road and rail – and in all 
kinds of weather – before reaching its destination (some of it being several days en route and 
arriving in barely usable condition).381  Faced with this problem, some farmers preferred to 
market their own milk, butter and cheese directly to the public. With Government not directly 
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involved in the marketing of dairy products, the maintenance of hygienic standards was left in 
the hands of municipal authorities. As Cory said: 
Milk supplies for the larger towns however were better organised as the producers 
thereof were by this time expected to comply with certain minimum hygienic 
requirements which were enforced by the local authorities. Nevertheless there was 
much room for improvement. None of this milk was pasteurised and it was the usual 
practice in most areas – urban and rural – to boil or scald the milk before use.382 
By 1910, white farmers themselves began to complain about the scarcity of creameries within 
reasonable distances from farmers. The Rhodesia Stock Owners Association (Bulawayo) 
mourned that “without the factory to take whatever cream may be obtainable, dairy farming at 
any distance from towns would have to follow the old-fashioned system of the domestic churn 
with all its associated drawbacks.”383 The Department of Agriculture was pushed to take an 
active role in providing a market for producers. In 1910 Nobbs stated that the “time seems close 
at hand when the manufacture of butter on factory lines, co-operative or otherwise, is inevitable, 
the raw product – milk – becoming more and more plentiful.”384 
 
In 1912 the Department of Agriculture established the first state-owned creamery in Gwelo. The 
creamery received milk cream from producers for the manufacture of butter and cheese. Payment 
to producers was based on the quality of the butter fat received, and the creamery employed a 
qualified man for such grading. The butter fat was graded into four classes, each with its own 
price: first class, second class, third class and ungraded. Occasionally, the Dairy Expert would 
visit the creamery to test the cream and butter fat sent by farmers, as well as the quality of the 
butter and cheese manufactured at the creamery. The Rhodesia Stock Owners’ Association 
(Bulawayo) lauded the development as a major step forward in the development of an organised 
marketing system. Unlike the old system, the association noted that the system gave stock 
owners an opportunity to conduct their business on ‘modern lines’, producing the milk at distant 
points, separating on the farm and despatching the cream to a central factory, where it will be 
paid for on the basis of actual butter fat supplied. 385  However, some dissatisfaction was 
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expressed by farmers regarding the methods of testing cream, the price paid for butter fat, and 
the standards used to grade butter fat, among other issues. Farmers felt short-changed by the 
system, particularly in situations when the Dairy Expert visited and down-graded some cream 
and butter fat.386 This marked the beginning of contestations between farmers, creameries and 
the government over grading and pricing mechanisms which, as demonstrated in chapters 4, 5 
and 6, dominated their interaction. 
 
The Gwelo Creamery, however, was the only state-sponsored creamery to be opened during the 
time of Company rule in Southern Rhodesia. As butter and cheese production began to increase 
from 1921 onwards, the co-operative spirit that had been extinguished by the farmers’ failure to 
take over the Devonshire and Café Creamery in the mid-1900s was re-birthed. Three previously 
privately owned butter factories were bought off by farmers in Salisbury, and amalgamated to 
form the Farmers’ Co-operative Industries in 1921.387 The number of co-operative concerns 
continued to increase so much that by 1923, four creameries were operating in the territory, that 
is, the Gwelo Creamery, the Farmers’ Co-operative Creamery Depot, Salisbury; the Rhodesia 
Co-operative Creamery, Bulawayo and the Model Dairy in Bulawayo.388 In addition, no less than 
24 cheese factories were in operation throughout the territory, and as in the case of creameries, 
most of them were established between 1921 and 1923, when milk, butter and cheese production 
figures began to soar. With the increase in the number of creameries, the amount of farm-made 
butter, with all its pitfalls, began to decrease, while creamery butter recorded substantial 
increases. The output of creamery butter was 554 206 lb. in 1923, as against 282 85 lb. in 1922; 
whilst that of farm butter fell from 391 058 lb. to 338 343 lb. during the same period.389 Added 
together, total butter production in 1923 was 892 549 lb. Emerging from this is the fact that 
although the state had become involved in the marketing of dairy products, most creameries and 
factories at this stage were either privately or co-operatively run. 
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“The squeezing-out process”: The White Agricultural Policy and African livestock and 
dairy regimes 
As noted in the previous chapter, African agricultural producers took advantage of settlers’ 
indifferent attitude towards agriculture during the last decade of the 19th century and produced 
for the market. The Company’s desire to focus on settler agriculture that was awakened from the 
mid 1900s inevitably meant that settlers had to contend with African competition. Even more 
problematic was the fact that a thriving African agricultural sector would have the effect of 
limiting the amount of cheap African labour, itself an important variable in the success of settler 
agriculture. The position of African cattle owners was generally worse than that of those that 
tilled the land. With major cattle diseases seemingly under control,390 the settler herd had begun 
to grow considerably by so much that it overtook the African herd for the first time in 1919.391 
This meant that settler cattle owners competed for grazing lands with Africans resident on 
European land. In fact, the African herd itself was on the rebound, more than doubling from just 
under 200 000 in 1908 to over 400 000 by1914.392 
 
The post 1908 period thus witnessed a systematic and intentional crushing of African agricultural 
enterprise. With regards to dairy farming, as had happened after 1893, the decades following the 
adoption of WAP were followed by further weakening of African capacity to produce surplus 
milk and other dairy products for the market. However, whereas during the early years of 
occupation it was negated mostly by the outbreak of diseases and cattle losses at the hands of the 
Company and settlers, African prosperity in dairy farming after 1908 was generally a result of a 
deliberate effort by the colonial administration to ensure minimal competition from indigenous 
people. The relentless assault on African cattle owners’ enterprises was described by the Civil 
Commissioner for Bulawayo, Marshall Hole, as the ‘squeezing-out process’.393 
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As the implementation of WAP gathered momentum, voices of both the Company and settlers on 
the need for a revision of existing patterns of land ownership and utilisation were raised. By 
1908 the Company, with the support of the few farmers on the land had realised that the position 
of Africans resident on both alienated and unalienated land, was no longer tenable. They wanted 
to revisit with a view to move most of them onto the less productive reserves. This, it was hoped, 
would not only reduce African prosperity, but also create a ready pool of labour on settler farms. 
The passage of Private Locations Ordinance in 1908 was thus the first of many attempts to move 
Africans off European land. Modelled along nineteenth century South African landlord-tenant 
legislation, the Private Locations Ordinance stipulated that all agreements with tenants should be 
in written form and undersigned by the Native Commissioner; that owners in occupation of land 
needed licences worth 1 shilling yearly for each African on their farm, while absent landlords 
had to pay 5 Shilling for every African on the farm.394 
 
Arguing from a paternalist perspective, Lewis Gann argued that the Ordinance was promulgated 
to “protect” Africans residing on European lands “from the worst of abuses” at the hands of the 
European land owners. To the extent that the ordinance was passed to deal with labour shortages 
on settler farms and mines, Gann’s premise has been discredited.Revisionist scholars like Rennie 
have argued that, though it was disguised as an attack on absent landlords who made a living 
from rents extracted from African producers, the Private Locations Ordinance was really an 
attempt to ‘deny Africans the use of white owned land, except in the capacity as labourers.’395 
Christopher Youé argues that the ordinance was a two pronged weapon: aimed both at allowing 
for extensive occupation of European land and reducing the number of Africans occupying 
alienated land.396 
 
It should be noted, however, that the proclamation of the Private Locations Ordinance was not 
entirely successful in curbing land tenancy. With some land owners simply passing on the 5 
Shilling to willing tenants, a considerable number of Africans remained on European land, 
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possibly producing even more products for the market in order to meet increased rent demands. 
It was not until 1925, with the institution of the Morris Carter land commission, that a more 
pointed attack on land tenancy was launched together with the call for segregation, as a result of 
growing settler fears of African competition for both land and labour. Its weaknesses 
notwithstanding, the Ordinance led to the movement of many Africans onto the reserves, 
particularly in Mashonaland. The Chief Native Commissioner for Mashonaland in 1908 reported 
that 1 335 Africans living on previously expropriated had to move to the reserves as their 
numbers were in excess of the permitted 40 adult males per farm.397 Similarly, the Chief Native 
Commissioner for Matabeleland lamented that 199 indigenous people had left European land as 
a result of the ordinance.398 In effect, however, the number of displaced Africans was much 
higher: Palmer states that districts like Belingwe, Bubi, Bulawayo Matobo and Umzingwane 
recorded between 50% and 100% more people leaving European land than what official numbers 
show between 1910 and 1911.399 
 
The imposition of rents on all Africans occupying unalienated land was yet another step towards 
stifling African agrarian prosperity. From as early as 1906 officials had begun to voice their 
misgivings for allowing Africans to prosper on Company land at a time when labour was acutely 
scarce on settler farms. Indeed, one member of the Legislative Council in 1906 argued that 
legislating for a rent on unalienated land “might have the effect of sending labour on to the 
farms.”400 Again modelled along the 1884 Natal Squatters Rent Law, the introduction of rentals 
on unalienated land was done in 1909. Whereas the Private Locations Ordinance aimed at 
removing Africans from land allocated to settlers for occupation, the introduction of rentals was 
aimed at driving them off unalienated land. The rentals, as did the Private Locations Ordinance, 
resulted in the movement of many Africans off this land onto reserves. Unable to pay the high 
rentals charged by the Company, many Africans were forced to move off the land, with the 
consequence that some districts were ‘cleansed’ of all Africans formerly resident therein. For 
instance, the Native Commissioner for Fort Victoria reported in 1910 that nearly all of Chief 
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Bere’s people had moved onto the reserves, in the process totally dismembering the community 
under his jurisdiction.401 
 
Many settler cattle owners took advantage of the introduction of rentals on unalienated land to 
increase rentals for their own tenants who competed with them in the beef and dairy business. 
Writing in 1912, the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland complained that many settler 
cattle ranchers had begun to charge grazing fees on top of the usual rents.402 The financial burden 
placed upon African cattle owners by the rentals and fees was exacerbated by the introduction in 
1914 of the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance. Whereas the issue of cattle dipping had been 
optional since 1910, the 1914 Ordinance made it mandatory for all cattle within an area where 
the majority of stock owners had expressed the desire to dip their livestock.403  Without any 
consultations, Africans in some districts were forced to pay dipping fees of 1 or 2 Shilling per 
head per annum. In 1914, the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance was passed, which “enabled 
compulsory dipping to be applied in any area where this was the wish of the majority of 
farmers.”404 These financial demands helped to drive African livestock owners away from land 
earmarked for settler occupation. 
 
Unable to meet the increased financial obligations placed on them, many Africans and their 
cattle moved out of European areas onto the detested reserves. As happened in South Africa after 
the passage of the Native Land Act in 1913 which, as Sandra Swart argues, was just as hard on 
black-owned animals as it was on their owners, the passage of the Private Locations Ordinance 
and other fees in Southern Rhodesia led to the displacement of many African owned cattle.405 
The Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland reported that numerous Africans were 
complaining about having to pay so many fees and taxes, noting that he expected no less than 
7 400 people, together with some 11 000 head of cattle, to migrate into Belingwe, Gwaai, Lower 
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Gwelo, Que Que, and Shangani reserves.406  The number of cattle that did move with their 
owners onto the reserves was reduced by the fact that many Africans lost many of their herds as 
they prepared to leave European farms. A couple of issues led to this scenario: firstly, the 
imposition of restrictions on cattle movement as a result of the re-emergence of East Coast Fever 
in 1912. This made it very difficult, and sometimes impossible for cattle to be moved from one 
district to another. Secondly, some settlers denied Africans evicted from other farms the 
permission to pass through their farms with cattle on the purported grounds of fear of the spread 
of diseases.407 This forced Africans to sell their cattle to settler farmers at low prices. From the 
foregoing, it may be safely argued here that while the earlier-mentioned increase in the settler 
stock was due to a decrease in stock disease, the continued loss of cattle by Africans partly 
contributed to this phenomenon, thus curtailing their capacity to produce milk. 
 
If the conditions of reserves at their initial creation from the late 1890s were bad, the situation 
was further worsened by the further reduction in their size that happened between 1908 and 
1914. Anxious to accommodate an increasing number of settlers, the Company sanctioned a 
move aimed at reducing the size of the reserves. The revision of the boundaries was initially 
done with a view to increasing or reducing the size of reserves, depending on individuals. In 
1908, however, the Surveyor-General, W.J. Atherstone, argued that many reserves, mostly in 
Mashonaland were too big, adding that many of them needed to be reduced. This received the 
excited support of the Estates Department, which contended that the reduction was necessary in 
light of the need to find more land for in-coming settlers. As the process of re-configuring the 
reserves’ boundaries began, F.W.A Taylor, an official of the Estates Department, stated that the 
re-configuring of borders should be done with a view to release more “land considered suitable 
for (settler) settlement” by creating boundaries which would “exclude from them such land as is 
recommended for farming purposes.”408 Despite Company reservations on what it considered 
inadequate changes, which in itself led to the appointment of another Commission in 1914,409 
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some half a million acres of land formerly designated as reserves had been expropriated and 
earmarked for settler occupation.410Given that milk is a highly perishable product, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, sending milk to creameries and dairies from remote areas became very 
difficult. 
 
There can be little doubt about the impact of the ‘squeeze’ on African cattle and milk regimes. 
Although there were no discriminatory laws and policies on the dairy market at this stage, the 
forced movement of Africans on to the reserves weakened their capacity to produce for the 
market. The previous chapter has shown that the reserves were inhospitable for both human and 
animal life. The situation was worse for the Matabeleland province, where the Gwaai and 
Shangani reserves were notorious for their arid climate, poor soils and debilitating bovine 
diseases. Marketing of products on the official markets was made nearly impossible by the fact 
that when re-configuring the reserves’ boundaries, the Estates Department ensured that few 
reserves were located near the major railways and roads. Because milk is a highly perishable 
commodity which needs to be transported to the market almost immediately after marketing, few 
Africans were able to send milk to existing dairies. While there are no official figures showing 
milk production and marketing in the reserves prior to the late 1920s, Cory remarked that the 
paucity of figures of milk delivered to dairies and creameries was a result of the fact that very 
little, if any milk was received from reserves during the period under review.411 He added that as 
Africans and their stock were still attempting to adjust to life in the reserves prior to the 1930s, it 
was “predictable that the primary concern of many would be to produce enough for family 
consumption, with some whatever surplus left circulating within the community.”412 Owing to 
the negligibly small contribution of African milk on the official market, the African sector was 
not included as being part of the country’s dairy industry. 
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It should be noted, however, that a few wealthier Africans managed to participate on the official 
dairy market in spite of the displacements. A few Africans, mostly of South African and 
Batswana origin, took advantage of the existence of a clause in the 1898 Southern Rhodesia 
Orders in Council which gave Africans the right to “acquire, hold, encumber, and dispose of land 
on the same conditions as a person who is not a native.”413 Although the Company was generally 
disinclined to sell land to Africans, having acquiesced to the clause only to appease the Colonial 
Office, it however did not have the power to stop settlers from selling land to Africans who had 
the money to buy freehold farms. A number of well to do black South Africans and a group of 
Basotho people were able to purchase farms from settlers who had decided to move out of the 
country. Indeed, 14 farms, constituting 46 966 acres of land, were purchased by Africans 
between 1896 and 1925. Half of these farms were acquired by black South Africans.414 
 
However, it was the Basotho who had settled in Fort Victoria district who embarked on 
commercial dairy farming. Jacob Molebaleng and three others purchased Erichsthal Farm415 in 
the Victoria District from the Posselt Family for £1000 in 1907.416 It was owned in four equal 
but undivided shares which meant that they lived on the farm as a community rather than as 
individual private owners. Led by Ephraim Morudu, another group of nine Basotho men bought 
Niekerk’s Rust Farm, near the Harawe area in 1909, and administered it like a small co-operative 
society, into which many other people subsequently joined. 417  In his study of the Basotho 
communities in Southern Rhodesia, Joseph Mujere has demonstrated the manner in which the 
Basotho on the two farms used their links to the Dutch Reformed Church missionaries to access 
education and resources to construct relatively well developed infrastructure on their farms 
which enabled them, among other things, to produce milk and cream for the nearby dairies and 
creameries in Victoria and Gwelo.418 
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The only report of indigenous black people who also acquired land and built dairy infrastructure 
came from Rugby farm, which was owned by 21 Karanga men who had been trained as teachers 
at the Dutch Reformed Church Mission at Morgenster. After initially failing to purchase the farm 
from the BSAC in 1909, they managed to acquire it for 100 head of cattle in 1911.419 One of the 
part owners of the farm had accumulated a huge herd of cattle, and by 1920 had managed to 
purchase a cream separator, among other dairy utensils. By 1925 Rugby farm had become one of 
the key suppliers of milk and cream at dairies in Victoria and Gwelo. 420  The Native 
Commissioner for Victoria in 1925 reported that together with producers at Erichsthal and 
Niekerk farms, Rugby farm represented a breed of “progressive” and “intelligent natives” who, 
because of their level of education, ownership of property and their entrepreneurial skills”, had 
become a paragon of “hard work and determination”, which fellow Africans in reserves should 
emulate.421 However, the administrator’s sentiments are predicated on an underlying bias and 
fundamental misconception about the political and socio-economic imperatives that shaped the 
position of Africans in dairying, and agriculturein general. First is the erroneous assumption that 
Africans in the reserves were not successful in commercial dairying because of a lack of 
intelligence and “entrepreneurial skills”. The previous chapter has shown that Africans did take 
advantage of opportunities on the milk market during the early 1890s, before they were thwarted 
by the predatory colonial state and new stock diseases. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
further steps were taken by the colonial administration to weaken African agriculture, a point 
which the Commissioner does not mention. 
 
Secondly, the commissioner failed to note the fact that lack of capital, education and training 
among Africans during the 1920s was a result of the discriminatory policies of the Company 
government. Whereas the Company offered financial and technical support in the procurement of 
land, cattle, and labour, no such support was advanced to African communities. Indeed, a look at 
the Africans who purchased land and erected milk and cream producing infrastructure shows that 
they had received both their education and capital from non government-related institutions. 
From the foregoing, therefore, it may be feasibly argued that increased African inactivity on the 
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colonial market was a direct result of the “squeezing-out” process on which the Company 
embarked as it sought to strengthen settler agriculture from 1908 onwards.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the impact of WAP on the development of settler dairy farming in 
Southern Rhodesia, particularly focusing on the role of the Company in helping – technically and 
financially –settlers to establish a viable industry that ensured a steady supply of milk, butter and 
cheese to the growing settler population. It has been argued that notwithstanding this support, 
dairy farming only grew as a side line to the more popular beef production. Given the exacting 
nature of milk and butter production, coupled with the fact that it was not as lucrative as beef 
production, few settlers were prepared to commit resources into dairy farming on a long term 
basis, preferring to produce milk and butter on a part time basis. With a paucity of dairy cows 
(both heifers and bulls) in the country, much of the milk that was produced locally was derived 
from beef cattle ranchers who merely dabbled in dairying when beef prices dropped. The 
developments, particularly increased milk and butter output and the erection of creameries and 
cheese factories, did little to mask the fact that dairy farming as an agricultural industry had not 
yet taken off on a sound foundation.  
 
This chapter further discussed the implications of WAP on African dairy production. It has 
demonstratedthat African success on the dairy market between 1908 and 1923 was further 
diminished by the displacements which took place after the institution of the Private Locations 
Ordinance and the introduction of increased rents on unalienated lands. Although some Africans 
who had purchased farms were able to use their land and livestock on the colonial market, they 
constituted a small percentage of the total population. In fact, they had defied a system carefully 
instituted to ensure that Africans would not compete with settler producers on the market. Thus, 
the period after 1908 marked the heightening of the process of eliminating Africa dairy produce 
from the colonial market. While issues of hygiene and cleanliness were raised later, the assault 
during this time was predicated on the need to minimise African agricultural competition in 
general. The overarching argument in this chapter, therefore, is that while the administration was 
largely successful in eliminating African competition in the cattle industry, attempts to establish 
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a sound settler dominated dairy industry were not successful: to all intents and purposes, the 
country was, by 1923, still suckling on the udders of beef cows.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Cream rises? Butter Production, the Dairy Produce Act and the segregation 
debate, 1924 – 1935  
 
Introduction 
The mid-1920s represented a key phase in the development of Southern Rhodesia’s dairy 
industry. Whereas the country had long depended both on the Union of South Africa and Britain 
for imports to avert domestic shortages, the mid 1920s marked the first time that Southern 
Rhodesia produced a butter surplus, which, in turn, led to its active participation on the 
international export market. This coincided with the culmination of political events in the 
country which led to the induction of a settler government, a development which settler farmers 
hoped would bring better fortunes for the country’s agrarian sector. Within the context of a 
complex set of socio-economic and political dynamics that prevailed during the period under 
review, this chapter examines the development trajectory that dairy farming – both settler and 
African – took during the first decade of self-rule, from 1924 until the mid-1930s. It focuses 
particularly on butter, which was the flagship dairy product for the entire pre-Second World War 
period, analysing the implications of increasing butter production on the industry. It will be 
argued that, owing to an inadequate domestic market, the soaring production levels of the 1920s 
necessarily meant that Southern Rhodesia was forced to enter the international export market 
prematurely.  
 
This chapter seeks to add to existing historiography on the performance of Southern Rhodesia’s 
agricultural commodities on external markets (which is currently dominated by beef, maize and 
tobacco), and the local dynamics that shaped their experiences.422 It outlines the problems that 
dairy farmers and creameries faced on the markets, and examines the interventions that were 
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taken to help the industry toparticipate on the export market profitably. In the main, it focuses on 
the Dairy Produce Act that was passed in 1925. Modelled along similarly named and couched 
Australian legislation, but implemented under different socio-economic circumstances (as this 
chapter will show), the Dairy Produce Act was meant to provide Rhodesian farming with the 
much needed respite both locally and internationally. It demonstrates that the state missed the 
key point that farmers were largely responsible for low quality butter exports.  
 
While very little was done by the state to intervene in the farm processes, white farmers and 
some consumers raised their concerns about the continued participation of African producers on 
the colonial dairy market, blaming them for producing low grade cream under unhygienic 
conditions. This chapter ends with an examination of the debate within the settler community on 
the suitability of African participation on the market, and the racial prejudices that accompanied 
it. It engages literature on the African body, culture and cleanliness in analysing the premises on 
which settler arguments against African commercial dairy farming rested. The core argument 
made in this chapter is that the state’s insistence on reforming manufacturing processes and 
ignoring farm production methods, and white farmers’ position that African producers alone 
were responsible for producing low grade cream were tantamount to missing the point; hence 
Southern Rhodesia continued to struggle on the export scene until the 1930s. 
 
Background: Self-Rule and its implication for agriculture 
The relationship between the Company and the settler community in Southern Rhodesia had 
become strained by the second decade of the 20th century.423 With the white population growing 
in number and influence, this community began to question the basis of the Company’s claim to 
land in the country, and by 1910 the matter of land ownership had become contentious. The 
majority of settler farmers felt the Company was too pre-occupied with making profits for its 
shareholders at the expense of settler agricultural development. Indeed, as early as 1901 this 
body of people, which was beginning to operate as a group, had begun to argue that the private 
interests of the stakeholders were outweighing the interests of the settlers and the country at 
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large.424 These calls grew louder with Charles Coghlan, himself a prominent lawyer, criticising 
the dual role of the Company (as both a government and a commercial entity) as “repugnant to 
anyone of British stock.”425 The general sentiment was that “it was no longer desirable to have a 
commercial company as a governing body.”426 In 1914, the Colonial Office agreed to refer the 
matter to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
 
With the Company, settlers, the Crown and Africans all taking an active interest in the matter, 
the Privy Council in 1918 ruled that the Crown – rather than the Company – was the ultimate 
owner and custodian of all land in Southern Rhodesia. The ruling effectively meant that the 
Company could not trade in land, its treasured asset and out of which it had intended to make 
long-term profits. The result was that the Company lost its desire to administer the country; it 
intimated to the Colonial Office that it would cease its administrative duties upon the charter’s 
expiry in 1923.427 In a referendum in October 1922, settlers were given the option of self-rule or 
amalgamating with the Union of South Africa as its fifth province. The vote was in favour of 
self-rule (also called Responsible Government). Thus did settler nationalism, defined by loyalty 
towards the ideal of ‘political individuality’, triumph over the lure of economic inducements 
offered by General Smuts, then Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. From October 
1923, the colony acquired self-rule under the Responsible Government Party, under the 
leadership of Charles Coghlan.  
 
The impact of self-rule in Southern Rhodesia has received considerable scholarly attention. 
Martin Loney has argued that self-rule meant that the country enjoyed significantly enhanced 
autonomy to chart its socio-economic trajectory.428 Scholars like Astrow and McBride, on the 
other hand, argued that settlers in Southern Rhodesia continued in their role as the local face of 
global imperialism.429 However, Phimister, has posited that the state of the international markets, 
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and Southern Rhodesia’s subservient role on them played a greater role in shaping the colony’s 
economic fortunes.430 Using dairy farming as a lens, this chapter and chapter 4 demonstrate that 
although the colonial state did acquire more control over local politics, especially in the 
subjugation of African agricultural enterprise, the fledgling settler agricultural sector suffered as 
a result of the harsh realities on the international markets. Although the Department of 
Agriculture provide more administrative apparatus for research, and provided more technical 
assistance and advice to settler farmers through agricultural colleges and demonstration farms 
and the new Land Agricultural Bank formed in 1924,431 the dairy industry struggled to penetrate 
international and regional markets profitably. The next section discusses the factors leading to 
Southern Rhodesia’s entrance onto the export market. 
 
Increasing production and entrance onto the export market 
The circumstances in the beef industry, which had been largely responsible for the dairying 
‘boom’ as explained in the previous chapter, persisted throughout the 1920s, hence contributing 
to the continued expansion of butter, milk and cheese production. As early as 1923, Nobbs had 
reported that “as a direct result of the difficulties in the way of selling slaughter cattle, attention 
is being forced towards dairying. This, in the case of the smaller man, is a most desirable 
development.”432 This led to increased butter output. It is argued here that increasing butter 
production beyond local requirements forced the country to enter the highly competitive export 
market at a time when the local industry was not in a position to participate competitively with 
the major producing countries of the world. The ensuing debate between farmers, creameries and 
the government precipitated legislative intervention aimed at addressing problems lying at the 
base of commercial dairy farming.The post 1923 decade was characterised by an unprecedented 
growth in both farm butter (butter made on the farm by the cattle owner) and creamery butter. As 
the table below shows, output had been trebled between 1922 and 1927. 
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Graph 2: Dairy Production, white Farmers, 1922 – 1927.433 
 
A significant feature in the distribution of the increase in butter production was the geographical 
imbalance that had begun to emerge by the early 1920s. Although the Matabeleland region had, 
over time, become perceived to be more suited to a cattle economy, the output of butter was 
generally much lower when compared to Mashonaland, which had begun to contribute the “great 
bulk” of the country’s butter and cheese. 434  In his 1928 report, Hamilton stated that 
“Mashonaland farmers continue to make the great bulk of our locally produced butter and 
cheese.”435 He added in 1930 that the minimal butter supplies from Matabeleland actually came 
from African producers.436 Although, topographically, Matabeleland was better suited to cattle 
ranching, its considerably more arid climate was less suitable for milk production in comparison 
with Mashonaland. 
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An important consequence of the increase in dairy production was that the country was faced 
with the necessity to enter the export market by 1924. Even during the years when droughts 
necessitated a decrease, the figures were still higher than local demand. This development, 
therefore, was not so much indicative of the growth and maturation of the dairy industry as it was 
a result of a limited internal market. Indeed, it is argued here that the relatively small settler 
population in the country during this time meant that there would always be more butter than the 
internal market, comprising almost exclusively the settler community, could consume. Despite 
the policy to attract as many settler immigrants into the country as possible, the settler 
community constituted a very small proportion of Southern Rhodesia’s total population at any 
time in the country’s history. Besides the slow inflow of immigration, also contributing to the 
low white population in Southern Rhodesia was the fact that over half of new arrivals did not 
settle in the country permanently, but soon emigrated to other British colonies. As Josiah 
Brownell and Alois Mlambo demonstrate for the pre-Federation and post-UDI periods 
respectively, although immigrants who came to Southern Rhodesia were referred to as settlers, 
few of them actually did settle in the country.437 As the table below shows, the white population 
constituted about 4.4% of the total population in 1921, and had risen to a mere 4.7% by 1941. 
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Graph 3: Settler and total population in Southern Rhodesia, 1921 to 1941.438 
The African population, which comprised the country’s majority, could not be regarded as a 
stable market at this time. Predominantly rural, the vast majority of Africans did not consider 
butter, cheese and market milk as an important part of their diet. As discussed in chapter 2, 
Africans had their own ‘traditional’ methods of processing and preparing milk products which 
did not only pre-date but subsisted parallel to the colonial market systems. Timothy Burke’s 
study on the dynamics shaping the consumption of commodities in Southern Rhodesia reveals 
that although the “tastes” and “needs” of Africans were slowly changing as they became more 
integrated into the cash economy through proletarianisation, their response to the consumption of 
market butter and cheese was slow.439 In any case, their position on the periphery of the colonial 
socio-economic system meant that creamery butter, milk and cheese were beyond the reach of 
most rural Africans. Thus, Southern Rhodesia began to look beyond its borders for the disposal 
of butter, and to a lesser extent, cheese. Although fresh milk production was also soaring during 
the period under review, the rate of increase was relatively lower as most farmers chose to 
produce cream for the manufacture of butter. Considering its keeping qualities and the limited 
contemporary technology available, the movement of milk within the country, let alone outside 
the borders for export, was restricted. The country was faced with surplus butter each year from 
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1924 until the late 1930s. In 1926, for instance, 774 961 lbs valued at £55 537 were exported to 
the Union of South Africa, Congo and Northern Rhodesia. 440  Cory admitted then that the 
industry would have to depend on the export market for the disposal of surplus butter not so 
much because the country was producing huge stocks of butter in comparison with other 
countries, but because of the low consumption levels at the time.441 
 
Yet, the country’s successful participation on the international market hinged on its ability to 
produce commodities of a reasonably high quality, which would enable it to compete with other 
established countries in the world. Whereas the issue of quality had not been given much 
attention prior to 1924, the low quality of Southern Rhodesian butter was dramatically exposed 
when the state began to look to the regional and international markets for the disposal of its 
product. A government-authored report describing the general state of agriculture in 1924 
succinctly captured the state of affairs in the dairy industry at the time: 
                             The old days in Rhodesia when there was a local market for all that a farmer 
could produce have passed…as late comers into these (foreign) markets, it may be 
difficult to dispose of Rhodesian dairy products unless it can be proved that they 
are as good in quality as those produced by our competitors.442 
In the same article, the government conceded that nearly all the butter that was made on farms 
was unsuitable for export on account of the “unacceptably bad conditions under which it was 
made.”443 For instance, reflecting on the 1924 season, Hamilton, the Dairy Expert, lamented that 
the “proportion of low grade butter coming out of the creameries’ churns is quite high”.444 This 
state of affairs, as shall be explained later in this section, derived from a miscellany of factors, 
ranging from lack of dairy cows, inadequate infrastructure on the farms, unhygienic practices 
and the manufacturing procedures. 
 
Creamery and farmers’ representatives acknowledged the need for a concerted effort if Southern 
Rhodesia’s dairy industry were to participate competitively on the international stage where 
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countries like Canada, New Zealand and Denmark had long established themselves. A 
representative of the Rhodesia Creameries of Bulawayo lamented that the small local demand for 
butter was forcing creameries to look to “enter the highly competitive regional and international 
markets at a time when the industry was still dominated by low grade butter and cheese.”445 In 
the same vein, the chairman of the Umtali District Farmers’ Association admitted in 1925 that 
his association “considers that something should be done to improve the grade of butter that is 
produced in this country, [the] quality of the article is very bad.”446 The Assistant Dairy Expert, 
Cory, admitted that “not less than half of the country’s butter was either second or third grade, 
particularly in the Matabeleland province where temperatures (are) higher and rainfall erratic.”447 
In this light, the Minister of Agriculture tabled the Dairy Produce Bill in the Legislative 
Assembly in 1925 while the Dairy Division introduced the Milk Recording Scheme three years 
later, both of which were intended to redress the problems which bedevilled the dairy industry.  
 
The Dairy Produce Act of 1925  
As a response to the new circumstances facing the dairy industry, the Dairy Produce Act was 
passed in 1925. The legislative intervention was aimed at putting the dairy industry on a firmer 
economic basis through improving the quality of Southern Rhodesian butter. In outlining the 
anticipated impact, the Dairy Expert stated that the Act would “raise the standard of our dairy 
products”, and that this was vital if “as appears likely, Southern Rhodesia is to compete on the 
overseas markets where older colonies and other countries have so firmly established 
themselves.”448 The Secretary for Agriculture described the passage of the bill as a “momentous 
occasion” for dairy farming, while its provisions were anticipated to have “a revolutionary 
impact on the entire spectrum of the industry.”449 
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While there was a general consensus on the need for remedial action to improve the quality of 
Southern Rhodesian butter, there was very little consultation between the government, farmers 
and creameries on the nature and extent of reforms that needed to be made during the period 
leading to the passage of the Act. Instead, government officials seemed more eager to emulate 
legislation from Australia – a similar settler state that had long established itself as a major 
dairying country. Explaining the context of the proposed legislation, Hamilton said:  
               Dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia is profitable for neither the farmer nor co-
operative creamery. This has come about as a result of the country’s entrance onto 
the regional and international butter market, and our product has not fetched a 
decent price as a result of its inferior quality. It is prudent that we study how 
successful dairying countries in the Dominion worked to improve the quality of 
their butter article over the years. Australia, for example, introduced a uniform 
butter production standard at all creameries...our (butter) article shall continue to 
be inferior unless our processes are similarly regulated.450 
It is thus not surprising that the Dairy Produce Act was modelled along the similarly couched 
Australian Dairy Produce Act of 1903 which put in place standards of cream grading and butter 
manufacturing at creameries and factories.451  The Secretary for Agriculture also referred to 
similar Irish legislation (The Dairy Produce Act of Ireland which had been passed in 1924) 
during intra-department correspondence on the issue.452 The first piece of legislation specifically 
dealing with dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia, the Dairy Produce Act focused, in the main, on 
regulating the processes in the manufacture and packaging of butter and cheese. As shall be 
demonstrated in this section, while the focus on the manufacturing processes should be lauded, 
its failure to effectively address issues that affected farmers at the production level greatly 
limited its effectiveness in strengthening the position of the industry. In any case, the countries 
after which the legislation was modelled had established dairy farmers whose experience in the 
industry was much greater than Southern Rhodesia, whose settlers were still experiencing 
teething problems in dairy farming.  
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One of the key provisions of the Act was in relation to the compulsory registration of all 
creameries, cream depots and cheese factories which received processed and packaged milk and 
cream. 453  In order for any such enterprise to qualify for registration with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Lands, the enterprises needed to satisfy an appointed inspector that their 
premises met set standards in the manufacture of butter, fresh milk and cheese.454 As a quality 
control measure, the chemical composition of butter was regulated, with a stipulation that all 
creamery butter should contain no less than 80% milk fat, no more than 16% water and a 
maximum of 4% salt.455 Seven creameries were registered in 1926, which increased to 11 by 
1935. Similarly, four cheese factories were registered in 1925, with the number rising to 9 in 
1935.456  Dairy officers were employed within the Dairy Division to regularly monitor and 
inspect registered premises, to ensure that minimum hygienic and quality standards were 
followed.  
 
The thinking among government officials throughout the 1920s was that processes at the 
creameries were largely responsible for the low quality of the butter produced in the country. In 
an analysis that explained the rationale behind the legislative intervention, Cory reasoned that 
“the butter-maker at local creameries is not able to churn out the desired article...the majority of 
them do not have the necessary expertise and experience”.457 Giving the example of inspection 
of the Co-op creamery in Salisbury, he added: 
                             During my visits to one of the creameries I paid particular attention to the 
treatment the cream received from the time of arrival to that of churning, and apart 
from the testing, grading, weighing, it received none...the most important part of 
the manufacture was overlooked, namely cooling and blending, due to no cooling 
apparatus being installed. The cold chamber...was too hot for storing butter. Apart 
from the few reasons given which are significant to justify a change, there are 
many others such as site, floor space, and not sufficient provision for chill water. 
In my opinion, the local creamery is totally unsuitable to be used as such.458 
The scathing report, which was generally representative of the majority of the creameries which 
Cory and other inspectors visited, was used as further evidence that the major contributing factor 
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for the poor quality butter was the inadequate facilities and bad manufacturing practices at the 
premises. To this end, the Dairy Division organised a conference to discuss ways in which 
creameries, cheese factories and depots could be assisted to comply with the new regulations. 
Held in Bulawayo in February 1927, creamery representatives appealed for financial assistance 
from the government for the capitalisation of their operations. For instance, one Mr Walker, 
representing the Rhodesia Creameries Bulawayo, argued that, “more than anything else, 
government should urgently find ways of granting financial assistance to all creameries if 
Rhodesian butter is to make an impact on the export market”.459 
 
This view led to calls to the Ministry of Agriculture by the Dairy Division for the provision of 
increased financial and technical assistance to creameries, which would, in turn, help them to 
recapitalise their operations. Besides their perceived lack of expertise and experience, most 
creameries were too small to be able to handle the “ever increasing volumes of cream and milk 
they are handling each year.”460 In his submission to the Secretary for Agriculture, Hamilton 
argued that creameries could not continue to solely depend on their limited funds and that “it is 
time government became more directly involved in assisting co-operative creameries in 
acquiring implements they so badly need at the present moment”. 461  Consequently, the 
government reserved £10 000 each year between 1927 and 1935 for the purchase of churns, 
separators and testing glassware which would enable “Rhodesian creameries to manufacture 
butter which could be safely placed on the overseas market.”462 
 
Although the belief held by most officials of the Dairy Division that many of the problems 
besetting the industry were caused by inadequate manufacturing processes was not entirely 
without merit, there is evidence that the root of the problem lay at the production level. As 
illustrated in the previous chapter, most dairymen were either unable or unwilling to invest in 
dairying on a full time basis, preferring to produce as a mere side-line to beef production. This 
was due to undercapitalisation or the perceived profitability of beef production. Hence, the Dairy 
Produce Act represented a missed opportunity to tackle problems at the root of the dairy farming 
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sector. In fact, the expenditure that was involved in assisting creameries came under some 
criticism from the 1935 Commission of Enquiry into the Dairy and Pig Industries. In light of the 
relatively small dairy industry in the country at the time, the commission argued that instead of 
increasing government spending on creameries, “a reduction in the number of creameries 
operating is imperative if the industry is to be placed on a sound footing.”463 It illustrated that the 
976 000 lb. of butter produced in 1935 could be handled in one creamery, and recommended that 
only four creameries should be left to operate in the country to cater for all geographical regions 
of the country.464 Besides the wasting of resources on underutilised plants, the existence of many 
creameries presented the Dairy Division with more financial and human challenges in 
monitoring and controlling the processing plants. 
 
Officials of the Dairy Division and some creamery officials during the 1920s believed that the 
grading and testing procedures were generally lax and inconsistent, leading to poor quality butter 
receiving a higher grading. To resolve this, the Dairy Produce Act provided that dairy officers 
would, in addition to visiting dairy farms, monitor cream grading and butter testing procedures at 
creameries to ensure uniformity.465 Writing to the Secretary for Agriculture in 1927, Hamilton 
captured this thinking thus: 
                              A stricter grading due to the administration of the Dairy Produce Act should 
result in a higher standard of grades being adopted by the creameries. Now that 
Southern Rhodesia has entered overseas markets with dairy products the necessity 
for this higher standard is at once apparent.466 
 
As a result, dairy officers spent more time inspecting creamery operations than they did on the 
farms. Some creamery owners also believed that the solution to the country’s butter quality 
problems lay with their grading and testing methods. For instance, the manager of Lal Bagh, a 
private creamery based in Bulawayo argued in 1926 that “now that the supply of cream is 
becoming very great, and the country aims at export to compete with the world’s greatest 
communities, I would advocate stricter grading, especially for manufacturing export quality 
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butter.”467 The secretary of the Creamery Committee, a creameries’ representative body, also 
agreed that “the time has now come for the creamery proprietors to adopt a stricter and more 
consistent grading system, one which would reward that producer who sends good cream for 
butter manufacture.”468 
 
The cream grading procedures at most creameries had, indeed, been quite inconsistent, and were 
partially responsible for the production of cream of an inferior quality by farmers. Creameries 
often changed grading schedules in response to seasonal fluctuations. It was customary for 
creameries during winter, when dry conditions469  prevailed, to pay the first grade price for 
second and third grade cream, in order to encourage farmers to maintain production. Butter 
which would normally be graded as third grade would be given a first grade rating when 
production of milk and cream was low, then revert to the normal grading during other seasons of 
the year, when production had increased. After touring the Gwelo Creamery towards the end of 
1926, Cory was outraged that of the 23 cans of third grade cream he inspected, no less than 15 
had received 1st grade rating. Of the 18 cans of 2nd grade cream, no less than 14 had received a 1st 
grade rating.470 In explaining this practice, which was adopted from South African creameries in 
Mafeking and Johannesburg, the Umtali Farmers’ Association contended that the practice at least 
encouraged farmers to increase production in winter, when there would be little natural pasturage 
to feed cows, thus limiting the amount of imports during winter, and then exporting during other 
seasons. 471  Although it is true that incentives were considered necessary instruments in 
encouraging winter milk and cream production in countries such as South Africa, Australia and 
England , none of the said countries used a differential grading system to achieve that object.472 
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The standard instrument in most cases was the use of a higher price for milk and cream delivered 
to creameries, without necessarily lowering the grading system. In Australia, for instance, cream 
prices were increased in winter beginning 1916 in order to avert a significant fall in butter 
production.473 While it had the effect of increasing the quantity of cream available for butter 
making purposes, changing the grading schemes had the effect of painting a misleading picture 
concerning the quality of farmers’ produce, with the result that “very little inducement is held out 
to the supplier to improve the quality of his product.”474 This provided the context for the post 
1925 reforms which sought to regularise grading systems at all creameries. However, although 
the push to regularise grading systems was a noble step towards improving the butter quality, it 
was bound to have limited success if other factors that contributed towards low grade butter on 
the farms were not addressed. Writing in 1936, the Committee of Enquiry into certain aspects of 
the dairy and pig industries criticised the obsession on grading to the disregard of farm processes 
thus: 
                              It must be remembered that any system of grading, no matter how strict, is only 
effective up to a point – the grader is compelled to classify cream according to the 
condition in which he finds it – he has no knowledge of the conditions under 
which the cream has been produced, nor is the extent to which it may have been 
contaminated always revealed in its appearance.475 
               On this evidence, it is clear that for as long as production processes were not regulated, 
interventions at the grading level were bound to meet with limited results in improving the 
quality of butter. 
               
Registration of Depots 
The focus on the processing and manufacturing processes was further underlined by the fact that 
the legislation provided for the mandatory registration of all depots that received milk and cream 
for transmission to creameries and dairies. Most depots were located in remote areas, especially 
                                                                                                                                                                           
History Series, 29, 4, (1976), 593, and Gilmore, ‘Kill, cure or strangle: The history of government intervention in 
three key agricultural industries on the Atherton Tablelands, 1895-2005’, 150. 
473
 Gilmore, ‘Kill, cure or strangle: The history of government intervention in three key agricultural industries on the 
Atherton Tablelands, 1895-2005’, 150-152.  
474
 NAZ S1193/D1Dairying: 1926-1930. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief Dairy Officer, 21 January, 1927. 
475
 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into certain aspects of the dairy and pig industries, 1936. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
124
in reserves where Africans continued to produce milk for the market.476 African areas were, by 
design, often located in locations far from the railway lines and major roads. The 1930 Land 
Apportionment Act set aside land for African purchase, the Native Purchase Areas, but most of 
this land was not much better than the reserves.477  Taking advantage of the long distances 
producers in remote areas had to travel with milk to creameries, some former transport riders had 
established depots in African reserves where they purchased milk from which they separated 
cream and sold to creameries.478 When pushing for the compulsory registration of depots, the 
general thinking had been shaped by the belief that milk and cream would deteriorate while still 
at the depots, hence contributing to the manufacture of low grade butter. To this end, the new 
law mandated that all depots needed to have properly constructed buildings with the requisite 
ventilation and refrigeration facilities. Thus, the compulsory registration was seen as a means of 
ensuring that all functional depots were sufficiently capitalised with the requisite facilities for the 
separation, storage and transportation of cream, particularly refrigeration facilities. However, 
even as late as the 1950s, some of the depots were still housed in poll and dagga structures.479 
 
The compulsory inspection and registration processes of depots in African reserves offers a lens 
into the contentious relations between depot operators on one hand, and government officials on 
the other. From 1926 until the early 1930s, the Dairy Division received numerous applications 
from cream depots in Matabeleland province, where, it must be noted, the vast majority of 
African milk and cream producers were based.480 Although Mashonaland produced more dairy 
products than Matabeleland generally, Africans in Matabeleland produced more in comparison 
with their counterparts in Mashonaland.481 Most of the applications were turned down because 
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their premises were deemed unsuitable for keeping milk and/or separating cream. For instance, 
Cory noted that buildings at five depots in Kweeneen, Pakwi No 1, Romaquabone and Mphoengs 
Store Depots in southern Matabeleland lacked adequate space, proper ventilation, cooling 
facilities, and were not fly proof, and ruled that: 
                              For these and other reasons none of the depots can be regarded as eligible for 
registration under the Dairy Produce Act, 1925. Before the premises concerned 
can be registered, various necessary alterations...will have to be made, or 
alternatively, new and more suitable dairies will have to be erected. I strongly 
advise that the latter course be adopted.482 
Similar responses were made for many other depots in the province, especially in Plumtree and 
Shangani. At least three white depot proprietors namely, J. Haskins and Sons, J & S Press and 
Geo Hoare, all of Plumtree, had their operations declared illegal and their applications for 
registration turned down on similar grounds.483 This set the stage for a clash between officials of 
the Dairy Division and operators, who felt that they were disenfranchised by a system that 
deliberately aimed to destroy their role of linking African producers to the colonial market. 
Conveniently deploying the plight of African producers to his advantage, Jason Haskins argued 
that although the legislation was well intentioned, officials were “denying the native people of 
this country an opportunity to eke a living, despite the fact that most depot owners have 
constructed new buildings in line with the law.”484 Although Haskins was raising an important 
point on behalf of depot operators, there is a high probability that his interest in having his 
premises registered did not lie with the plight of African producers, but in saving his business 
from imminent collapse. 
 
Moreover, the implementation of the regulations exposed the differences in opinion between 
government officials. This may be seen in the way existing and prospective depot operators 
successfully mobilised Native Commissioners in their confrontation with Dairy officials. The 
case of Geo Hoare vividly captures the interaction of ideas between dairy officers, Native 
Commissioners, and depot operators. After Cory had refused to register his two depots in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
observation was also made by Cory, whose duties as the Assistant Dairy Expert were mainly restricted to 
Matabeland, when he predicted that “in the near future native cream production will constitute an important feature 
of the Dairy Industry in Matabeleland. 
482
 NAZ S1193/D1/2 Letter from Cory to Hamilton, 14 January 1930. 
483
 NAZ S1193/D1/2 Letter from Hamilton to the Acting Secretary, Department of Agriculture, 7 January, 1930.  
484
 NAZ S1193/D1 Dairying: 1926-1930. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief Dairy Officer, 21 January, 1927. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
126
Radtladi and Madabi (in Matabeleland) not only because his “pole and dagga building with a 
thatched roof and an earthen floor” was unsuitable, but also because “the work of separation (of 
cream) is performed solely by [unsupervised] natives”485, Hoare (himself a dairy farmer) enlisted 
the services of the Chief Native Commissioner in his battle for registration. The Chief Native 
Commissioner called for the revision of the criteria used in the inspection and registration of 
depots, arguing that an “unduly strict implementation of the regulations without due 
consideration to the important role they (depots) play in native reserves will be in the interests of 
neither the depot owner nor the native.”486 He further contended that the mere fact that cream 
separation was carried out by Africans did not, of necessity, mean that the process was 
insanitary.487 Although Cory may have had a valid case against poorly equipped depots, his 
refusal to register depots partly because they were manned by African employees presents an 
irreconcilable contradiction with his position on African production in the reserves. As is shown 
in the next section, Cory argued, persuasively, that African milk production and cream separation 
on their own premises in the reserves was not different from methods and processes used by 
settler producers.  
 
The Dairy Division, however, was adamant that registration licences would not be issued. Cory 
added that the concern about African interests expressed by Hoare was hypocritical. The Chief 
Dairy Officer, in defence of Cory’s position to deny them registration, argued that depot owners, 
as middlemen, were largely interested in making extortionate profits from dealing in African 
cream at the detriment of the general good of the dairy industry. 488  Suggesting that depot 
operators’ were unwilling to invest in the dairy industry, he asserted that: 
                              I think that the point has been missed or obscured that the cream depots which 
must, under the Dairy Produce Act, 1925, be registered as cream depots are the 
property of European Native Traders who obviously are making a profit, either 
directly or indirectly, from dealing in native cream....In this view I cannot 
understand the attitude of the Native Commissioner at Plumtree as it is obviously 
highly important that native traders owning separating stations and deriving 
profits should set an example...These remarks, in my opinion, are subversive to all 
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good order and discipline and are all the more extra-ordinary since they emanate 
from a responsible government official.489 
A closer look at the position of depot operators in Matabeleland, however, shows that most of 
them were unwilling to expend much money on investing in the enterprise, although they were 
making reasonable profits from the cream trade. Most of them considered the cream trade merely 
as one among many. Eira Kramer has shown that European traders in African reserves prior to 
1944 made huge profits by purchasing many agricultural goods from Africans and marketing 
them on the main market.490 The same traders also established trading shops in African areas 
where they sold consumer goods at inflated prices. 491  Interestingly, even after they were 
eventually registered (after constructing the required buildings and facilities), most cream traders 
stopped purchasing cream from African reserves by 1935 (whom they had earlier claimed to be 
protecting), preferring instead to purchase cream from Bechuanaland producers who offered 
lower prices.492 
 
Hoare’s premises, together with many similarly constructed premises were not registered until 
they presented ‘acceptable’ plans to construct brick and mortar buildings, with concrete floors. 
The policy, however, seems not to have been pursued with any consistence. Indeed, ‘Magodi and 
the Dairy’, a short educational film, shot during the federal period depicting African milk and 
cream production – with a view to encourage sanitary and ‘modern’ African production in light 
of the post World War Two milk and butter shortages – shows that although depots were 
equipped with the required cream separating implements, the buildings were still standing on 
poorly ventilated poll dagga walls and earthen floors.493 Hence, a considerable number of depots 
continued to operate without the prescribed structures. 
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Problems of transport  
Besides unsanitary conditions at depots, another reason behind the delivery of poor quality at the 
creameries was the inadequate transport system available to both farmers and depot operators to 
ferry cream to creameries. As noted in chapter 3, dairy farming requires reliable transport, on a 
daily basis, for the movement of milk and cream to creameries and dairies before it becomes 
adulterated. Most farmers and creameries depended on the services of the national railway 
company for the transportation of cream from farmers or depots to creameries. However, the 
train trips were too few and far between for the smooth transportationof perishable products such 
as cream. For example, nearly all cream producers in Matabeleland relied on the trains that ran 
between Bulawayo and West Nicholson for the transportation of cream to Bulawayo. However, 
only two trains ran every week, with the result that cream could only be sent to the creamery a 
similar number of times each week.494 Settler producers were dissatisfied with the arrangement, 
arguing that cream, even if it had been of very good quality at production, would have 
deteriorated by the time it reached the creameries, which in turn affected their earnings. 
Humphrey Gibbs, the secretary of the Bulawayo Cream Producers’ Association painted the 
impact of the transport situation thus: 
                             Under the (hot) conditions which obtain in this part of the country, it is essential 
that cream be sent to the creamery more frequent than this; the two trains 
mentioned depart from West Nicholson on Tuesday and Friday mornings and 
arrive at Bulawayo in the afternoon. Cream arriving at Bulawayo on Tuesdays 
afternoons, therefore, is generally five days old, has been travelling for almost 12 
hours, and in warm weather is invariably of very poor quality when received at the 
creamery.495 
Similar challenges existed in other parts of the country. The train running between Sinoia and 
Salisbury often either ran behind schedule or missed trips altogether, with the result that farmers’ 
associations in the Sinoia area complained to Rhodesia Railways that the value of their products 
such as cream, butter, cheese, eggs, pigs and poultry often deteriorated while they waited for the 
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train or in transit to Salisbury.496 This state of affairs was aggravated by the railway workers’ 
strike in 1929, which virtually paralysed the railways, particularly in Salisbury and most districts 
in Mashonaland. The strike resulted in creameries, which paid transport costs, resorting to hiring 
private motor lorries, at a higher cost.497 Thus, the Dairy Division lobbied the Department of 
Agriculture to introduce a regular refrigerated motor truck to replace the railway service.498 
However, the lobby was unsuccessful at this time due to what the Secretary said was a “lack of 
fiscal space” to finance a road motor service on a nationwide scale, with the result that a road 
service was introduced only for the Marandellas/Salisbury route.499 
 
The erratic and unreliable transportation by train was compounded by the unsuitable vehicles 
that were used to ferry cream to railway stations. Given that many farms were located a 
considerable distance from the railway lines a Railway Motor Lorry, provided by the national 
railway company, drove between farms and depots to collect agricultural products and 
transported them onto railway stations at a fee. The trucks, however, were generally inefficient, 
and without a refrigeration system, cream lost its freshness in transit to the railway lines. The 
same complaint applied to the road motor service that ferried cream from certain areas direct to 
creameries. Introduced in 1926, the service was both unpredictable and intermittentin its 
movements. It was not uncommon for farmers to complain that the lorries arrived late and then 
took too long to arrive at railway lines, as they went around farms. The comments of one 
member of the Cream Producers’ Association, West Nicholson, identified only as Parkes, are 
quite revealing on the operations of the lorries: 
                             The van in which the cream is carried is frequently overloaded, and, usually, 
some of the cans are exposed to the direct rays of the sun. The cream is carried in 
the guard’s van, in which fish, dogs, vegetables etc is transported.500 
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Yet this motor service played an even more critical role in reserves which were situated even 
further from the railway network. This was exacerbated by the passage of the Land 
Apportionment Act in 1930, which saw huge tracts of land near the railway lines being set aside 
for settler agriculture, while many Africans were pushed further onto unproductive lands further 
from the railway network. 501  Considering the distances they had to move cream to reach 
railways, depot operators almost invariably faced far reaching challenges in ensuring that cream 
arrived at the creameries in a condition good enough to make butter of a decent grade.Although 
the complaints raised by depot operators and some white farmers concerning unreliable transport 
arrangement were valid, this does not fully account for the poor state in which milk and cream 
reached creameries. As shall be shown in this chapter and chapter 5, methods of production at 
the farm were largely responsible for this state of affairs. As these lorries were often unreliable, 
farm employees sometimes carried cream to the railways lines, and often directly to creameries 
and depots, as the picture below shows. 
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Figure 1: A picture of African dairy farm workers carrying cream to a depot in 1932. Chipinga, Manicaland.502 
 
Although the legislation provided that dairy officers should occasionally visit farmers’ premises 
to give ‘advise’ to producers, no policy instrument were put in place to ensure that producers met 
specific hygienic and quality standards in the production and handling of milk, butter and farm 
butter. Nor did the Act provide for mandatory presence of any infrastructure such as milking 
sheds and utensils such as separators, cans and buckets. Moreover, no provisions were made to 
ensure that farmers possessed the right dairy livestock, or that a proper livestock management 
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system, such as proper feeding of dairy livestock, breeding, and milk recording were 
implemented. In fact, relatively fewer visits were made to farms (both African and white) in 
comparison with the frequency with which dairy inspectors visited creameries and depots. The 
general feeling among creamery owners was that the Dairy Division “had not hired enough 
inspectors to cover both creameries and primary cream producers themselves”, with the result 
that “very few farms have hosted these officials, yet it is from the farms where the primary 
problems in the industry are emanating.”503 With the law providing specific requirements for the 
manufacture of butter and also making creamery and depot inspection mandatory, dairy officials 
tended to spend more time at the creameries and depots, hence limiting the frequency with which 
they could visit farms.  
 
The Milk Recording Scheme 
As part of ongoing efforts to improve the quality of dairy products, the Dairy Division 
introduced a Milk Recording Scheme in 1928. Modelled along Australian and South African 
practice, the Dairy Division employed an official recorder, who paid monthly visits to dairy 
farmers that entered the programme and compiled a record of the milk and butter fat production 
capacity of each animal on test, the feed consumption, feed cost and the gross income for each 
cow.504 The underlying rationale was to measure – and ultimately improve – the productivity of 
each cow, and the elimination of unproductive animals from the dairy herds. The programme, 
which was entirely voluntary, thus facilitated interaction between producers and state experts.  
 
The scheme, however, was poorly subscribed. In 1930, Hamilton reported that only 1 333 cows 
belonging to some 32 farmers had been placed under the programme.505 This was aggravated by 
the fact that each participating farmer was charged 6d. per cow per month for the first 10 cows, 
and 3d for each additional one.506 More worrying for the Dairy Division was the ever decreasing 
number of farmers who had initially presented their cows for the test. By 1934, milk recorders 
were complaining that many farmers who had initially entered their cows for recording were 
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pulling out of the scheme.507 The following statement by a member of the Eastern Victoria 
Farmers’ Association succinctly reflects the general attitude towards the scheme: 
               A few of our members initially registered to participate in the Milk Recording 
Scheme, (because) it is standard practice in all successful dairying countries. 
However, in light of the shortage of pedigree dairy stock and supplementary feed, 
some have had to withdraw in order to save themselves from embarrassment the 
recorders’ results brings.508 
              The low number of subscribing producers should be viewed within the context of a dairy industry 
that was still dominated by dilettantes whose long term interests lay in ranching, and the shortage 
of capital among bona fide dairy farmers. The dearth of good dairy cattle, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, had been the Achilles heel of the dairy industry. Although good dairy cattle 
could be imported from South Africa through the Friesland Cattle Breeders’ Association (with 
which the government had established an arrangement),509 or overseas from England, many of 
Southern Rhodesian farmers opted for beef cattle, or dual purpose breeds which could enable 
them to produce beef. Indeed, Hamilton lamented that “(dairy) farmers are, however, not 
supporting the government loan scheme for the purchase of dairy stock to the same extent as was 
anticipated.”510 J.S. Brown, a member of the Dairy Industrial Control Board, commented that “in 
herds I know of, there are not more than 20 dairy cows.”511  Although mixed farming was 
generally encouraged, especially when it applied to maize growing and cattle rearing, the milking 
of beef cattle was discouraged.512 As late as 1935, the Committee of Enquiry into the Dairy and 
Pig Industries complained that: 
                             The sale of cream from beef herds has increased...This practice is very much 
against the interests of both the dairy and beef industries, inasmuch as, while 
increasing the colony’s surplus cream supplies, it retards the growth and injures 
the constitution of beef calves.513 
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Undercapitalisation also contributed significantly to the paucity of dairy herds, and pedigree 
cattle in general. Machingaidze has demonstrated that despite the colonial government’s earnest 
efforts to develop settler agriculture, lack of capital was one of the chief hindrances to its 
success.514 With direct reference to the cattle industry, Samasuwo contended that “the process of 
economic expansion in the cattle sector itself was hampered by severe under capitalisation on the 
part of most white ranchers.” 515  Although loans had been available to prospective farmers 
through the Land and Agricultural Bank, itself a creation of the Responsible Government in 1924 
after the dissolution of the Land Bank, the funds made available were often inadequate for the 
purchase of many bulls and cows. Whereas attempts were made to circumvent similar problems 
– with little success – in the beef industry by inviting international capital, particularly Liebigs, 
local dairymen and creameries had to go it alone.516  Consequently, a significant number of 
prospective dairy farmers resorted to purchasing only a few cows and a bull with available funds, 
and then relying on the inevitably slow natural increase to expand their herds.517 
 
The management of dairy herds was one problem with which those farmers who had gained 
access to good dairy cattle had to contend. Given the climatic difficulties, particularly in the 
south-western regions, dairy cattle needed supplementary feeding for most of the dry months in 
the country, when pastures were low. However, most farmers did not have sufficient funds for 
this purpose. After a reconnoitring tour of settler dairy farms in 1939, T. Adams, a member of 
the Dairy Industry Control Board reported that he had never “seen a dairy herd in this country 
that was properly fed all through the year [as] it could not be done.”518 With most farmers unable 
to afford supplementary feed, Friesland cattle which had been imported from South Africa 
tended to deteriorate from the time they arrived in the country due to ill-feeding, especially 
during the dry winter months. As Adams observed, “the quality of stock around Salisbury in 
1939 is inferior to that of the 1920s.”519 
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The impact of the above scenario on dairy farming was the production of low quality milk and 
cream. The general outlook was succinctly captured by the Senior Officer in Animal Husbandry 
who, while acknowledging that “considerable improvements in plant and organisation have been 
made at creameries”, added that: 
                              Little improvement is evident as far as the general quality of cream supplies is 
concerned. Large quantities of second and third grade cream, which become 
increasingly difficult to market each year, continue to be produced. Much of this 
low grade cream is produced by dairy farmers situated long distances from the 
railway, who have gone into the dairy business, but who, in many cases, would be 
wiser in the long run to confine themselves to beef production.520 
As long as no measures were taken to ensure that a well funded crop of authentic dairymen who 
possessed the requisite pedigree dairy stock was developed, the Milk Recording Scheme would 
not help improve the economic fortunes of the dairy industry. 
 
Hence, it is not surprising that, notwithstanding the passage and implementation of the Dairy 
Produce Act and the Milk Recording Scheme, there was no noticeable improvement in the 
quality of butter produced at the creameries. In fact, Southern Rhodesian butter continued to 
struggle on the international market throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Officials often bemoaned 
the deteriorating quality of butter at a time when they expected an improvement as a result of the 
1925 legislative intervention and the Milk Recording Scheme. Speaking in 1935, a member of 
the Rhodesia Butter Agencies only identified as Straith, stated that although Southern Rhodesia 
produced the highest amount of butter in Southern Africa after South Africa, “there is a dearth in 
first grade butter in this country.”521 The veracity of Straith’s comments may be corroborated by 
the fact that at a time when the country was exporting surplus second and third grade butter in 
the region as well as to Britain, Southern Rhodesia was annually importing first grade butter to 
supplement faltering local production throughout the late 1920s to the 1930s.522 
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Even more disturbing was the fact that exports were often conducted at a loss. In 1929, for 
instance, 15 000 lb. of second and third grade butter were exported to the Union of South Africa 
alone at a loss of 4d per lb.523 With no government subsidies in place during this time, Rhodesian 
farmers and the creameries bore the brunt of low prices which their butter was fetching on the 
international markets. Although the beef industry was undergoing similar problems regarding 
lack of capital and low quality beef, dairy farming was in a much worse position because it is 
highly perishable, thus requiring more care at the production level.524 Writing in 1940, F. Harris, 
the Minister of Agriculture attested that dairy farming was neglected by farmers because “they 
could not get a price remunerative enough to continue producing either cream or butter.”525 
Hence, to the extent that it ignored the dynamics affecting dairy production among farmers, the 
Dairy Produce Act fell short of improving the economic position of the dairy industry. 
 
“Dairying is a white man’s industry”: Debates on the conditions of production on farms 
Despite the absence of any laid down stipulations, the conditions under which milk was 
produced and cream separated came under discussion within the settler community as well as the 
government itself. The general perception among settlers, and some government officials was 
that African producers were too slovenly and sloppy to produce clean milk and cream for 
commercial purposes, and thus needed to be eliminated from the trade. Although the colonial 
establishment viewed the elimination of African competition as a vital component of the White 
Agricultural Policy, this section suggests that white perceptions towards African hygiene also 
played an important role. This is particularly so as consumers also participated in bringing 
pressure to bear on the government to banish African cream and milk from the market. Also, 
some officials of the department appeared uncomfortable with the employment of unsupervised 
Africans on settler dairy farms.526 
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This perspective contrasts with mid-19th century narratives of some white travellers, missionaries 
and traders.527  Most traders and missionaries’ narratives of African embodied practices and 
hygiene show that they appreciated Africans, especially the Ndebele, as clean and healthy. 
Thomas Morgan Thomas, for instance, a missionary who lived within the Matabele palace 
during the 1860s, described the Ndebele people as “not wanting in good taste in respect to 
beauty, cleanliness and dress.”528 With reference to the Shona, Stanley Hyatt, a trader who 
operated in Mashonaland during the 1880s and 1890s, seems to have developed a close 
appreciation of their ‘alternative’ practices and forms of social organisation. Despite the Ndebele 
derogatorily referring to them as ‘amaswina’ (dirty people), Hyatt noted the rationality behind 
some of their practices. For example, he observed that they shared sleeping huts with their goats, 
and smeared their floors with cow dung. The former was a protective measure from predators 
while in the latter case cow dung acted as a cleansing agent.529 The use of cow dung to smear 
floors and as an aid in fermenting milk, as shall be noted in the next chapter, was criticised as an 
unhygienic practice which facilitated the contamination of milk.530 
 
The period after 1890, when the colonial political and socio-economic system was beginning to 
take root, brought with it a change in attitudes towards the African body and social practices. 
Mobilising a crude populist social Darwinism, most settlers believed that whites were at the 
vertex of the human racial hierarchy in mental, physical and cultural terms.531 This belief, which 
was widely held within the settler community in the country, was used to justify the use of 
segregation laws, particularly to limit African access to certain privileges such as land and state 
support which were accorded to whites in virtually all colonial states throughout the Southern 
African region. As Sauer, a member of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council had argued 
in 1899, “neither in mental capacity nor in physical fitness could the aborigine ever become the 
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equal of the European.”532 Timothy Burke’s study extensively discusses settler attitudes towards 
Africans – their bodies and social practices from the 1890s onwards.533 He argues that white 
settlers after 1890 viewed Africans as “filthy, depraved, and ugly”, and thus inherently 
diseased.534 Jean Comaroff has noted that the increasing common image of Africans as ‘greasy’ 
and diseased reflected a growing and racially charged antipathy towards African bodies.535 While 
they make interesting analyses regarding settler attitudes towards the African body, Burke and 
Comaroff do not explain the fluidity of attitudes depending on the spaces in which the prejudices 
were made. The attack on African commercial dairying was in tandem with the general 
segregationist debate that had begun to gain traction since Southern Rhodesia’s attainment of 
Dominion status in 1923,536 which itself had brought a renewed sense of white nationalism in the 
country. These calls for a more segregated society culminated in the passage of the Land 
Apportionment Act, which settlers came to regard as their ‘Magna Carta’.537 Influenced by the 
above prejudices, many settlers, including some government officials, began to question the 
wisdom of allowing Africans to produce dairy products on a commercial basis from the mid-
1920s onwards. Although the 1925 Dairy Produce Act did not expressly mandate the exclusion 
of African producers, some settlers and government officials did attempt to take advantage of its 
provision for the inspection of farmers’ premises and production methods to minimise or even 
exclude African involvement in dairy farming.   
 
The notion that Africans were not sufficiently systematic or ‘smart’ for dairying was raised, 
albeit indirectly, by Hamilton in 1926 when he suggested one of the chief reasons for the 
production of poor quality cream on settler farms was the employment of Africans for milking 
cows. Announcing the arrival of the first consignment of milking machines in the country in 
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1927, Hamilton claimed that the machines would “obviate all risk of infection due to uncleanly 
[sic] or unhealthy native milkers.”538 In fact, he further suggested that all Africans involved in 
the production of milk – either as employees on settler farms, or as producers themselves – 
should be subjected to regular medical inspection, a routine which he did not recommend for 
settler producers.539 Simmering discontent within the settler consuming community was also 
building. One of the most direct attacks on African involvement in dairying came from one T. 
Nangle, in a newspaper article, who questioned thus: 
               I should like to ask...the Minister of Native Affairs, the Chief Native 
Commissioner or the Department (of Agriculture), if they consider that natives 
have “rights” in the dairy or pig industries. Have they asked consumers if they are 
prepared to eat scavenged pigs or give their children dairy products made from 
milk produced under the most filthy [sic] conditions, knowing that no food is 
more easily contaminated than milk. Dairying is a white man’s industry and I hold 
the native should under no conditions be allowed to enter it.540 
Underscoring the contempt with which they viewed African production, another settler went as 
far as threatening to boycott Southern Rhodesian dairy products until Africans were barred from 
commercial dairying. He complained that: 
                             Strong criticism of unhygienic production is bad enough, but when one reads that 
there was a definite tendency for the supply of cream from the natives to increase, 
it is the limit. So butter from cream out of kaffir kraals has been sold to the 
public? No more creamery butter for me, sir.541 
Such attacks on African milk and cream production prompted the Chief Dairy Officer, Hamilton, 
to push for an examination of the position of African producers in dairying. To this end, 
Hamilton, who did not spend much time on either the dairy premises or creameries, proposed 
that more attention be paid on African dairy premises with a view of exploring “the possibility of 
placing an embargo” on cream produced by Africans.542 He added: 
               In view of the groundswell of complaints and general disapproval within our 
consuming population, we need to evaluate the position of the native in cream 
supply, especially the cleanliness of both the producer and his premises. It is our 
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prerogative as custodians of this industry to ensure that basic hygienic standards 
are followed...and that unseemly producers are weeded out...543 
In this light, Cory personally embarked on a fact finding mission in the major milk and cream 
producing reserves of Matabeleland, particularly in Gwanda, to inspect methods and conditions 
of production. Although all settler premises were also mandated to be inspected, these were 
mostly done by junior dairy inspectors. The emerging differences in opinion between Hamilton, 
the Chief Dairy Officer whose duties were largely administrative and Cory, the Assistant Chief 
Dairy Officer who was the chief inspector of creamery and dairy premises, reveals the difference 
between general prejudice and the actual situation on the ground. Numerous inspections of 
African cream and milk production methods showed that although a suite of malpractices existed 
in African milking processes, similar malpractices were also rampant among settler farmers. For 
instance, Hamilton, who had earlier asserted in another context that Africans needed to be 
medically inspected before dealing with milk products, paradoxically now maintained that the 
general conditions under which cream was produced on settler farms were “of the crudest 
possible description” after receiving Cory’s reports.544 
 
One of Cory’s most commonly repeated criticisms against African milking systems was that in 
nearly all cases, the milking was done inside the kraal. Indeed, the film ‘Magodi and the Dairy’ 
shows an African man and his children milking cows inside the kraal into a metal container, and 
taking the milk to the nearest white-owned depot within a few hours of production, where the 
milk was sold, before being processed into cream and despatched to a creamery.545 This system, 
which dates back to pre-colonial times, was roundly condemned by dairy officials as unhygienic. 
Cow dung and flies created a fertile ground for the breeding of bacteria within the kraals, leading 
to the contamination of milk.546 While it is incontrovertibly clear that this system had an inimical 
impact on the quality of milk, and thus needed to be curbed, it is important to realise that the 
majority of settler dairymen milked their cows in a similar way. It was not uncommon for dairy 
officials to complain that most settler dairymen had not erected any milking sheds, and that 
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milking in open kraals was “too frequent a practice”. 547  Giving evidence to the 1935 
Commission of Enquiry, Dan Judson admitted that settler cream producers had not erected 
milking sheds with the result that milking in the kraals was the norm, rather than the 
exception.548 
 
Most reports by dairy inspectors show that both African premises and settler farms were not 
equipped with proper infrastructure and implements. With no government financial and technical 
support, many African producers in the reserves could not afford to construct the required 
infrastructure such as milking sheds, proper dairies with concrete floors, cooling implements for 
cooling and treating milk and cream. Aggravating the situation for many of them was the general 
scarcity of water, itself a deliberate and long standing characteristic of the reserve areas into 
which most Africans were thrown from the 1890s, but magnified by the passage of the Land 
Apportionment Act in 1930.549 After visiting African cream producers in Gwanda, Cory reported 
that: 
                              One of the most serious difficulties natives in the Gwanda district have to 
contend with at the present time is scarcity of water...this scarcity is one of the 
most unsatisfactory features observed on my recent tour of inspection and is 
responsible for the poor quality of cream produced by natives in this part of 
Matabeleland.550 
While he noted that water was indispensable for maintaining the health and general cleanliness 
of the individuals engaged in milking and separating cream, he reasoned that: 
               It is futile to expect the native cream suppliers concerned to observe any great 
degree of cleanliness in their habits or in their methods of producing milk and 
cream, and until such time as this matter receives attention, the cream produced by 
natives in these and similarly situated areas will continue to be of inferior 
quality.551 
Having made this observation, Cory described the average African producer in Gwanda as “an 
intelligent type”, adding that the majority of them were “fairly conversant with the general 
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principles to be observed in the production of milk and cream...conditions under which cream is 
produced by natives are by no means as unsatisfactory as we have been led to believe.”552  
Noting that, in any case, most settler farmers employed African labour for their own dairying 
operations and other domestic duties, and in stark contrast to the general belief embedded in the 
settler community, Cory persuasively concluded: 
               It is true that certain features of the methods employed by the natives engaged in 
cream production could undoubtedly be improved, but at the same time it should 
be borne in mind that such criticism as may be levelled against the methods 
practised by native cream suppliers may with equal justice be directed against the 
methods commonly in vogue on the average Rhodesian dairy farm...it would be 
obviously unjust, therefore, to prohibit the natives in these districts from 
producing cream or to compel them to improve their methods unless a similar 
improvement could be effected in methods employed by cream producers 
generally. 553 
 
Although, as explained in chapter 5, no policy framework was introduced specifically banishing 
African cream marketing, the implementation of control legislation without the extension of state 
financial and technical support ensured that the majority of prospective indigenous dairy farmers 
were kept out of the mainstream market.  
 
Indeed, owing to the factors discussed earlier (undercapitalisation and settlers’ hesitation to 
invest in dairy farming) most settler dairy farms were not equipped with the requisite machinery, 
while milk and cream handling procedures were generally unsanitary. In reference to the 
Midlands and Matabeleland regions, Hamilton bemoaned that “farmers have of late been 
compelled to milk owing to sheer necessity, and many possess no dairies, nor facilities for the 
proper handling of cream and milk.”554 The 1935 Commission corroborated this; stating that: 
               Milking and separating are carried on under unhygienic conditions, resulting in 
contamination. There is also a great lack of care in the treatment of the milk 
immediately after milking and of the cream after separating.555 
Despite the existence of technical assistance through Gwebi College’s demonstration farms556, 
and considerably greater access to financial assistance, most white owned dairy farms were not 
                                                     
552
 NAZ S1193/D1/2 Letter from Cory to Hamilton, 20 May 1927. 
553
 NAZ S1193/D1/2 Letter from Cory to Hamilton, 20 May 1927. 
554
 NAZ S1193/D1/2 Letter from Hamilton to the Secretary for Agriculture, 11 March 1927. 
555
 Report of the commission of enquiry into certain aspects of the dairy and pig industries, 8. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
143
run along proper dairying lines. The words of F.A. Lammas, the Bulawayo District Dairy 
Officer, in 1934, help to put the state of affairs into proper context. Describing a farm owned by 
Kirk, who was also involved in running the Gwelo Dairy, Lammas said; “a more slovenly and 
dirty farm I imagine would be difficult to find. Mr Kirk by all accounts has had university 
training, and should be acquainted with the rudiments of dairying.”557 
 
Dairy inspectors’ visits to farmers’ premises – both settler and African – from 1926 until the 
mid-1930s, however, not only brought to the fore the extent of the problems on farms which had 
been overlooked in virtually all interventions that had been made in the industry thus far, but also 
revealed analogous production methods between settler and African methods of production. By 
the late 1920s it had become patently clear that the problem of ill-equipped farmers, due either to 
undercapitalisation or reluctance on the part of farmers, needed to be addressed urgently. 
Belatedly noting the inadequacy of the Dairy Produce Act in 1933, the Chief Dairy Officer 
indicated that the legislation should be extended “to apply to every farmer either supplying 
cream to a creamery, or making cheese or butter for sale to the public”.558 He further suggested 
that all milk and cream producers needed to be compulsorily registered under the same 
conditions and regulations that applied to creameries and cream depots. As the next chapters will 
show, however, these calls went largely unheeded until 1937, when a raft of measures was taken 
to improve production methods. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the period covering the early 1920s to the 1930s came with a 
complex set of socio-economic and political dynamics, and these had a profound impact on dairy 
farming. The arrival of self-rule brought with it high hopes within the settler community that 
more attention will be paid to their interests. Although some scholars have viewed the advent of 
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self-rule as having marked a momentous milestone in the fortunes of settler agriculture, this 
chapter has argued that although the settler government sought to improve the economic standing 
of farmers, these attempts were, in the short-term, generally unsuccessful in dairy farming. 
Although the Dairy Division attempted to fortify the general standing of the industry through the 
introduction of the first industry-specific legislative intervention, this fell short of addressing the 
outstanding issues which the Company government had left unresolved. Largely focusing on the 
manufacturing and marketing facet of dairying, the Dairy Division was unable to help establish 
farmers on a sustainable and viable basis. Yet this had been the perennial Achilles heel of the 
dairy industry since the early years of colonial occupation. This chapter has also illustrated that, 
given the racial discourse of the time, which was informed by the segregation debate of the 
1920s, the position of African cream producers came under increasing attack from the settler 
community, which viewed African producers as unsuitable for dairying and thus responsible for 
the production of bad quality cream. It has been argued that beyond the need to reduce African 
competition on the market that characterised other agricultural enterprises, the assault on African 
production was also caused by deep-seated white attitudes and prejudices towards African 
hygiene. However, evidence from official reports showed that production methods and 
conditions were generally inadequate in both African and white sectors. By failing to improve 
the position of farmers and their production methods, moves towards regulation during the 
period under review did not yield the required results. Hence, Southern Rhodesia continued to 
struggle on the international scene – exporting low grade butter at a loss while importing higher 
grades – throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Crisis, control and contravention: The depression, increased regulation and 
farmers’ responses, c.1931 – 1940. 
 
Introduction 
The outset of the Depression marked an important benchmark in the trajectory of Southern 
Rhodesia’s fledgling agrarian economy. The collapse of prices on the international markets 
ushered in a period of socio-economic and political stress within the farming community, thus 
forcing the government to expand the scope of its involvement in the country’s agricultural 
life.559  By examining the impact of the Great Depression on dairy farming, this chapter seeks to 
add onto existing historiography on the socio-economic impact of the recession on Southern 
Rhodesia’s agrarian industries. It focuses on state interventions that were made to cushion 
farmers from tumbling prices and the ensuing interaction between the state and farmers over such 
remedies throughout the 1930s. The circumstances leading to the formation of the Dairy Industry 
Control Act (DICB) and, in comparison with other local industries and other dairy interventions 
within Southern Africa, the nature of its operations are examined. 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that Southern Rhodesian butter was predominantly of inferior 
quality and that the 1925 Dairy Produce Act, which was supposed to have a remedial effect in 
that regard, did not yield the desired results. This chapter also examines the factors leading to the 
passage of yet another legislative instrument in the late 1930s – the 1937 Dairy Act – which 
aimed at increasing the extent of state control over farmers’ dairying activities in ongoing 
attempts at improving the quality of the country’s dairy products. The differing responses by both 
white and African dairy producers, and how, in turn, these refashioned policy shall also be 
discussed. In the main, this chapter demonstrates that although increased state control of farmers 
was appropriate, it was resisted by white dairying dilettantes. Similarly, to the extent that the 
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implementation of the regulations had the effect of alienating African producers from the 
colonial dairy market, it also contributed to the growth of a parallel and illicit African milk trade.  
 
Depression and the emergence of the Dairy Industry Control Board 
As with most agricultural economies elsewhere in the world, the collapse of agricultural 
products’ prices on the international markets from 1929 onwards ushered in a period of severe 
crisis for Southern Rhodesia’s predominantly agricultural economy. 560  With international 
agricultural prices tumbling, the majority of local farmers, particularly those who depended on 
exporting, operated on the verge of bankruptcy. 561  Under pressure from the white farming 
community, the state increased the scope of its involvement in agriculture to include finding 
markets for farmers as well as shielding them from the impact of falling prices on the 
international markets. Mandivamba Rukuni has stated that government policy in Southern 
Rhodesia during the 1930s shifted from laissez faire to direct intervention in order to channel 
assistance to white farmers as result of the world depression.562 While the scope of government 
intervention was increased during the 1930s, state intervention had, for long, been a part of 
agricultural policy, as previous chapters have shown. Thus, strictly speaking, government policy 
had not necessarily been laissez faire prior to the 1930s. An agricultural regulatory framework, 
covering virtually all sectors of the agrarian economy whose products were earmarked for export 
was formulated with a view to cushion settlers from the effects of the depression. 
 
Studies by Machingaidze, Samasuwo and Carl Keiter on the beef and maize industries of 
Southern Rhodesia reveal how the colonial state roped in African producers – whose products 
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were deemed to be unsuitable for export – to subsidise settler export. Illustrating that African 
cattle were viewed as “the scrub beast” of inferior quality, Machingaidze and Samasuwo 
convincingly outline how, through a series of Beef Control Acts, the state’s strategy to rescue the 
beef industry involved making the African peasantry bear the bigger share of the ‘cattle 
burden’.563 Regarding maize, Keiter and Machingaidze outline how African maize producers, 
through a levy system, were made to shoulder the burden of exporting at a time when their maize 
was regarded as unsuitable for export, again due to alleged poor quality. 564  As shall be 
demonstrated in this section, however, black producers could not be roped in to subsidise butter 
exports as their numbers were too small.  
 
The advent of the depression came at a time when Southern Rhodesian butter was already 
struggling to compete on the international scene on account of its poor quality. As has been 
pointed out in chapter 4, despite the transformation of creamery and cheese factory operations, 
dairy farming was already struggling to provide both farmers and creameries with any profitable 
returns owing to the production of low grade butter. Prices had begun to fall at an accelerated 
rate from the 1927 season, reaching a record low of 3pence per lb for first grade butter in 
November 1930.565 The pre-Depression fall was a consequence of a low grade butter pile up, 
especially in Mashonaland where signs of overproduction had begun to show as early as 1925. 
Thus, the depression of the late 1920s to the mid-1930s did not initiate the marketing crisis in the 
dairy industry; rather, it served to expose and worsen problems that lay at the root of commercial 
dairying in Southern Rhodesia. One dairy farmer, who identified himself only as ‘Smiley’, 
complained that the low prices  
              We currently receive from creameries for our cream will soon push us out of 
cream production. I have no doubt in my mind that only a handful of farmers will 
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continue supplying cream to creameries, soon we will either stop milking the 
cows or we will make our own butter on the farms and retail it ourselves.566 
With a considerable number of farmers across the board going into liquidation, the government 
responded to the marketing difficulties by establishing commodity marketing boards to regulate 
the marketing of agricultural produce. This led to the passage of legislation which would lead to 
the formation commodity control boards – the Maize Control Board and the Dairy Industry 
Board in 1931, the Tobacco Marketing Board and the Cotton Research and Industry Board in 
1936, the Cold Storage Commission and the Pig Industry Board in 1937 – whose mandate were 
to help farmers to bear the burden of exporting.567 It should be noted that this was in line with 
developments in South Africa where statutory bodies were also established in order to regulate 
the marketing of agricultural commodities.568 
 
Although it was partly in response to the desperate situation in which the local dairy industry was 
trapped, the formation of the Dairy Industry Control Board, itself birthed by the Dairy Industry 
Control Act of the same year, was also a result of developments within the southern African 
regional dairying scene, particularly South Africa. A regional dairy conference held in Pretoria in 
1928 resolved to encourage that legislation be passed in southern African countries to impose 
levies upon butter and cheese in order to finance a regional board which would assist in the 
stabilisation of prices for local producers in member countries.569 Pursuant to this, South Africa 
passed legislation which led to the establishment of the Dairy Control Board in September 1930, 
which was mandated to impose and collect levies from farmers for the subsidisation of the export 
burden.570 
 
In a move that underlined South Africa’s dominant economic position within the region, the 
South African legislation provided for the participation by adjoining territories in the Union levy 
and bounty scheme. These territories included Bechuanaland, South-West Africa, Swaziland and 
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Southern Rhodesia. The Act provided that these territories adopt similar control legislation and 
paid a proportion of the levies to the Union Dairy Control Board.”571 Unwilling to subsidise the 
export of its surplus for the benefit of its neighbours, South Africa suggested that these territories 
should be treated as one economic unit for marketing purposes, and that they should all take fair 
part in adjusting the surplus in order to avoid an invasion of its local markets by surplus butter 
from South Africa.572 Bechuanaland, South-West Africa and Swaziland immediately joined in 
the voluntary scheme because, like South Africa, they were faced with surplus butter. Under the 
regional arrangement, contracting territories collected a levy from farmers and paid over to the 
Central Industries Control Board. The board would then pay the same amount of bounty on each 
territory’s exports overseas of butter and cheese as it did on South Africa’s exports.573 
 
Anxious to safe-guard Southern Rhodesia’s local producers and its northern markets – which 
constituted over half of the market for the country’s butter – creamery representatives, under the 
banner of the Rhodesia Butter Agencies, in 1930 joined the voluntary levy and bounty scheme. 
Pending the passage of the Dairy Industry Control Act, they established a temporary board to 
collect levies for onward transmission to South Africa’s Central Industries Control Board. After 
its establishment in 1931, the DICB collected levies from creameries, cheese factories and farm 
butter makers, and these levies were used for the payment of bounties on butter and cheese 
exports.574 The inception of the DICB played an important role in providing a cushion to farmers 
from the vagaries of the prices on the international market. In 1933, for instance, 5 895 948 lb. of 
butter were exported on which bounties of £136 684 was paid, on an average of 5.5d per lb.575 
With regard to the 1932 season, Cory observed that without the bounty, local prices would have 
dropped to as low as 3d or 4d per lb. in 1932 – this being the return for export exclusive of the 
subsidy – which was paid from the levy funds. Instead, in the same year, the producer received 
sixpence on each lb. of butterfat sold.576 It is thus not surprising that during the first year of the 
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DCIB’s operations, the production of butter and cheese reached a level previously not attained in 
the history of the country.577 
 
The levy principle, however, was only useful if the bulk of the country’s dairy produce was 
consumed locally, with only a small fraction being exported. This was because 1d per lb. levy 
was collected in respect of all creamery butter manufactured; an increase in the quantity of butter 
exported on bounty against total production effectively meant a reduction in the amount that 
could be paid as bounty on each lb. of butter exported. Given the limited domestic market 
discussed in chapter 4, which in turn necessitated the export of most of the country’s butter, this 
scheme could only be regarded as a short-term measure while other fundamental issues (such as 
the high proportion of low grade butter and high production costs) were addressed. As it turned 
out, neither the Dairy Industry Act (nor the DCIB it birthed) made provisions for the regulation 
of the production methods, which would have helped farmers and creameries to realise better 
prices in the longer term. The inter-territorial levy arrangement was, however, suspended in 1934 
following the passage of the Consolidated Dairy Bill in South Africa which, by replacing the 
South African Dairy Industry Control Act, effectively ended the regional arrangement.578 The 
consequent dissolution of the Central Board in 1935 effectively signalled the end of the levy 
scheme in Southern Rhodesia. Although the effects of depressed prices had somewhat subsided 
by then, Southern Rhodesian farmers continued to struggle on the regional markets as a result of 
the continued production and exportation of low quality butter. Reporting on the crisis, E.R. 
Jacklin, the chairman of the DICB explained that: 
               competition was being felt from butter imported from overseas sources at very 
low prices, and it was apparent that this would result in a serious loss to 
creameries. The position could either be met either by the abandonment of the 
market, or by considerable drop in butter fat prices to farmers, or by the payment 
of bounties. Neither the loss of such important markets nor a severe drop in butter 
fat prices could be contemplated with equanimity.579 
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The farmers’ predicament after the termination of the regional agreement was aggravated by the 
fact that the DICB did not have powers to fix producer prices prior to the passage of the Dairy 
Act in 1937. Although farmers received more or less uniform prices because of loose agreements 
creameries made under the banner of the Rhodesia Butter Agencies (an umbrella body 
representing creameries), these were subject to fluctuation depending on the operating costs of 
individual creameries.580 The Committee of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Dairy and Pig 
Industries (whose origins are discussed in the next section) noted that farmers had been left 
exposed at the mercy of “inefficient” creameries, and recommended that the DICB should be 
granted powers to fix prices, and introduction of a local levy scheme.581 Thus, the incorporation 
of a clause which granted the DICB powers to fix prices paid to farmers and wholesale prices in 
the 1937 Dairy Act should thus be viewed as an attempt to stabilise producer prices after the 
collapse of the regional agreement.  
 
Moreover, the government availed funds to the DICB for the payment of bounties on butter and 
cheese exports to the Congo and Portuguese East Africa. Unlike in the maize and beef industries 
where African production was roped in to subsidise the burden of export, the absence of a strong 
African sector on the official dairy market meant that the state itself had to shoulder this burden. 
The fixing of producer prices and the payment of bounties on exports by the government should 
also be viewed as part of self preservation measures under very difficult circumstances. As 
happened in beef and maize, the government sought to shield farmers, who constituted a vital 
political constituency, and the creameries from economic hardships. Prime Minister Godfrey 
Huggins was aware that he had swept into power in 1933 on the back of virulent opposition to 
his predecessor over perceived inability to decisively deal with the agricultural crisis.582 
 
Although these efforts, as did the Maize Control Act and the Cold Storage Act of 1937, managed 
to protect settler farmers from the vagaries of the international markets somewhat, the underlying 
issues contributing to the dairy industry malaise, however, remained unaddressed by both the 
state and the farming community. So long as there existed no broad and holistic control measures 
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to deal with the complex problems that afflicted dairy farming at the production level, whatever 
interventions were made at the marketing level were bound to meet with limited success. 
Although the price intervention only just managed to keep the farmers’ financial nostrils above 
the turbulent economic waters of the 1930s, much more needed to be done to improve production 
methods. The following sections examine factors that led to the introduction of tighter controls 
of farmers’ operations, and the farmers’ responses to increased regulation. 
 
Origins of the Dairy Act and control of farmers’ operations 
As dairy farmers and creameries continued to struggle to compete on the export market, despite 
the payment of bounties, officials of the Dairy Division began to call for a review of farming 
operations. For instance, E.R. Jackson, the chairman of the board, requested the Minister of 
Agriculture to introduce regulations for the inspection and licensing of all cream and butter 
producers, and the setting up of minimum standards of production, arguing that “the main scope 
for improvement of the industry lies on the farms.”583 F.A. Lammas, the Bulawayo District Dairy 
Officer, concluded in 1935 that “until the type of dairying is set on a more sanitary foundation, 
we can hope for very little progress in the dairy industry of this colony.” 584  In 1935 the 
government appointed a commission of enquiry whose mandate was to investigate the positions 
of the dairy and pig industry. Although it was one of many agricultural Commissions that were 
instituted during the 1930s, the Committee of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Dairy and Pig 
Industry was the first to specifically investigate the dairy industry.585 
 
It would be incorrect, however, to suggest that the main cause of its establishment was the short 
term circumstances related to the Depression. The commission represented the apex of thoughts 
and ideas regarding dairy farming that, although triggered by the immediate Depression-induced 
marketing crisis, spanned a significantly longer period of time. Indeed, the mandate of the 
commission was to, among other things, investigate and make recommendations on the 
operations of the Dairy Industry Control Board, the large amount of low grade cream delivered to 
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the creameries and the resultant high percentage of low grade butter produced in the country, the 
position and impact of farm butter in the industry, and the general means by which the industry 
could be expanded.586 “Regarding the dairying aspect of our cattle industry,” the Minister of 
Agriculture said when commissioning the committee, “the policy antecedent thus far shows that 
we have been missing something...this Committee is the first step towards the transformation of 
the dairy and pig industries.”587 
 
The evidence given to the Commission suggests that some settler farmers had come to realise 
that their own methods, and not only those of African producers, were the chief hindrance to the 
production of better quality butter. For instance, a member of the Eastern Victoria Farmers’ 
Association, identified as Richards, admitted that: 
              There should be an improvement with regard to our milking conditions, our 
storing and handling of cream, especially from the cow to the separator. I feel that 
a lot of infection takes place and once that contamination takes place, all the care 
in the world cannot stop it from deteriorating the final product.588 
The following exchange between Jan Judson, a farmer who was also a director of the Rhodesia 
Co-op Creameries and Jacklin, a member of the Committee, captures the general sentiment 
expressed by both farmers and creameries: 
Judson: Low grade cream...it seems that there should be some supervision on the bad 
conditions in which the milking takes place. 
Jacklin: What, in our view, should be done to improve the situation? Regulation, perhaps? 
Judson: I would absolutely approve of any regulations. Take the milk production round 
about here. The milk is sent to Bulawayo. An officer comes out and inspects the 
milking arrangements, the dairies, and all that sort of thing, but it does not seem to 
be universal. Some places are missed. But further afield, where cream is produced, 
there is no supervision at all. As a farmer-producer I welcome the most stringent 
                                                     
586
 Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Dairy and Pig Industries, 1. 
587
 NAZ S1215/1087/1 Committee of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Dairy and Pig Industries: Correspondence, 
1934-1935. Letter from the Minister of Agriculture and Lands to William Purdie Currie, Chairman of the 
Committee, 18 September, 1934. 
588
 NAZ ZAR 2/1/4 Written Evidence to the Committee of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Dairy and Pig 
Industries, Fort Victoria, 15 August 1935. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
154
regulations in regard to this, and I do not think any right-minded man would 
object.589 
Lammas concurred that the present control mechanisms would not bear the expected results for 
as long as farmers’ operations were left unregulated. He stated that “if you could get farm dairy 
inspection going properly, it would tend towards more economical production of cream.”590 
While the majority of farmers had come to realise that farmers’ production methods needed to be 
regulated, a few others, appeared to be still in denial. Arguing that settler cream production 
methods were sufficiently good, they attributed the high proportion of low grade butter to 
African producers, whose cream was mixed with settler cream, leading to ‘contamination’. The 
testimony of one farmer, F.R. Peach, is particularly revealing of the racial prejudice which 
tainted their views: 
               A lot of it (low grade butter) is from native creameries. It is produced under 
insanitary conditions. The only thing I advocate is that native cream should be 
branded as ‘native cream’ and butter branded as ‘native butter’. Also, a European 
collects the cream from the kraals. Europeans supply the natives with separators 
and cans and go round and pick up the cream. It is produced under the most 
insanitary conditions.591 
It is thus evident that a section of the settler community, still trapped in the racial discourse of 
the time, was unwilling to admit publicly the inadequacy of their methods, and opted to lay the 
blame on African producers. Yet, such views persisted despite the fact that, as illustrated in the 
previous chapter, farm inspections by officials of the Dairy Division had already indicated that 
both settler and African methods needed to be improved if dairy farmers were to successfully 
penetrate the international markets.  
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Notwithstanding the opposition of a small section of settler farmers, the Committee 
recommended that all producers needed to meet certain official standards of sanitation and 
hygiene.592 It had concluded that the focus on creamery processes during the 1920s had missed 
the point since the large amount of low grade cream produced was primarily due to the methods 
of producers.593 The corollary to this observation was the espousal of regulations under the Dairy 
Act, which provided for the compulsory registration of all urban dairies, both white-owned and 
African owned, and the increased inspection of rural dairies. The specific nature of the 
regulations, their impact on both settler and African producers, and their responses is discussed 
in the following section.  
 
Compulsory registration of milk and cream producers and farmer responses 
The passage of the Dairy Act in 1937 saw the adoption of a stringent set of requirements which 
farmers needed to meet in order to be allowed to supply milk and cream to processing concerns. 
It stipulated that all dairy premises throughout the colony from which milk, cream, butter, cheese 
or ice cream was sold or supplied for sale must comply with certain minimum hygienic 
requirements, while all dairies from which milk or cream was sold, for consumption as whole 
milk or cream, in a municipal area or area controlled by a Town Management Board, had to be 
registered.594 In such cases, registration was to be effected by the Chief Dairy Officer, with 
Bulawayo being the only exception as the powers of registration were left in the hands of the 
municipality.595 
 
In response to the old tradition of milking in kraals, and also in line with new sanitary standards 
prescribed in established countries such as Australia and England, the Dairy Act stated that 
milking operations must be carried out in an approved place, including a properly constructed 
cow-shed, a simple lean to shed with a concrete floor or an open milking kraal with a concrete or 
earthen floor; such kraal, however, had to be kept solely for the purpose, that is, cattle may not 
be kept therein at night. Also, the legislation stipulated that the milking place must be situated at 
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least 300 feet from any residential quarters and at least 100 feet away from any other kraal.596 As 
shown in the picture below, milking sheds did not need to be sophisticated or expensive. As Cory 
suggested, these would cost no more than £20, considering that it would be thatched with grass 
(which was cheaper and more readily available).597 
 
 
Figure 2: An example of a milking shed that farmers were advised to construct after 1937.598 
 
The same legislation stated that facilities had to be provided for the proper cleaning and 
sterilisation by steam or boiling of all dairy utensils such as milking cans and buckets, while a 
separate room had to be constructed specifically for the straining, cooling and storage of milk 
and cream. This room needed to have a cement floor, be fly and rat proof, be well ventilated, be 
provided with a ceiling, and had to be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected on a regular basis.599 
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Premises which were not compliant were barred from producing milk and cream for commercial 
purposes.  
 
It should be noted that the overarching aimof these regulations and, indeed, the entire legislation 
was the elimination of part-time cream and butter producers who only produced cream and butter 
in order to earn an occasional monthly cheque, especially during the summer months when their 
beef cows calved. It also sought to establish a professional, well trained corps of dairy farmers in 
the country. However, although these were arguably the most important measures taken in the 
dairy industry thus far, – considering that low quality products had been a long-standing problem 
in the industry – most settlers who had the desire to become bona fide dairy farmers still lacked 
the key to full time professional dairying: capital. 
 
Indeed, a significant number of farmers lamented that their inability to access dairy cows and 
basic dairying implements – for lack of adequate funding – was one of the chief impediments to 
their operations. As early as 1930, the government had expressed its awareness of the financial 
problem facing farmers. Hamilton observed that: 
              Most farmers who are at present sending cream to the creameries are in such a 
straightened financial position that to compel them to provide such premises 
would have the effect of driving them out of business altogether, and this would 
deprive them of what at present is their source of livelihood.600 
As a reflection of official thinking during the early 1930s, Hamilton’s statement above is 
noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, it serves as a belated and inadequate defence of the lack of 
regulation in the 1920s. Secondly, it explains new efforts by the state to grant settler farmers with 
financial and technical assistance with which to improve their herds as well as to provide proper 
premises and implements. 
 
The DICB decided to grant small loans to white farmers of up to a maximum of £20 without 
interest. These loans, which were recoverable by stop orders through creameries and cheese 
creameries, were given for the purpose of “assisting farmers to improve their dairy buildings or 
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to purchase modern dairy utensils.”601 This was a temporary stop gap measure, while awaiting 
the passage of the Dairy Act. This farm loan scheme was short-lived – lasting only four years – 
and was financed by a modest budget of only £500 per annum.602  Considering the cost of 
constructing milking sheds and purchasing separators and cooling utensils, which totalled up to 
£70, the scale of this programme was inadequate.603 
 
A much bigger scheme was introduced for white farmers in 1938, after the adoption of 
regulations to govern cream and milk production standards. Under this scheme, the government, 
through the DICB, offered farmers considerably bigger loans for the purchase of implements. If a 
farmer required more than £50 for constructing milking sheds and purchasing separators, 
officials of the Board would visit the farmer’s premises for evaluation and, depending on the 
officials’ report, funds would be made available through the creamery to which the farmer sent 
cream and milk. No such visit from Board officials was necessary if the farmer required £50 or 
less for buying small utensils such as a few cans and buckets. In both cases, however, the 
creamery would purchase the apparatus on behalf of the producer.604 In turn, a stop order account 
would be opened by the creamery leading to the deduction of some money from the farmer’s 
earnings for cream and milk.605 By 1943, 138 settler farmers had accessed funds through the 
scheme.606 This was intended to professionalise the industry and to eliminate dilettantes.  
 
This sector actively resisted the introduction of minimum requirements for commercial dairy 
farm operations, and the compulsory registration system for farmers supplying in urban areas. 
Evidence suggests that some livestock owners, in collaboration with some private depots, 
attempted to elude the registration system. This was done either through depot owners seeking 
permission to continue receiving milk and cream from unregistered producers from the 
government, or producers clandestinely delivering milk and cream to depots without official 
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records. Writing to the Chief Dairy Officer in 1940, the Fort Victoria District Dairy Officer 
informed him that “it has come to our attention that two depots have continued to receive cream 
from unregistered dairy producers.”607 Most of these producers, he added, “had expressed an 
unwillingness to get themselves registered, as dairy production is not one of the main agricultural 
activities on their premises.”608 The incidence of such practices subsided significantly after the 
Dairy Division threatened to annul the registration of conniving depots.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that some depots in Fort Victoria sought official permission to 
receive milk and cream from unregistered producers, citing the diminishing cream and milk 
receipts from farmers since the mid-1930s. For instance, a depot proprietor from Fort Victoria, 
Curtis, wrote to the District Dairy Officer initially applying for a registration licence on behalf of 
Browne, who was one of his main suppliers.609 After his supplier was denied registration because 
of the lack of infrastructural improvements at the farm premises, Curtis, however, successfully 
applied for a temporary exemption from complying with the regulations for his supplier, arguing 
that his depot would have been robbed of its principal supplier if Browne were pushed out of the 
cream business.610 Emerging out of this scenario, however, is a situation in which some livestock 
owners (despite not being interested in engaging in dairy farming on a full time basis,) wanted to 
continue earning extra income from part time dairy farming. Indeed, even after getting a six 
month exemption, Browne still had not constructed dairy premises, leading to the deregistration 
of his operations.611 
 
The Dairy Act and African commercial dairy 
The nature and impact of state assistance to African agriculture has been a subject of active 
scholarly attention. Colonial historians such as Gann have argued that the state played a 
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liberator’s role by setting aside some funds for African ‘development’ by emphasizing the little 
funds that were expended on African technical training.612 Yudelman has suggested that, in the 
final analysis, low productivity in the African sector was generally caused by cultural patterns of 
livestock management and land tenure.613 These views, however, ignore the fact that colonial 
agricultural policy was deliberately aimed at promoting white – and not African – agriculture. 
Machingaidze has argued that although settler farmers (and also some African farmers) sought to 
build up resources of capital from profits, settler farmers had an advantage in that the state 
extended financial assistance and extension services which ensured that African agriculture 
would not compete with white agriculture.614 In any case, African agriculture did not fall under 
the Ministry of Agriculture, but was administered by the Department of Native Affairs, with the 
result that the two sectors did not develop along the same lines. Jocelyn Alexander has argued 
that the interventions of the NAD, which fell under the rubric of ‘technical development’ from 
the late 1920s onwards, and the legislative interventions in individual agricultural industries in 
the 1930s were aimed at “undercutting African competition and subsidise white production.”615 
Using dairy farming as a window, this section examines the impact of the Dairy Act on African 
commercial production. It is demonstrated here that African inability to comply with regulations 
had nothing to do with general inability or cultural limitations, but was necessarily a result of 
lack of access to public resources that were availed to white farmers.  
 
While white dairy farmers had access to financial and technical support, which in turn helped 
them to comply with provisions of the Dairy Act, African farmers were excluded from such 
schemes. This effectively meant that only white dairymen and a small number of ‘middle-class’ 
Africans in Native Purchase Areas (NPAs) (particularly the Msengezi and Dewure Purchase 
areas) were in a position to comply with the requirements of the Dairy Act. As shown in chapter 
3 of this thesis, NPAs had been set aside for ‘progressive farmers’ as a political sop to “advanced 
natives for the loss of their rights to buy non-reserve land anywhere in the colony of Southern 
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Rhodesia.”616 However, as Shutt argues, the level of agricultural productivity in these areas was, 
in comparison with white agriculture, quite low. 617  Writing to the Secretary to the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Secretary for Native Affairs informed that “the sale of milk and cream to 
depots and creameries by natives had considerably gone down. The percentage of native cream 
and milk at the creameries and factories has gone below 5%.”618 Although most of those sending 
milk and cream to creameries from the Msengezi Purchase Area were local Africans, some 
dairymen from Dewure were not of Southern Rhodesian descent. A considerable number of them 
were Sotho, Xhosa and Zulu migrants who had moved onto the NPAs after being displaced from 
land they had bought prior to the passage of the Land Apportionment Act.619 As Mujere points 
out, most of these immigrants had used their links with the Dutch Reformed Church missionaries 
to acquire education and capital, which they used to purchase land.620 As most of them were 
businessmen, or were employed by government, they used their relatively stronger financial 
position to enter commercial dairying. 
 
These farmers’ position prior to the passage of the Land Apportionment Act had, however, been 
stronger than it became after 1930, when they were displaced from their original areas, which 
caused them to buy land in the Purchase Areas. Whereas they were initially able to construct 
modern commercial dairy enterprises through combining their resources prior to their 
displacement after the Land Apportionment Act, such joint ventures were generally discouraged 
by the state, with the result that farmers bought land and engaged in agriculture individually.621 
Nevertheless, records show that some individuals from Msengezi and Dewure Purchase Areas 
had their dairy premises and operations approved by officials of the Board, and thus continued to 
produce cream and milk for the official market after the passage of the Dairy Act.622 In 1942, the 
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Secretary for Native Affairs observed that while African contribution to creameries had fallen 
significantly: 
               A handful of Africans in Msengezi and Dewure had their premises and methods 
approved for cream production, and this is a signal that Africans may still 
contribute to this industry, if they are progressive enough to abandon old tribal 
methods...623 
Also remarkable in the official’s thinking is his view that the inability of Africans to comply with 
the regulations was solely an indication of individuals’ level of ‘progressiveness’, and not the 
discriminatory policies of the time. More than anything, this was a case of availability of 
financial and technical resources and knowledge.     
 
If only a few African farmers in the Purchase Areas continued to send cream to creameries and 
depots after the passage of the Dairy Act, then virtually all Africans living in the reserves had 
ceased to do so by 1939. The Secretary for Native Affairs intimated that “native cream sales (on 
the official market) have been stopped.”624 This situation, as he explained, came about as a result 
of the fact that “the methods of nearly all African cream producers have been found to be in 
contravention of the Dairy Act.”625 While the fact of the unacceptability of African premises 
under the new regulations is indisputable, state officials seemed reluctant to acknowledge that 
the major cause of the situation was the paucity of financial schemes to help Africans to comply 
with the regulations, despite African contribution to the state treasury through taxes. In this 
regard, therefore, it may be safely argued that although the Dairy Act did not explicitly 
pronounce the banishment of African farmers, its implementation led to the exclusion of 
Africans from commercial dairy farming. Indeed, to the extent that the government helped settler 
producers – and not African farmers – to comply with its provisions, events that followed the 
passage of the Act effectively ended African reserve participation on the official dairy market, a 
sector which had hitherto endured the impact of other negative factors such as land and cattle 
losses and displacement during the early years of colonial occupation. In this way, settler 
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consumers’ complaints about the unsuitability of African dairy farming and settler farmers’ fears 
of African agricultural competition in general were quelled.626 
 
African responses to exclusion 
The exclusion of Africans from the official market should not, however, be misconstrued to 
mean that African dairy production and marketing came to a standstill. Their inability to market 
cream and milk on the official market contributed to increased illicit African milk trade on the 
mines and centres where a ready market existed among mine workers. Employing what James 
Scott described as ‘weapons of the weak’ – a situation in which peasants respond, in 
subterranean ways, to authoritarian state policies through smuggling, theft and pilfering, among 
other things – African dairy producers smuggled their produce into the mine compounds and 
other centres where a market existed.627 Many producers admitted to transporting fresh milk 
(depending on distance) and sour milk from the reserves to nearby mines and urban settlements 
where a ready market existed. Referring to the mid 1940s, one informer from the Mberengwa 
district of Midlands reminisced:  
               My mother would send us to Zvishavane (then Shabanie) to sell milk and other 
goods. We carried milk in clay pots and plastic containers. Since we knew that it 
was illegal, one had to be careful not to be caught, both on the way to the mine, 
and also while we were on the compound itself. We would visit mine compounds 
at night, or sometimes customers would leave their rooms to come to our meeting 
places. While it was common for one to be detained for a few days if caught by 
authorities, in most cases the milk would be confiscated and spilt in full view of 
the owner. Although some workers at the mine requested for fresh milk, most of 
the milk we sold was sour. 628 
 
Although their customers were predominantly African, there is evidence that shows that some 
white consumers did buy from these itinerant African traders. As another source added: 
The great majority of our customers were blacks who worked at the mine, and 
others working in white owned shops. However, a few whites would ask us to 
provide them with sour milk and cream. In most cases, white customers would tell 
us never to mention that they purchased African milk if we were caught selling 
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milk. Besides milk, we sold many other items such as fresh mealies and 
groundnuts during the harvesting seasons.629 
These developments should be viewed within the context of Africans who were not only evading 
the Dairy Act, but an entire trade policy in which, as Kramer has outlined, required African 
traders to acquire traders’ licences.630 While dairy products had been part of the African trade 
system even within the rural sector and begun to take shape with the establishment of urban and 
peri-urban areas where an African population existed from the early period of colonial 
occupation, this phenomenon became even more widespread from the late 1930s onwards.  
 
The secretive and yet increasingly widespread sale of milk on mine compounds by Africans, 
particularly on the Shabanie Mine compound eventually came to the attention of state officials. 
Writing to the Secretary for Agriculture, Cory acknowledged that “the sale of milk on mine 
compounds and other urban spaces by natives has become pervasive on mine compounds in the 
southern parts of the colony.”631 This system, he argued, needed to be addressed, not least 
because “these illegal native traders have begun to sell milk to European consumers.”632 This 
realisation triggered debate among colonial officials on the most appropriate response to illicit 
milk sales. On the one hand, Dr Ireland, the Medical Officer for Shabanie and the Acting Native 
Commissioner for the area, albeit for entirely different reasons, argued for the relaxation of the 
provisions of the Dairy Act as it applied to Africans selling milk on the mine compound. In his 
push for Africans to be allowed to sell milk, Dr Ireland contended that “it should be within the 
discretion of the Dairy Officers, without insisting on strict observation of the provisions of the 
Act.” The root of his argument emanated from his belief that: 
               Children in the Shabani mine compound would suffer from ill health from their 
inability to receive a certain amount of milk as a result of cessation of purchase of 
this product by their parents, from native residents in the vicinity, and similar 
conditions probably apply elsewhere.633 
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The concern for the nutrition of African children on mine compounds expressed by Dr Ireland, 
however, smacked of the old paternalist attitudes by the colonial state. Similar attitudes 
manifested itself in South Africa through the introduction of feeding schemes intended for 
malnourished children in which milk and vegetables were distributed during the 1940s.634 Very 
little attention was paid to the root cause of malnutrition in rural areas. Regarding the risk of 
disease outbreaks as a result of contaminated milk, Dr Ireland added that: 
               For generations the natives have been consumers from early childhood and that in 
consequence of consuming a contaminated product for many years, it is more 
probable the native built up a resistance to casual milk borne diseases...the only 
control I suggest is that milk offered for sale by natives should be examined at 
regular intervals for visible dirt. 635 
He further suggested that African producers would instead need to be forced to use cleaned metal 
utensils during the milking, storage and marketing of their milk.636 Arguing from a financial 
viewpoint, this proposal received the support of the Native Department. The Acting Native 
Commissioner for Shabanie suggested that barring African milk sales would be unfair not only to 
African traders, but to his Department because he was also expected to collect taxes from the 
same Africans whose source of income was being blocked.637 
 
The Dairy Division, on the other hand, was opposed to the idea of legalising or even tolerating 
African milk sales on mine compounds. Lammas strongly expressed himself against the idea of 
relaxing regulations in the interest of the Africans in the mine compound. After visiting a number 
of African premises where milk was produced for sale, he averred that: 
               the native in that area at least, is no more enlightened today than he was years 
ago. The (African) dairyman lives in a very primitive state, he has only one hut 
which is used as sleeping and eating quarters, and would of course be used as a 
dairy....In conclusion, I would suggest that if the native in that area is to be 
permitted to sell milk, the regulations should be relaxed entirely as I do not think it 
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possible to exercise any effective control over production...there would appear to 
be no advantage in this Department examining the milk for the presence of dirt. 638 
A compromise was reached, eventually. The Minister of Agriculture, after meeting with Ireland 
and officials from the Native Affairs and Dairy Division, agreed that temporary measures be 
taken to allow Africans to sell milk on mine compounds, on condition that this milk would only 
be sold to other Africans. The agreement was that enforcement of requirements would not be 
feasible, particularly because of the prevalence of the clandestine trade. Part of the resolution, 
however, was that methods of cleanliness would be inculcated onto African milk producers 
gradually, but as rapidly as circumstances would allow. The thinking that Africans needed 
instruction on hygiene and sanitation in order to comply with regulations was, however, flawed. 
Without equal access to financial and technical assistance, Africans, like white producers, could 
not be expected to erect the required infrastructure. Nevertheless, medical views, supported by 
financial interests of the Native Department, triumphed over the Dairy Division. As was the case 
in South Africa from the 1940s, these medical views which Wylie described as an “apolitical 
version of the malnutrition syndrome”639, somewhat influenced state policy. Thus, milk trade 
between Africans on mines and white farms continued to occur throughout the course of the 
1940s and 1950s. As chapter 6 shows, figures of this trade were not factored into official data of 
the dairy industry. 
 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the above. Firstly, through circumventing the law and 
engaging in illegal milk trade, African dairy producers carved a niche for themselves within the 
colonial hegemonic system, which forced the state to eventually endorse – albeit reluctantly – 
their activities. Secondly, besides the  importance of granting Africans an opportunity to earn 
money (which, in turn, would help them to meet their financial obligations to the state), as well 
as African nutritional issues which were considered in allowing Africans to sell milk in 
contravention of the regulations for as long as the settler community was not part of the 
consumers, the state not only acknowledged the existence of a dual dairy marketing system, but 
effectively contributed towards its sustenance.   
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“Cream should be sent to creameries!” White farmers, creameries and the farm butter 
debate 
One of the topical issues that arose during the 1930s was the production of farm butter, whose 
quantities had begun to adversely affect the quantities of cream sent to creameries for the 
manufacture of cream butter. As cream prices began to fall, an increasing number of producers 
began to bypass creameries, opting, instead, to produce butter on their premises and marketing it 
themselves as farm butter.640 This section examines the origins of the problem of increasing farm 
butter production in the country during the 1930s, and its attendant problems it spewed on the 
dairy industry. It also outlines the measures that were taken to control farm butter making, 
particularly the impact of the Dairy Act of 1937, on farmers, and the public discourse that 
followed its passing.  
 
As noted in chapter 2, most settler cattle owners initially churned butter on their own premises 
during the first two decades of colonial occupation, particularly before creameries were 
established. Although it played to the advantage of beef producers who earned more through the 
sale of farm butter, this phenomenon created a couple of problems for the industry in general. 
First, because it was relatively cheaper than creamery butter, hence, as farm butter glutted the 
market, it drove creameries out of business. This happened especially during the summer seasons 
when most cows calved.641 Secondly, the quality of Farm butter was comparatively inferior, thus 
exposing consumers to potential health hazards. Although it had begun during the early 1890s, 
his phenomenon had, nevertheless, begun to subside during the post First World War period 
largely as a result of the increasing number of creameries that had been established as the dairy 
industry began to take shape. Indeed, throughout the period between 1921 and 1929 the 
percentage of farm butter on the market showed a decreasing tendency, with a corresponding 
increase in creamery butter.  
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By the early 1930s, however, it had become increasingly evident that a general sense of 
disillusionment and dissatisfaction pervaded farmers’ attitude towards creameries’ operations. 
The increasing volumes of cream which creameries had been handling began to subside 
considerably during the 1930s, while farm butter quantities evinced a growing trajectory. 
Although this was partly due to the general decrease in dairy output, as a result of erratic rainfall 
patterns alluded to in the previous section, also contributing to the decrease in creamery butter 
production was what farmers perceived to be adverse marketing conditions at the creameries.642 
As a result of the often low grade cream the ranchers made, they found it more financially 
rewarding to avoid creameries, and, in the process causing excessive seasonal competition 
between creamery butter and farm butter in summer.  
 
As early as 1930, dairy officials had begun to lament the ever increasing amount of farm butter 
on the market. The Senior Officer in Animal Husbandry commented that 500 00lb. of farm butter 
produced in 1930 represented a “worrying increase”, before warning that: 
               Producers should realise that, however, that farm butter is not an exportable 
product, and that it is only through the expansion of the creamery system that 
permanent extension and development of the export butter can be achieved. An 
increase in the output of farm butter reacts to the detriment of the industry as a 
whole.643 
              The proportion of farm butter to total production, however, continued to increase, so much that it 
had swelled from 16% in 1930 to 25% by 1935.644 As creameries continued to handle deceasing 
amounts of cream, calls for intervention grew louder, with Hamilton warning that “the continued 
large production of farm butter is a serious menace to the dairy industry in the colony.”645 Such 
complaints, however, would not yield the desired results as long as the circumstances that pushed 
farmers to bypass creameries were not addressed.  
 
The result was that an increasing number – nearly a third – of all producers began to bypass 
creameries altogether, instead, opting to produce and package butter on their premises for the 
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market. Many of the farmers who ventured into farm butter making defended their decision as 
being influenced by unsatisfactory prices paid by creameries for cream. What made farm butter 
making an attractive proposition was the fact that unlike creamery butter whose price was 
determined by creameries, farm butter could be sold direct to the market at any price. Hence, 
farmers could earn more by marketing farm butter through their own agency and retailers at 
prices higher than what creameries paid yet lower than the retail price of creamery butter. In this 
way, farm butter production became an easy avenue through which farmers could eschew the 
tightly regulated but unprofitable butter marketing system, which at this time was reeling under 
the high cost of participating on the export market. A member of the Chipinga based Gazaland 
Farmers’ Association explained his entrance into the farm butter business thus: 
                    It is the grade of the butter fat during the flush season that induced me to make 
butter. It is simply because the price goes so low. I sell it as butter or ghee. I 
sell it to the stores for the Indians’ consumption.646 
Another farmer, identified as Mr Tarr, from the Charter District Farmers’ Association explained 
his change-over from sending to the creamery to making butter himself thus: 
               I have always sent to the creamery before. I made up my mind I would support 
the creamery and I followed the creamery’s instructions as well as I could. I 
thought for a few years I would try making butter and I found it was very 
satisfactory. I always got the top price, and I found that I made about 25% more 
by turning it to butter than by sending it to creameries. I send the butter to the 
stores. They pay me 1/6d per lb...I found it paid better, and that is why I stick to 
it.647 
 
Farmers’ complaints over low prices, however, were hypocritical. A comparative analysis of the 
prices paid to farmers for cream and butter fat, however, shows that Southern Rhodesian 
dairymen were in a much better position than their counterparts in South Africa and Australia. 
South African farmers, for instance, received an average of 4d less than what Southern 
Rhodesian farmers received for all grades of butter between 1935 and 1937.648 By and large, this 
was a consequence of the fact that South Africa continued to experience huge surpluses – which 
needed to be exported – at a time when production levels had begun to fall in Southern Rhodesia 
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from 1933 until 1936 as a result of inconsistent rainfall patterns that characterised most parts of 
the country.649 Indeed, the Rhodesia Butter Agencies conceded that, had it not been for the high 
cost of transport, they would have considered importing cream from South Africa.650 Farmers on 
Australia’s Atherton Tablelands also fared badly during the 1930s. They received 7d and 9d per 
lb. of butterfat for their cream, which, on average, was about 2d less than Southern Rhodesian 
farmers were paid.651 
 
Further contributing to the high incidence of farmers avoiding creameries in preference to farm 
butter making was the grading system at the creameries towards which, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, farmers had held misgivings for a long time. The small difference in price 
between the various grades of cream also made its bearing upon the amount of low grade cream 
produced, but when the difference became too great, the low grade cream producers turned to the 
manufacture of farm butter. With most of the cream produced deemed to be third grade, and thus 
fetching lower prices, unsatisfied farmers found it more profitable to produce direct for the 
market. For instance, a Gwelo farmer complained in 1935 that three-quarters of his cream was 
deemed to be third grade by the Gwelo Creamery, a situation he attributed to “either some little 
defect in the grading mechanism, or (in) the grader himself.”652 
 
The farmers’ reluctance to send cream to creameries must also be viewed within the context of 
their attempts to eschew a regulated system, in preference of the relative freedom they enjoyed in 
the production and marketing of farm butter. In contrast to the legislated procedures governing 
creameries, farmers made butter at their premises under no restriction. They could also package 
and market their article in any way they thought could best help sell their produce to 
unsuspecting consumers. The majority of farm butter was packaged in wrappers which had 
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“attractive, but misleading” inscriptions such as “Finest Farm Butter”, or simply “First Grade 
Butter”.653 
 
Without any regulatory framework governing the production and marketing of farm butter, 
farmers took advantage of this window of opportunity to enter the market themselves. Indeed, 
besides pushing creameries out of business especially during the flush seasons when most cows 
calved, the creation of such an unregulated parallel marketing system, potentially posed a health 
hazard to consumers. As one farmer candidly opined: 
               It seems to me the farmer should come under the same regulation as apply to 
creameries, inspection of his butter and grading. At the present time, so far as I 
know, all farm butter is labelled first grade and it is sent into Bulawayo for sale. 
Many farmers are up to neck [in debt] with the merchants and the merchants have 
to take over produce to cut down the account. It does not matter what is in the 
wrapper. It is never inspected. All butter I send in is marked ‘First Grade’ and I 
take the price – I have a right – but I have no objection to its inspection. The buyer 
takes the description on the label as correct.654 
By the mid-1930s, the relationship between farmers and private creameries had nearly broken 
down. Always suspicious of creamery concerns, some farmers’ organisations began to clamour 
for the shutting down of some creameries, arguing that most of them were not offering any 
“useful” service to their communities. The farmers’ contemptuous attitude towards creameries is 
captured by Govan Verran, a member of the Gazaland Farmers’ Association, who said “it is our 
idea that we want to give up the creameries because of the low price. We are not contemplating 
starting a new creamery.”655 Edwards, from the same association, was even more scathing: 
               Many creameries in other countries have broken down because of 
mismanagement; I do not think there is any reason for the continued subsidisation 
of creameries in this country. There is a need to first find out the reasons behind 
farmers’ apathy towards creameries. This is important, because most of them are 
not proprietary concerns and farmers own no stake in them...We were faced by the 
same problem in New Zealand, and the proprietary concerns found themselves 
eliminated by non-supply.656 
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Moreover, farmers pointed to the long distances and to the unavailability of an adequate and 
efficient transport system as a major contributor to the production of farm butter. As noted in the 
previous chapter, some farmers had to travel long distances to reach the railway lines, and then 
contend with unreliable train schedules, hence cream and milk would lose its keeping qualities in 
transit. One W.T.Summers, a farmer, argued that far from the alleged unsanitary conditions 
under which cream was produced, the reason for the production of low grade cream in most 
cases was that “ a great deal of fermentation takes place either while awaiting the train, on the 
train itself or in inside the guard’s van”.657  Thus, farmers preferred to avoid the ordeal of 
transporting cream to creameries, opting to transport self-made butter. Although this somewhat 
accounted for the farm butter boom, it remains valid that the major contributing factor towards 
farm butter making was the low income farmers fetched at the creameries for predominantly low 
grade cream, itself a result of the insanitary conditions under which cream and milk were 
produced.  
 
In spite of the obvious role of the predominantly low grade cream they produced, farmers mainly 
attributed their failure to earn good prices to what they perceived as under grading tendencies by 
creameries. They believed that creamery proprietors were acting as greedy middlemen, whose 
interests lay more with the accumulation of profits than with the welfare of the producers. As one 
farmer from Fort Victoria, Duncan Pyewell, said: 
               In my opinion there is not such a large quantity of low grade cream as is made 
out. There is not the amount we so often read in the papers. I should say the cause 
was the dairy firms making a good profit. We do not get a good grade....let the 
creameries give a fair deal and they will not have any of that competition (with 
farm butter).658 
Besides the unsatisfactory prices paid by creameries, farmers’ complaints should also be viewed 
within the context of the ownership structure of most creameries and dairies. As indicated in 
chapter 3, the majority of creameries were privately owned with only two (the Farmers’ Co-
operative Creamery in Salisbury and the Rhodesia Co-operative Creamery in Bulawayo) under 
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the ownership and administration of farmers. The Gwelo Dairy was the only owned state-owned 
creamery by the early 1930s. Thus, state and some farmers’efforts to push for the establishment 
of more co-operative concerns to run creameries during the 1910s and 1920s, as had been the 
case in major dairying countries such as New Zealand, had not yielded the desired results by the 
mid-1930s. As a considerable number of butter producers were more preoccupied with beef 
production until the 1930s, few of them had any genuine interest in co-operative concerns. 
 
The farmers’ argument, however, was not corroborated by circumstances on the ground. While 
there may be little doubt as to the effects of the international depression on agricultural prices in 
Southern Rhodesia, it is also incontrovertibly clear that the poor grading argument served as a 
mere scapegoat to support the making of butter on the farms. The testimony of Morrisby, a 
dairyman who had accumulated 20 years’ experience in dairy farming helps to shed light not 
only on the relative advantage Southern Rhodesian farmers enjoyed regarding prices, but also on 
the embellishment many farmers made when disparaging creameries’ grading methods. He stated 
that: 
The price given, compared with other countries, New Zealand and Australia, is 
high. I have supplied for 20 years, and I have always got first grade, but a little 
time ago I did get third grade. I spoke to the Dairy Officer, but since then I have 
not had third grade. I am very particular about cattle eating weeds, Mexican 
marigold, and the cleanliness of my equipment.659 
Morrisby’s admission that his cream always received favourable grading is thus an indication 
that the low grades that farmers received from creameries for cream, and the struggles Southern 
Rhodesian butter faced on the international market was proof that the complaints of the majority 
of farmers over under-grading  were unjustified. 
 
Besides compromising the quality of butter, farm butter making placed creameries, most of 
which had undergone considerable expansion during the 1920s, in a difficult economic position. 
Always receiving a declining amount of cream, most creameries found themselves generally 
underutilised and increasingly redundant during the 1930s. It is therefore scarcely surprising that 
most operators advocated the introduction of regulations that would control the operations of 
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farm butter makers, especially those who only produced in the flush season, as they tended to 
crowd out cream butter on the local market. As Maclean, a representative of the Rhodesia Butter 
Agencies, rhetorically asked “In the event of the farm butter maker doubling his output [which is 
now 50% of the whole needs of the Colony], what would be the position of the creameries.” He 
added:  
               Some would have to close, (and) if the creameries had to shut, the butter has to be 
stored. My idea is that all butter should be made in the creameries and in the 
meantime to improve conditions in the outlying districts.660 
The bigger grievance was on the “seasonal opportunist”, whose interests did not lie in dairy 
farming. Straith, a member of the same organisation, added: 
              The consistent farm butter maker would not, as a rule, produce low grade butter. 
He has to feed (the cows). If he is going to supply butter throughout the year, he 
must have some organisation and will give it his attention. But he is not subject to 
any control or standard. I would suggest that, first of all, they should get decent 
conditions of working, and then introduce grading regulations.661 
 
While it is certainly true that farm butter making constituted a dangerous threat to creameries, 
bona fide dairy farmers and the consuming public, the concerns raised by creameries masked the 
general inefficiencies which characterised their operations. While acknowledging the deleterious 
impact of farm butter makers, particularly the seasonal actors, the 1936 Committee noted that 
most creameries needed to minimise operational costs, particularly reducing overruns, since they 
impacted negatively on manufacturing costs.662 Drawing comparisons with dairy industries in the 
Australian states, South Africa and New Zealand, the Committee added: 
If expansion of the industry is looked for by way of overseas export, it is obvious 
that the margin required by our creameries must be reduced to a figure bearing 
more favourable comparisons with those of other countries. There is otherwise no 
prospect of attaining a competitive position in the overseas market.663 
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Indeed, while creameries in South Africa averaged an overrun of 20%, and those in New Zealand 
22%, Southern Rhodesian creameries averaged just 16% in 1935.664 Interestingly, the Committee 
attributed these figures, which indicated a “serious degree of inefficiency”, to the creameries’ 
giving excessive butterfat grades to farmers, among other malpractices.665 
 
Two conclusions may thus be drawn. Firstly, although the activities of farm butter makers did 
contribute to the creameries’ crisis during the mid 1930s, part of the creameries crisis emanated 
from their own inefficiencies. Secondly, although farmers constantly complained of being under 
graded by creameries, such complaints were largely unjustified since creameries were in fact 
paying them more than the average farmer received in the major dairying countries at this time 
through both the prices they stipulated and over grading.  
 
Given the mutually contradictory views expressed by farmers and creamery operators, the 1936 
Committee sought to strike a balance between the two sides while ensuring that the interests of 
the industry in general were safeguarded. However, it acknowledged the “menace” farm butter 
constituted to the industry and recommended that farm butter needed to be eliminated, gradually, 
from the formal butter market. It stated that: 
Whilst appreciating the position of these farmers, your Committee does not 
consider that the seasonal farm butter maker should be allowed to disorganise the 
industry by flooding the market at certain seasons with low grade butter. Farm 
butter making is a menace to the industry, and the object in view should be the 
ultimate elimination of the farm butter maker, as has been done by legislation in 
Australia.666 
The proposal for the curtailing of farm butter production was to form the basis of one of the most 
far reaching provisions of the Dairy Act of 1937. The legislation provided that all farm butter 
makers were to be registered and be issued with production licences by the DICB.667 Renewable 
annually, the licence was reserved only for producers who had built up a high capital and 
consistent business in butter making before the Act came into force, or who were so situated that 
they could not supply cream to a creamery, or dairying in a remote area where the making and 
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sale of farm butter was considered to be in the interests of the local community.668 In this case, 
producers whose premises were situated within 12 miles of a thrice-weekly rail or road motor 
service were regarded as being able to send cream, and were thus denied licences.669 
 
Further, the same legislation stipulated that farm butter makers should be allotted quotas for the 
production of the commodity on the basis of each individual’s granted contingent upon 
satisfactory methods of production being employed.670 The quantity of farm butter made by any 
individual dairyman was restricted to a quantity not exceeding that which he had made during 
the 12 months immediately preceding its introduction.671 Yet, as happened with the issuing of the 
licence in the first place, the quota would only be increased if the farmer proved that their farm 
was geographically disadvantaged, in which case cream, as a more perishable commodity, was 
more difficult to transport to urban centres than butter. These measures should be viewed within 
the context of Southern Rhodesia’s attempts to competitively enter the export market against a 
background of the comparatively low quality of butter that characterised the dairy industry 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. As the Minister of Agriculture explained it, the dairy industry 
could “not be developed along internationally competitive lines as long as the excessive 
competition between farm and creamery butter, which arises especially during the flush season is 
not curbed.” 672  Furthermore, to the extent that it would contribute towards a more tightly 
regulated system with a higher degree of uniformity of butter manufacturing mechanisms, the 
elimination of farm butter was viewed as an essential step in the improvement of the quality and 
uniformity of all locally manufactured butter. The Dairy Act provided for the compulsory 
grading of all farm butter by dairy inspectors before it could be packaged and sold on the market. 
It also provided that all packaging should be inscribed with a notification showing that the 
product had been made at the farm, the producer’s address and the grade of the butter.673 
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The gradualist approach towards the elimination of farm butter from the industry evident in these 
regulations should be viewed as an attempt by the state to ‘protect’ farmers who had long 
depended on the production of farm butter while at the same time eliminating the seasonal butter 
producer whose main interests lay in beef production. This aim was expressed by the Bulawayo 
District Dairy Officer, who argued that this type of producer, for lack of proper dairy cow feed, 
made an article which contained defects in flavour, the majority being “insipid or flat”. He added 
that: 
               Dairying in this colony is no longer a mere side line; to many it has become  the 
most important branch of farming, and for this reason a standard quality and 
colour should be aimed at. To achieve this, the industry should be rid of the part-
timer; he disturbs the equilibrium of the industry.674 
While the legislation appeared quite straightforward on paper, its implementation was not as 
seamless. Indeed, the post 1937 period was characterised by constant disagreements, accusations 
and counter accusations between settler farmers and the state over the implementation modalities 
of the farm butter quotas, grading and the motives governing the new regulations. In some cases, 
white farmers employed Scott’s weapons of the weak to circumvent the law because of what 
they perceived to be the state’s insensitivity to the plight of farmers.675  For instance, after 
unsuccessfully applying for an increased quota, C.B. Nilson of Koodoovale farm began to 
contravene the regulations by exceeding his allocated quota, and distributing his produce to 
another dairyman who did not produce enough farm butter to fully utilise his own quota.676 After 
his case – which was one among many – was discovered, Wilson defended himself by 
complaining that the introduction of quotas was “insensitive to our financial interests”, since he 
had begun to earn less by sending more cream to the creamery than he had become accustomed 
to before the advent of quotas.677 While acknowledging that farm butter was more profitable, the 
Minister was eager to remind farmers that “unless we have established a first class creamery 
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butter, the industry will be in great trouble (on the international markets). You must look at it for 
the future.”678 
 
While the regulations controlling farm butter were aimed at ensuring that the bulk of Southern 
Rhodesian butter was manufactured and marketed through the creameries, they also had the 
inadvertent effect of discouraging some farmers from investing in the industry. The impact of the 
introduction of farm butter licences and the quota system on dairy farming, and the state-farmer 
relations in particular is perhaps captured in the case of Schaller, a dairyman based in 
Mashonaland. By the mid-1920s he had “built a very suitable dairy” and invited inspection by 
the Dairy Officer. Furthermore, he had constantly grown his herd to about twenty, which was 
headed by a dairy Shorthorn bull purchased from South Africa.679 The major challenge for him, 
however, was geographical – cream production was virtually impracticable during the summer 
months owing to the state of the roads and the Umnyiati River linking his farm and the nearest 
creamer depot in Umvuma.680 Consequently, Schaller could only travel to Umvuma once a week, 
which, while suitable for butter transportation, was unsuitable for cream. 
 
Schaller’s confrontation with the DICB came in 1940, when he was granted a quota of only 740 
lb., which he felt was too small considering the investment he had made in an attempt to 
construct a modern dairy farm with an expensively built dairy herd. He argued that: 
               This quota is far short of my possible production and cows are calving which I 
cannot milk, as I am restricted from selling produce. I am very unsettled by the 
uncertainty of the position. I could produce 4 000lb. if I were to fully utilise my 
potential. I cannot understand why the government encouraged us to invest in 
bigger and better dairy herds and better dairy facilities some 20 years ago now that 
they are limiting us.681 
                                                     
678
 NAZ S1215/1363/1 Inspection and Registration of Dairies: Letter from C.B. Nilson, Koodoovale Farm to the 
Minister of Agriculture, 10 June 1940.   
679
 NAZ S1215/1363/ Inspection and Registration of Dairies: Letter from Mr E.V. Schaller to the Secretary, 
Department of Agriculture, 19 October 1940 . 
680
 Although 30 miles was not considered too long a distance for the transportation of cream, the fact that the road 
linking the farm and Umvuma was in a bad state made it difficult to frequently travel to Umvuma during the 
summer months, when conditions were often muddy. In addition, the Umniati River was virtually impassable during 
the wet season owing to the small size of the bridge. 
681
 NAZ S1215/1363/1 Inspection and Registration of Dairies: Letter from Mr E.V. Schaller to the Secretary, 
Department of Agriculture, 19 October 1940. 
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Despite the Land and Agricultural Bank describing Schaller as “extremely hardworking, sound 
in his methods, economical and thoroughly reliable”,682  the Board denied him an increased 
quota, contending that “a producer who takes butter to town once a week may reasonably be 
expected to take cream to town together with butter once a week.683 On this evidence, it may be 
argued that besides its noble ambitions to set the dairy industry on a more stable foundation 
through eliminating side-liners, the implementation of the Act also discouraged genuine dairy 
farmers who had invested in the dairy industry. 
Indeed, the result of the blanket application of the regulations was that some long-serving bona 
fide dairy farmers who, for complex geographical and economic reasons, could not send cream to 
creameries abandoned dairy farming altogether. With his herd and infrastructure acutely 
underutilised, and scale of business determined on an annual basis, Schaller was denied a 
temporary quota increase of an additional 300 lb., which could cushion his business while he 
made the transition to beef production. With resignation, he stated that he was  
               prepared to cease production altogether, but will require time, but I have already 
started breeding type animals for fattening. Until the changeover is effected, I 
must rely on dairying to provide my working and living expenses. 684 
Indeed, the number of registered white dairy producers decreased from 201 in 1937 to 183 by 
1942.685 In the same vein, although farm butter production declined from 483 000 lb. in 1937 to 
124 000 lb. by 1943,686 it did not necessarily translate to any significant increase in creamery 
butter production, since total butter production fell from 1 656 000 lb. in 1936 to 1 299 000 lb. 
by 1944.687 The significance of this loss on the industry can be understood better when put 
within the context of shortages of dairy products that emerged with the advent of the Second 
World War, as illustrated in the next chapter. While the circumstances leading to the withdrawal 
of dairy farmers may not necessarily be identical to Schaller’s case outlined above, there is 
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 NAZ S1215/1363/1 Inspection and Registration of Dairies: Letter from the Manager, Land and Agricultural Bank 
of Southern Rhodesia, to the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, 12 October 1940. 
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 NAZ S1215/1363/1 Inspection and Registration of Dairies: Letter from Chairman, Dairy Industry Control Board, 
to the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, 26 October 1940.  
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 NAZ S1215/1363/1 Inspection and Registration of Dairies: Letter from Mr E.V. Schaller to the Secretary, 
Department of Agriculture, 19 October 1940.   
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 NAZ 1216/1366/2 Dairy Industry Control Board Reports and Minutes: Minutes of a meeting held at Salisbury, 
18 March 1942. 
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 Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Conditions Prevailing, etc, into the Pasturage of the Colony, 1943. 
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 Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Conditions Prevailing, etc, into the Pasturage of the Colony, 1943. 
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nevertheless sufficient evidence to contend that besides reducing the amount of farm butter in the 
industry, the regulations  also had the unintended effect of pushing some producers out of the 
industry altogether.  
 
Conclusion 
Drawing contextualising comparisons with other dairy industries within the sub-region and the 
Commonwealth, this chapter has discussed developments within Southern Rhodesia’s dairy 
industry during the economically volatile 1930s. This chapter has sought to add to available 
literature on the 1930s depression in Southern Rhodesia and its impact on agricultural industries. 
It has shown that the establishment of the Dairy Industry Control Board managed to ease the 
plight of the farmers in the face of the agricultural crisis of the 1930s, but proved inadequate to 
improve the quality of butter that was produced at the creameries. Clearly, regulating 
manufacturing processes at the creameries as had been enforced during the 1920s had proven to 
be inadequate, hence both the government and some farmers began to call for the improvement 
of infrastructure and utensils, and general hygiene on the farms – both African and settler owned. 
 
The passage of the Dairy Act in 1937 was a watershed event in the history of local dairy farming 
in that it sought to bring farmers under increased control and regulation. Some settler producers 
stood against the introduction of controls, primarily because they were side liners whose main 
interests lay in beef production. Since the presence of sideliners had been at the core of the 
problems the country faced on the international market, this move was overdue. However, it has 
been argued here that a section of white producers and the majority of African farmers resisted 
the espousal of regulations to control farmers’ operations, with circumvention being a common 
resort among both black and white producers, albeit in different ways. The few settlers who 
resisted the regulation of farm processes, especially the forcible introduction of dairy utensils and 
milking sheds and farm butter controls, did so either because they had no interest in investing in 
dairy farming, or were preoccupied only with profit making at the expense of the 
professionalization of the industry generally. In examining increased state control over white 
farming activities, this chapter has sought to show that the interests of white farmers were not 
always synonymous with the state. For Africans, however, lack of capital and government 
support led to the development of a parallel milk market on mine compounds, which the state 
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was eventually forced to recognise. Using the dairy industry as a lens, the chapter has added to 
available scholarship on the colonial state and African agricultural development and responses 
during the 1930s.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Cream of Empire? The Second World War and the Food Production 
Drive, 1939 – 1951 
 
Introduction 
The outbreak of World War II (WW II) marked an important shift in the development of 
Southern Rhodesia’s fledgling economy. Previously, most agricultural industries had depended 
on external markets for the disposal of produce, but the rapid increase in white immigration and 
the increasing African urban population necessarily meant that production began to fail to meet 
domestic needs. At the same time, the local food industry was brought under increasing pressure 
from Britain to provide foodstuffs as part of Southern Rhodesia’s imperial war effort. This 
chapter discusses state and farmers’ responses to British calls for butter supplies at a time when 
the local production was struggling to meet internal demand. It demonstrates that despite public 
expressions of support to British calls for increased butter supplies by the state and farmers, no 
exports were made due to the changing internal consumption dynamics. In doing so, this chapter 
engages two historiographical strands. Firstly, it engages, and seeks to add to existing 
historiography on the cattle industry in Southern Rhodesia during WWII, which so far has 
focused on beef production.688 Secondly, it engages scholarship on regional and international 
dairy industries during and after the Second World War for comparative purposes, illustrating 
that some of the Southern Rhodesian experiences and interventions were modelled along 
international experiences. 
 
 
                                                     
688
 E. Mufema, ‘The impact of the Second World War on Rhodesian agriculture with particular reference to tobacco, 
maize and beef cattle’, Honours Dissertation, Department of Economic History, University of Zimbabwe, 1992; 
Samasuwo, ‘“There is something about cattle” Towards an economic history of the beef industry in colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1939-1980’, PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2000 and  N. Samasuwo, ‘Food production and war 
supplies: Rhodesia's Beef Industry during the Second World War, 1939-1945’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
29, 2, (2003), 487-502.  
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This chapter also draws from local studies that have focused on the role of the war in boosting 
the manufacturing and mining industries. 689  It examines the effect of the increasing white 
immigration rate, and the growing black urban population in war-time and post war Southern 
Rhodesia. It demonstrates that the expanding demand which followed the population growth 
precipitated a radical change both in the patterns of production and consumption of dairy 
products. In light of shortages that characterised war-time and post war Southern Rhodesia, this 
chapter discusses the interventions that were effected to avert shortages. It argues that, although 
the state resorted to ad hoc interventions as the emergency of shortages escalated, the war 
generally led to the intensification of the reform process of white commercial dairying that had 
begun during the late 1930s.  
 
Whereas previous historiography on the impact of the war on the country’s livestock industry has 
focused on the beef crisis and state attempts to coerce Africans to dispose of their livestock 
through forced de-stocking measurers, very little has been done to examine the impact of such 
measures on African milk regimes.690 This chapter examines the impact of de-stocking measures, 
and other steps that were taken to create a ‘native beast’ for African livestock owners. It 
demonstrates that while these measures were helpful to the state in increasing beef supplies, they 
further undermined African dairy production and marketing. 
 
“But, where is the butter?”: War, the war-effort and expanding domestic consumption 
The outbreak of WWII in 1939 had a revolutionary effect on Southern Rhodesia’s agrarian 
economy and the cattle industry in particular. Whereas both the beef and dairy industries had, 
prior to 1939, depended on external markets for the disposal of meat and dairy products, war-
time and post war conditions meant that focus shifted towards a rapidly expanding domestic 
market. This section discusses war-time calls for increased butter supplies that were made by 
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 See G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, Essays on the political economy of Africa, (New York: Heinemann, 1973); I. 
Phimister, A social and economic history of Zimbabwe, 1890-1948: Capital accumulation and class struggle, 
(London: Longman, 1988); A.S. Mlambo, ‘From Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965’, in B. Raftopoulos and 
A.S. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008, (Harare: Weaver Press, 
2009). 
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 Focusing on war-time beef production, Samasuwo’s article outlines the extent of the de-stocking regulations that 
were introduced from the early 1940s, and delineates the factors that led to the adoption of such measures. See 
Samasuwo, ‘Food production and war supplies: Rhodesia's Beef Industry during the Second World War, 1939-945’, 
497-499. 
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Britain on Southern Rhodesia as part of the war effort. It argues that, expanding white 
immigration immediately after the outbreak of war, and the disturbances in international trade 
associated with war ultimately rendered such an arrangement untenable. Instead, the rise in local 
demand led to acute dairy shortages which, in turn, precipitated a shift from butter towards 
whole milk as the major dairy product.  
 
In early 1939, when the outbreak of war appeared inevitable, the Committee of Munitions and 
Food Supplies, which had been established in Britain to ensure food security in the event of war, 
intimated that Britain would require food supplies from Southern Rhodesia and the rest of the 
Empire. It stated that although maize and beef were the principal commodities needed, the 
imperial government may “issue orders requisitioning stocks of cereals, dairy produce, flour, 
sugar , meat, oilseed and fats” from Southern Rhodesia and other colonies as part of their Allied 
war effort.691 The committee noted that although Southern Rhodesia had been a net importer of 
processed milk products such as condensed and desiccated milk from the United Kingdom, the 
colony needed to increase its butter production with a view to exporting more butter to the 
United Kingdom for the duration of the war.692 
 
Initially, Southern Rhodesia positively responded to the imperial call for increased supplies of 
food from Britain. Increased demand for foodstuffs from Britain from Southern Rhodesia and 
other British Dependencies led to the Southern Rhodesia government signing a contract with the 
British Ministry of Food to supply British troops in March 1940. The Dairy Division encouraged 
farmers to produce more cream so that more butter could be sent to Britain. Because of the 
familial British connection within the majority of the white population in the country, most 
farmers responded positively to the call from the Empire. Speaking at a farmers’ meeting, the 
chairman of the Figtree Farmers’ Association said he  
               felt sure (that) more cream could be produced. I am certain that England could do 
with all the butter she could get, as farmers are paying more attention to cream 
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production. We need to support Britain at her hour of need, and it is part of our 
war effort. Government should give some inducement in the form of a small 
bounty on each pound of butterfat produced.693 
Such jingoism, however, did not last long. The rapid white population increase that followed the 
war meant that the colony’s initial expression of patriotism towards Britain did not translate into 
material provision of butter supplies. 
 
The establishment of Empire Air Force Training Centres in Salisbury, Bulawayo and Gwelo in 
1939 led to a material increase in the white population in the country. In total, these were 
responsible for the arrival of about 20 000 Royal Air force personnel, their wives and families 
into the country during the first two years of the war. Further, at least 6 000 internees and war 
refugees had settled in Southern Rhodesia by 1945. 694  Consequently, the country’s white 
population grew by nearly 20% from 68 954 to 82 386 between 1941 and 1946, with up to 
10 000 new arrivals recorded in 1942 alone.695 In the short-term, these developments helped to 
create a much wider domestic market for the agricultural industry. Lewis Gann and Michael 
Gelfand have observed that farmers and industrial firms suddenly encountered an almost 
insatiable market as a result of the exploding white population in the country. In the long term, 
the dairy industry was to be indirectly affected by the demand generated by the expansion of 
sectors directly linked to the war effort. Samasuwo has stated that the war boosted the production 
of strategic base minerals such as chrome, tungsten and copper, particularly after Turkey ceased 
to supply chrome shortly prior to the outbreak of hostilities.696  This opportunity led to the 
expansion of the mining sector, which, in turn, led to an increased demand for food on the mines.  
Moreover, the increased demand for pipe tobacco and cigarettes in Britain (as a result of its 
inability to acquire it from South America during the war) and the corresponding increase in its 
price from the early 1940s led to a tobacco boom in Southern Rhodesia. With the ‘leaf of gold’ 
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 Minutes of a meeting of the Figtree Farmers Association held on 30 July 1940, quoted in, Vuka, August, 1940. 
 This magazine was the official mouthpiece of the Matabeleland Farmers’ Association. 
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 Southern Rhodesia was used as a training venue for the Royal Air Force and as a safe haven for war internees 
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(London: Eyre Methuen, 1977), 274.  
695
 Official yearbook of Southern Rhodesia, 4, 1952, 412. 
696
 Samasuwo, ‘Food production and war supplies: Rhodesia's Beef Industry during the Second World War, 1939-
1945’, 493. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
 
186
arguably the most rewarding agricultural commodity, many farmers’ focus was diverted from 
food production, with the result that the country lost its food self-sufficiency at a time when its 
domestic needs were expanding.697 Although Southern Rhodesia was expected to – and actually 
did – provide man power on the war front as part of the Allied war effort, the government was 
equally eager to ensure that most white commercial farmers stayed on the land. The production 
of sufficient food to send to Britain and to feed Empire Air Training personnel and other 
European refugees within the country was in itself considered a vital part of Southern Rhodesia’s 
war effort on the ‘home front’.  
 
The corollary of this was that milk and butter shortages began to be experienced in the major 
urban areas by the 1940s. It should be remembered that, as illustrated in chapter 5, Southern 
Rhodesia had already begun importing butter from South Africa to meet its regional obligations 
as a result of a drought-induced reduction in production levels since the mid-1930s in order to 
maintain supplies to regional markets. Although production had begun to improve somewhat 
since the droughts of the 1930s, the rapid domestic population increase acted as a huge 
countervailing force, leading to Southern Rhodesia’s failure to satisfy its local requirements, let 
alone regional markets. The gravity of the shortages was vividly captured by the Chief Dairy 
Officer thus: 
               Though we are likely to have a record (production) this year, we shall have to 
import some dairy produce, mainly butter. This is due to an increasing domestic 
consumption which has taken place in the last five years. Five years ago it was 
750 000 lb., now it is 1 400 000 lb. If the domestic consumption continues to 
expand at this rate we shall be hard put to find sufficient butter for our own 
requirements, let alone to maintain our export trade to adjoining territories. We 
would have preferred to maintain our supplies abroad, but where is the butter 
required for that?698 [emphasis mine]  
Indeed, Southern Rhodesia experienced a deficit in both milk and butter production throughout 
the duration of the war. For instance, in 1942 alone, the country experienced a deficit of 
1 520 000 litres of milk and 614 568 lb. of butter.699 
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The shortages had two important effects on the dairy industry and the colony in general. Firstly, 
since Southern Rhodesia had pledged to provide butter to Britain during the war as part of the 
country’s war effort to the Allied powers, the colonial administration found itself with a difficult 
choice to make: to renege on its initial pledge to send butter supplies to Britain as part of its 
contribution to the Allied war effort and placate the growing white population, or to prioritise 
imperial obligations and risk upsetting its local political constituency that continued shortages 
could potentially cause. The former option was taken. Exports to Britain and regional markets 
(which Southern Rhodesia had established as captive markets since the 1920s) stopped at the end 
of 1941. This decision should be viewed within the context of the decades-old dream to build a 
‘white man’s country’ in Southern Rhodesia through increasing the white population through 
white immigration. 700  The situation in South Africa, where white consumers had become 
“increasingly agitated “by the country’s continued sending of butter to Britain at a time when the 
“Union itself began to confront a shortage” may also have served as a valuable lesson to 
Southern Rhodesian authorities.701 
 
The second impact of shortages was the extent to which they altered the local disposal pattern of 
the dairy industry. Inadequate supplies of milk to urban and mining settlements essentially meant 
that considerable quantities of milk which would normally be converted into butter and cheese 
for export had to be diverted to the local fresh milk trade. This was necessitated by the fact that 
milk is more perishable than any other dairy product and the limited technology of the time made 
the importation of whole milk much more difficult than butter. Consequently, emphasis shifted 
from cream production towards milk production, with government incentives and bonuses being 
advanced for milk production.702 As the graph below illustrates, the proportion of milk that was 
utilised for butter making fell steeply between 1940 and 1950 because more milk was utilised for 
the liquid milk trade.  
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 This hope to ensure huge white settlement in Southern Rhodesia was expressed in as early as 1907, when it was 
expressed that the White Agricultural Policy will only succeed if many white settlers immigrated into the country, 
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Graph 4: Estimated percentages of total milk suppliers used for various purposes.703 
The importation of dairy produce from overseas was made difficult by the escalation of war, 
which disrupted normal peace-time marine transportation and the paucity of refrigeration 
facilities on ships docking at South Africa’s major seaports which complicated inter-continental 
trade during the war. Indeed, overseas trade stopped altogether between 1943 and 1944, while a 
negligible amount of foodstuffs occurred in 1945.704 The existence of similar shortages in South 
Africa, which had traditionally supplied Southern Rhodesia with first grade butter and cheese, 
meant that the country had to find ways of expanding local production. With the dairy deficit 
reaching an equivalent of 1.5million gallons of milk by 1941, butter, cheese, and milk rationing 
was introduced in the major urban centres under the Rationing Order of 1942.705 
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War time shortages were not peculiar to the dairy industry, however. Similar shortages and 
rationing measures were witnessed in other food industries. A similar shortage, for instance, was 
witnessed in the beef industry, with the result that the government increased destocking measures 
in African areas with a view of coercing Africans to sell their livestock cheaply to government. 
The beef crisis also forced the government to invoke the War-time Emergency Powers of the 
Slaughter Cattle Prices Order of 1941 which allowed agents to buy cattle at low prices and 
selling them directly to licensed butchers or the Cold Storage Commission at the prescribed high 
prices.706 Similarly, the sale of maize was controlled during the war, especially after the drought 
of 1942, to the point that the government restricted the use of maize as a supplementary feed for 
livestock.707 The butter shortages were also a common feature in other Dominions, especially in 
Australia where “a reduction in butter production occurred in all states.”708 However, the major 
difference was that while in Australia shortages were caused by the removal of producers from 
the farms for the war front, in Southern Rhodesia it was mainly a result of an expanding 
domestic market and stagnating production that had begun prior to the war. As happened in other 
agricultural industries in Southern Rhodesia, a drive for increased dairy production was espoused 
from 1941 onwards.  
 
The Drive for ‘guided expansion’ 
The emergent food shortages seemed poised to precipitate a socio-political crisis for the 
government. As already noted in the previous section, besides sending troops to the actual 
battlefield, the provision of adequate food for Italian prisoners of war and Royal Air Training 
staff and the Rhodesian Army was regarded as an important part of the war effort by the 
Southern Rhodesian government. Also, as a country that harboured a long standing dream of 
creating in Southern Rhodesia a ‘white man’s country’ through luring white immigrants, 
Southern Rhodesian authorities were eager to impress incoming immigrants and visitors with its 
ability to protect their material interests and offer a comfortable bourgeois life. Moreover, the 
persistent food shortages were bound to cause social upheaval among the white population 
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already in the country, which constituted a vital political constituency for Godfrey Huggins’ 
government. As early as 1939, the Minister of Agriculture explained the plan to increase food 
production to the Legislative Assembly thus: 
I wish to make it clear to all sections of the (agricultural) community that the 
colony must spare no effort to maintain her normal agricultural output of maize, 
tobacco, cattle, dairy products, pigs, and so forth. While I realise the intense desire 
on the part of farmers and tobacco producers to offer themselves for military 
service, I am convinced that they will be performing an equally, and perhaps more 
valuable national service by remaining on their farms and continuing with their 
normal programme of livestock and crop production.709 
With regards to dairy farming, however, the initial government response was focussed on 
‘guided expansion’ in order to achieve self-sufficiency.710 The Dairy Division sought to maintain 
assiduously its aim of ensuring that production was done along the right lines, as illustrated by 
the passage of the Dairy Act discussed in chapter 5. Addressing farmers at a Farmers’ Field Day 
at Matopos Experiment Station in 1940, Cory warned that although there was room for increased 
production in the dairy industry: 
              We do not, however, want indiscriminate production. The industry in the past has 
been characterised by a very a high percentage of inferior products and this is a 
heritage from the past which we are gradually eradicating from the industry. A 
very high percentage of dairy products are of second or third grade quality. This 
entails a financial loss amounting annually to thousands of Pounds which has to be 
borne by the industry and ultimately by the producer himself.711 
 
Cory’s argument reveals the thinking behind the continuation of the push for improved 
production conditions on the farms, which began during the 1930s, as a remedy to the war-time 
crisis. This approach was supported by creamery representatives who argued that the mere 
introduction of bounties and subsidies to stimulate production was not in the long-term interests 
of the industry as it would not encourage efficiency. For example, the manager of the Bulawayo 
based Rhodesia Co-operative Limited contended, convincingly, that: 
              greater efficiency in our production of cream is the ultimate solution since one day 
we would have to enter the world market with our butter surplus and knowing 
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what the present ruling price for butter was, I am quite certain that local prices 
would come down with a bump.712 
This view provides the context for the heightening of the programme of granting loans to dairy 
farmers for the erection and purchasing of dairies and dairy utensils discussed in the previous 
chapter. Even more funds were set aside for white dairy farmers during the 1940s. In the last 
three months of 1942 alone, for instance, £1 700 was distributed to dairy farmers for the 
purposes of improving their production sites.713 In the same vein, the DICB continued to deny 
numerous applications for the registration of their premises for cream and milk production on the 
basis of their unsuitable methods, in spite of the looming crisis.714 As outlined in the previous 
chapter, a plethora of applications for an increased farm butter quota in 1940 were rejected on 
the basis of Cory’s argument that although expansion of cream production was required 
indiscriminate production would reverse on-going efforts to wean dairy farming from overly 
depending on the beef industry.  
 
The Matabeleland Farmers’ Union leadership generally agreed that dairy producers, as did the 
rest of the farming community, needed to continue with the reform process that had been 
initiated in 1937 if they were to survive not only the war, but the future in general. Writing in 
Vuka, the president noted that: 
We all know that our methods will not really bear scrutiny from the business point 
of view; that our production has been haphazard....but my point is that under the 
new scheme of things all this must be changed if our industry is to survive. And a 
start must be made now, because agricultural processes are slow, and years lapse 
before results begin to show. 715 
Not all member associations of the Union agreed on the prioritisation of reform over price 
incentives, however. The Figtree Farmers’ Association, for example, passed a resolution that “as 
it is now more or less an emergency, only the payment of cream bounties would achieve the 
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intended expansion of the industry.”716 Indeed, the view that the major solution to any crisis lay 
in increasing producer prices and offering of incentives – flawed as it was – was the most 
dominant among farmers when they engaged the government. 
Calls for increased subsidies and incentives, however, began to bear the desired outcome as a 
result of the exacerbating crisis during the war. Indeed, given the emergency of the ever-growing 
deficit, the government was forced to adopt short-term contingency plans, which included the 
provision of incentives for production. The situation was made much more urgent by the drought 
of 1942, which affected virtually every agrarian sector, with the result that the state looked as far 
afield as Sierra Leone, Brazil and Argentina for food imports.717 The situation for the livestock 
sector was worsened by the introduction of restrictions on the sale and utilisation of maize in 
1942, which constituted a vital element for supplementary feeding. The ability of dairy cows to 
produce milk consistently throughout the year, especially during the winter season when natural 
pasture was scarce, was severely compromised. Speaking at a farmers meeting in Figtree, one 
farmer remarked that although creameries were paying “reasonable” prices: 
               It is nearly impossible for us to increase cream production this year because we 
are acutely short of maize feed. Never mind the water crisis affecting livestock, 
our failure to access maize and other supplementary feed (either) because of 
government controls or high prices (at which it is sold) means cream and milk 
supplies will be low again this year.718 
One effect of the shortages, particularly the 1942 drought, was the temporary but important 
reversal of some dairy regulations. In a reversal of the rigidity with which farm butter quotas had 
been introduced and closely monitored after the passage of the Dairy Act as recently as 1937, the 
DICB announced in 1942 that “(a)ll licensed farm butter makers may now make as much butter 
as they can, subject to whatever Government Rationing Order may be in force.” 719  This 
concession, which signalled an abandonment of the quota system for the entire duration of the 
war, was similar to measures taken in beef production where, owing to war-time shortages, the 
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market was “completely undiscriminating in terms in as far as quality of beef was concerned.”720 
Hence, in this regard, the war should be viewed as having reversed – albeit temporarily – pre-war 
efforts towards establishing a high quality dairy industry as quality was sacrificed for quantity.  
More ad hoc measures were taken to mitigate the effects of shortages at the height of the war. 
The Food Production Committee (FPC), which had been established in March 1942 for the sole 
purpose of ensuring food self-sufficiency during the war, began to offer producer incentives to 
increase food production across the entire agricultural spectrum. These incentives ranged from 
subsidies to fixed producer prices.721 With regards to dairy farming, the government announced 
that the initial effort would be to increase prices paid to farmers for butterfat through state 
sponsored subsidies in April 1942. This included an annual bonus for cream, all of which would 
make overall producer prices “as high as any that is paid in any part of the world.”722 Also, 
beginning February 1942, a war subsidy of one penny per pound through the creameries and 
factories was paid to farmers.723 Mindful of the need to placate the increasingly restive Southern 
Rhodesian white population, Huggins’ government was anxious to contain war-time inflation 
through food price hikes; hence the financial incentives extended to farmers did not affect the 
wholesale or retail prices of dairy products. 
 
With virtually all the butter being consumed locally, Southern Rhodesian farmers were protected 
from the vagaries of the international markets. Although the DICB had increased winter prices 
for butterfat and milk, another round of increases was instituted in 1943.724 A Price Equalisation 
Scheme was announced with the object of “stabilising the wholesale and retail prices of butter, 
and to encourage winter production by a substantially increased price for butterfat produced 
during this period of the year.”725 This scheme had the effect of increasing producer prices to 
levels that were described by the DICB as “unparalleled throughout the world”, as the 
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government sought to keep producers on the farms in an attempt to attain self-sufficiency.726 On 
their part, farmers responded by increasing cream and milk production, with the result that a 
record 1500 000 lbs. of butter was produced in 1944 alone.727 This notwithstanding, the ever 
expanding population increase meant that the country continued to experience shortages 
throughout the war, and the period following the year. Speaking in 1944, Cory admitted that “if 
the domestic consumption continues to expand at this rate we shall be hard put to find sufficient 
butter for our own requirements.”728 Hence, notwithstanding the introduction of contingency 
plans to incentivise milk and cream output and the corresponding increase in production, 
shortages could not be averted throughout the war years. 
 
Expanding demand and post-war interventions 
The post-war period was characterised by an even faster rate of immigration, a factor which 
aggravated the extent of shortages. Although the Empire Air Training Scheme was discontinued 
with the cessation of hostilities in 1945, a significant number of the personnel returned to the 
country at the end of their tour of duty after being impressed by the state’s settler friendly 
policies.729 Moreover, white immigration was further heightened by the influx of whites who, 
lured by Southern Rhodesia’s attractive friendly white settlement plan, sought to flee the harsh 
post-war economic conditions in Britain and other parts of Western Europe.730 The expansion of 
the Southern Rhodesian economy, particularly the manufacturing and mining industries provided 
vast economic opportunities for prospective immigrants. For instance, as a result of post-war 
reconstruction in Europe, the demand for Southern Rhodesian asbestos and chrome doubled 
between 1946 and 1950, with the result that both the base minerals sector and railways witnessed 
tremendous growth during the time under review.731 
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As had happened during the war, the post-war period was characterised by a tobacco boom. The 
shortage of the dollar in Britain forced the country to take a growing interest in sourcing its 
requirements from within the Sterling Area of the Empire. The corollary of this growing interest 
was the increase in tobacco producer prices and production within Southern Rhodesia. As a 
result of these opportunities, more immigrants moved to Southern Rhodesia where land was 
readily available for white immigrants. Further, the continued expansion of the mining and 
manufacturing sectors after the war offered more employment opportunities for immigrants in a 
country whose socio-economic policies gave whites an advantage over blacks.732 Moreover, the 
flight of British capital from South Africa from 1948 as a result of British insecurities following 
Afrikaner Nationalist Party’s ascension to power provided further opportunities for Southern 
Rhodesian economic prosperity.733 Thus, the white population in the country more than doubled 
within a decade, growing from 82 386 in 1946 to 177 124 in 1956. Over 17 000 immigrants were 
admitted into the country in 1948 alone.734 Contributing to the urban population expansion was 
the increasing presence of Africans in the major towns.735 With a significant number of them 
now employed in urban centres as a result of expanding industrialisation, and their spending 
abilities thus enhanced, African consumption of consumer goods became increasingly important 
in post war Southern Rhodesia.736 Thus, in spite of the steadily increasing local dairy output, 
demand continued to outstrip supply. As shown in the graph below, the butter shortfall actually 
increased, reaching a record high in 1950. 
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Graph 5: Shortfall between Production and Consumption of Butter in Southern Rhodesia, 1942-1950.737 
 
The shortfall, it should be noted, was also a result of the increased focus on fresh milk noted 
earlier, which reduced the amount of milk converted into butter at the creameries. The crisis, 
meanwhile, meant that butter rationing became a permanent feature of the dairy industry 
throughout the 1940s and the early 1950s. Throughout 1947, for example, a single person was 
allowed only ¼ lb. per week.738 As South Africa was unable to provide supplies during the late 
1940s due to shortages within its own borders, the country largely depended on Kenya for the 
few imports that were made during the 1940s.739 
 
Although the importance of the maize growing and the cattle industry to the national political 
economy was somewhat diluted by the emergence of the ‘leaf of gold’ and the manufacturing 
industry,740 the drive for food production was intensified after the war. Indeed, the government 
realised that the success of post-war industrialisation inexorably depended on the production of 
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sufficient food for the growing population which now included a permanently urbanised African 
population. To this end, the government re-organised the Agricultural Department into six 
separate specialist departments: Research and Specialist Services; Conservation and Extension 
Services (CONEX); Forestry; Lands; Veterinary Services and Irrigation.741 It was the first two 
departments – under the directorship of J.K. Chorley and C.A. Murray respectively – that played 
a pivotal role in the efforts to expand and modernise dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia. The 
publication of two reports by Frank Engledow on research, teaching, advisory work and 
agricultural development in 1949 and 1950 respectively gave impetus to the food production 
policy. Both reports re-emphasized the importance of food self-sufficiency in the social and 
political development of the colony.742 
 
The provision of loans to farmers for production that had begun in the early 1940s was extended 
to the post-war period by CONEX. Besides the continuation of the Price Equalisation Scheme in 
1947 in which the government paid a subsidy of 2 ½ d per lb., irrespective of grade, to all milk 
and cream producers,743 various loans were extended to dairy producers from the late 1940 
onwards. All dairymen who were registered members of the Intensive Conservation Areas 
(ICAs), which had been established in 1948 under CONEX, became eligible to receive special 
loans from the Land and Agricultural Bank for the purchase of farming equipment which could 
help increase farm productivity.744 This arrangement was thrashed out in negotiations between 
the Department of CONEX, the Dairy Division and the Land and Agricultural Bank.745 The Food 
Production Committees, which were reconstituted as Central Food Production Committees under 
CONEX, oversaw the loans while the Dairy Division approved and acted as guarantor for ‘bona 
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fide’ dairy farmers. At least 600 producers had benefitted by 1952.746 Thus, the provision of 
loans was an important part of helping farmers to increase their capacity to produce food both 
during and after the war. 
 
The cream of the cows? The Drive for dairy herds 
While the previous section has illustrated that initial efforts at avoiding ‘indiscriminate 
production’ were side-lined as the crisis of shortages unfolded, the government did not lose sight 
of the long term goal of achieving “guided expansion”. In tandem with the recommendations of 
the 1935 Committee of Enquiry and the ideals of the 1937 Dairy Act, the 1940s were 
characterised by intensified efforts to create a larger and more specialised industry. Although the 
policy to assist white farmers to acquire pedigree stock had begun with the advent of the White 
Agricultural Policy in 1908, it reached unprecedented proportions from the 1940s onwards, 
backed by a more concerted research programme on livestock management systems. Hence, the 
advent of the war should not be viewed as having marked the beginning of better herds 
programme; rather, the socio-economic circumstances of the war made the drive more urgent.  
Whereas the presence of surplus dairy products in the country for much of the 1920s to the 1930s 
had managed to mask the dearth of genuine dairy cows in the country, the outbreak of war and 
the ensuing shortages brought with it a realisation by the Dairy Division that more needed to be 
done to improve the quality of dairy cows in the country.747 This would be achieved through 
helping farmers to purchase genuine dairy cows as well as improving cattle management 
systems. The idea was to achieve self-sufficiency through the use of higher yielding cows (and 
not entirely through the payment of higher producer prices). 748  From the outset, the state 
responded to the expanding local market and the ensuing shortages by seeking to improve the 
quality of dairy cows among the farmers. While noting the need to respond to a looming crisis 
with regards to dairy supplies, Cory argued that: 
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              There is room for increased production in the dairy industry. However, far too high 
a percentage of our dairy products have been derived from cows of ranching or 
beef strain. With this type of cow as the basis of the industry there has never been 
stability in the industry. Production is too varied...we want production from 
recognised dairy or dual purpose herds.749 
While the scarcity of genuine dairy cows was certainly not a new phenomenon, Cory’s statement 
served as a pointer to government approach to war-time and post-war expansion in the dairy 
industry. He viewed the dairy deficit in 1942 to be a direct result of the dearth of dairy cows, 
saying the deficit represented “the output of, say, 4 000 good dairy cows” which needed to be 
bred or imported into the country.750 
 
Initially, farmers and farmers’ organisations were not entirely convinced that the solution to the 
shortages lay in the acquisition of better dairy cattle. As they had always done, their primary 
concern lay on immediate incentives such as prices and other bonuses that could be extended to 
producers. For instance, when responding to a comment by a member of the DICB about the 
shortage of dairy cows, the Chairperson of the Figtree Farmers’ Association expressed his belief 
that “the dairy cattle are (already) in the colony for this extra production”, and further contended 
that his organisation was of the view that the butter shortage would be better solved through 
increasing producer prices and other bonuses.751 Although increasing producer prices was one 
sure way of expanding production, it may also be argued that the farmer’s fixation with prices 
was myopic, particularly considering that major dairying countries had developed through 
reducing costs of production and use of the most economical dairy cows. For example, the Dutch 
government pushed for the expansion of the dairy industry through what Bert Theunissen termed 
the ‘Holstenisation’ of the dairy industry.752 This entailed the creation of the modern Friesian 
breed – an improved cross-bred between the American Holstein and the traditional Dutch 
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Friesland breed – which not only yielded higher and better milk, but was also more resistant to 
bovine tuberculosis.753 
 
In line with the stated drive for better herds, the government established a Livestock 
Improvement Committee in 1940 with the aim of improving livestock for beef, dairy, pig and 
sheep production. In turn, the Committee espoused a Livestock Improvement Scheme under 
which the Livestock Improvement Committee selected pure-bred bulls and female stock on 
behalf of farmers who would have been deemed eligible to receive grants and loans towards the 
purchase of good sires.754 Although conditions of this scheme were more or less similar to the 
schemes that had been in operation previously, the expenditure involved shows that the scheme 
was widely expanded during the 1940s. Whereas an average of £500 was spent on loans for the 
purchase of dairy cows annually between 1934 and 1939, up to £1 700 were set aside by the 
Food Production Committee for the purchase of dairy cows in 1942 alone.755 
 
Figure 3: A 'holstenised' Friesian dairy cow. This breed was by far the most popular dairy breed in the country.756 
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Moreover, to ensure that only specialist dairy producers received assistance, the conditions for 
the approval of loans for farmers were modified from 1941 onwards. Whereas virtually any stock 
owner could qualify for a cattle loan prior to the outbreak of war, the Dairy Division specified 
that assistance would be given to farmers with a proven track record of milk and cream 
production. In a circular to the Matabeleland Farmers’ Union in 1943, the Secretary for 
Agriculture and Lands intimated that his department would be importing dairy heifers on behalf 
of “bona fide farmers in the Colony”, and in co-operation with the Land and Agricultural Bank, 
the consignment of dairy heifers would be distributed to approved dairy farmers.757 Notably, the 
main object behind the careful selection of beneficiaries was part of the bigger battle to rid the 
industry of part-time producers. Recipient farmers were required to pay only £105 of the total 
cost of the cattle, with the rest paid by the Land and Agricultural Bank as a loan to be repaid over 
four years.758 This scheme, which had benefitted 320 dairy farmers by 1945, was lauded by the 
leadership of the Mashonaland Farmers’ Union as “a sure foundation on which the future of 
dairy farming in this country can be secured.”759 The rapid process of post war white settlement 
was facilitated by the Land and Agricultural Bank and the Land Settlement Board, which helped 
to advance more loans for the purchase of land, livestock and machinery. This was after the 
realisation that post-war developments would exert even more pressure to bear on the cattle 
industry. The gravity of the issue was expressed by Cory thus: 
               It is likely that there will be serious shortage of dairy bulls in this Colony after the 
war. Further, the rise in price of high grade bulls is forcing many of the smaller 
producers to make use of unregistered bulls. The Livestock Improvement 
Committee, in co-operation with the Dairy Division, is therefore very anxious to 
encourage a greater production of reliable grade bulls to meet these needs for the 
time being.760 
The Food Production Loans Committee, which fell under the Central Food Production 
Committee was formed in 1951, thus gave out loans in conjunction with the Land and 
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Agricultural Bank, to approved farmers for the purchase of Friesland bulls, cows and heifers.761 
Up to 690 loan applications were processed in 1951 alone, with the result that £613 000 was 
expended on the programme.762 Dairy farmers who were granted these loans were ordered to 
carry out their farming operations under the supervision of the ICAs operating in their areas. In 
this way, the progress farmers made in increasing the scope of their dairy production could be 
assessed.763 
 
Further, in June 1951 the government approved a total of £1 000 to be paid for all stud dairy 
stock imported from overseas. The result of this programme was the importation of more than 
200 Friesland heifers into the country for distribution among farmers.764 This system was further 
strengthened by the introduction of yet another scheme the following year by the Cold Storage 
Commission in which local heifers that had been proven to have “impressive milking 
capabilities” were distributed for cross breeding with imported Friesland bulls.765 This, the Dairy 
Division thought, would help the imported stock to acquire the hardiness and resistance to the 
harsh local environmental conditions.766 By 1950, about 40.8% (or 469 000) of white owned 
cattle were classified as ‘Grade cattle’, that is cattle with at least three-quarters pure-bred blood 
in them. Although this was predominantly of beef breeds such as Afrikander, Hereford, 
Aberdeen Angus and Sussex, the Friesland was the second most popular breed in the country.767 
Indeed, the impact of the schemes may be illustrated by the statistical increase in the number of 
cows that were successfully entered for the Milk Recording Scheme. As shown in chapter 4, this 
programme had been shunned by farmers during the 1920s and 1930s on account of the low 
productivity of the majority of their cows. The graph below shows that the number of cows 
entered for the scheme increased considerably between 1935 and 1950. 
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Graph 6: Herd Averages for Dairy herds tested under the Government Milk Recording Scheme, 1935-1950.768 
 
Significantly, the total number of dairy cows held on commercial farms increased steadily from 
1938 onwards. This is reflected in the following graph. 
 
Graph 7: Average number of dairy cows on white-owned commercial farms.769 
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In addition to importing live cattle from external sources, Artificial Insemination (AI) was 
widely used in an attempt to improve locally available breeds.770 Indeed, instead of importing 
bulls, the Livestock Improvement Committee sanctioned the importation of frozen semen from 
Friesland bulls which would be used inimproving the milking capabilities of local breeds in the 
ownership of white farmers. Reporting in 1943, the Central Food Production Committee stated 
that besides importing cows for dairy farmers, “upwards of 150 cows have been inseminated 
with imported semen from South Africa in the past 18 months.”771  AI was instrumental in 
assisting farmers to cross-breed more productive cattle with local livestock without the need to 
purchase live cows and bulls. 
 
The science of dairy farming 
Besides merely seeking to increase the number of dairy cows, one of the issues that received the 
earnest attention of officials of the Dairy Division and farmer organisations was the 
improvement livestock management systems on the farms, particularly the feeding aspect. This 
would in turn increase productivity per cow and reduce the cost of production. Samasuwo has 
stated that more focus was put on pasture research at the country’s research stations from the late 
1940s, when post-war industrialisation and demand was expanding.772 The refocus on the work 
at the Grassland Experimental Station at Marandellas, however, actually commenced as early as 
1939 when the Pasture Research Committee began a series of experiments at the station, when it 
became apparent that a paradigm shift was essential if the Southern Rhodesian cattle industry 
were to adequately address the challenges that came with the war.773 
With regards to dairy cattle, the experiments began with two trials in 1940 of Friesland cows. 
Besides the fact that the acreage of pasturage in the country had shown little increase during the 
previous few years, the results showed that the poorer granite soil at the station (which generally 
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resembled most of the areas on which cattle were kept in the country) could not sustain dairy 
cattle without the need for supplementary feeding.774 E. Romyn, the chairman of the Pasture 
Research Committee, reported in 1942 thus: 
It can be stated, however, that established pastures on the poor soils at Marandellas 
have not so far proved an economic success. The carrying capacity of these 
established pastures is greater than the natural veld but the increased yield in either 
beef or milk has not covered the extra cost of establishing and maintaining them. 
The fundamental cause of the failure has been the low fertility of the soils on 
which the attempt has been made to establish the high yielding grasses.775 
With the improved availability of funds during the 1940s, the white farming community became 
increasingly aware of the need to acquire proper dairy herds and to maintain them. Indeed, white 
farming magazines began to prominently feature livestock management and feeding methods 
from the 1940s onwards. An editorial in the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal titled ‘Dairying and 
the War Effort’ in 1942, for instance, stated that: 
              Increased production can be brought about in several ways but chiefly by 
improving the feeding methods and by feeding the cows to full milking capacity. 
Dairymen should grow as much feed as they can, particularly legumes which are 
almost irreplaceable for feeding milking cows...Dairy farmers now have a chance, 
while helping themselves, to make an important material contribution to the 
Colony’s war effort.776 
Similarly, Vuka ran a determined campaign in 1940 to warn farmers of the importance of 
maintaining dairy heifers at optimum productive levels. 777  Using the same magazine, the 
chairman of the Matabeleland Farmers’ Union advised farmers to desist from clamouring for 
higher prices, but, instead, to take advantage of the assistance rendered by officials of the 
Agricultural Department on pasture management. He observed that: 
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We have a golden opportunity now, while prices of our products are remunerative, 
to put our house in order. We should endeavour to consolidate our financial 
position (through) the improvement of our breeding stock, rather than to dissipate 
them on non-essentials. We are facing a rigorous and testing time, and there will 
be no place for the ignorant or the indolent, but on the contrary, the highest 
possible degree of efficiency will be imperative, so that modest returns will be 
offset by low production costs, while our quality will command the best of 
whatever prices are ruling.778 
Two significant issues emerge from the above statement. Firstly, there is an explicit concession 
that, far from becoming a stumbling block, the war actually provided Southern Rhodesian 
farmers with an opportunity to improve their production methods to match international 
standards at a time when they were cushioned from competition from the major producers of the 
world. Secondly, implicit in the statement is a realisation by the farmers’ body that profitable 
dairy farming not only depended on the prevailing producer prices, but largely on the 
achievement of high levels of efficiency which would in turn lower production costs. 
 
The post-war period phase was characterised by the devotion of more attention and funds 
towards research. For instance, in 1950 and 1951 £341 394 was set aside for livestock research 
and extension services and £134 834 was reserved for veterinary services. 779  Work at the 
Grassland Station in Marandellas was continued, and the Matopos Research Station concentrated 
on animal husbandry research. The Grassland Station began to test the effect of maize, wheat and 
silage crops, leguminous hay or fodder crops such as beans and soya beans on the productivity of 
both African and white-owned cattle.780  In general, the results of the research showed that, 
besides the lack of adequate pastures in most parts of the country, veldt pastures in the high 
rainfall areas in the north eastern areas lacked several minerals which in turn affected the milk 
productivity of dairy cows.781 
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In addition to the role of farmer magazines in information dissemination discussed earlier, 
farmers’ organisations held an increasing number of meetings and workshops with farmers with 
a view to encourage the adoption of supplementary feeding, especially during winter seasons.782 
Although shortages were more acute during the winter seasons throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
the use of supplementary feeding became “widespread” so much that the chairman of the Milk 
Producers’ Sub-Committee of the Matabeleland Farmers’ Union, E. Bickle, estimated that at 
least 75% of dairy producers in Matabeleland had begun to use supplementary feeding either 
through the growing of maize or purchase by 1948.783 Worth noting, however, is the fact that the 
increase in the use of supplementary feeding was not only due to increased awareness among 
farmers, but also due to the existence of price incentives for producers and increased state 
financial support which helped to recapitalise dairying operations. As the next section shows, a 
major incentive was offered for producers who acquired improved herds and adopted better 
production methods. 
 
The Dairy Bonus Scheme 
The Dairy Division introduced the Dairy Bonus Scheme in 1944. Under this scheme, which was 
directly administered by the Chief Dairy Officer, special bonuses were paid on first and second 
grade butterfat supplied to a creamery and on milk converted into cheddar, gouda or Roquefort 
cheese. In the case of Gouda and Roquefort cheese, which did not need to be graded, the Chief 
Dairy Officer would determine whether the quality of the cheese manufactured during the 
calendar year merited the bonus. Bonuses of 4d and 2d were paid per lb. for first and second 
grade butterfat respectively, while 1d per gallon was paid for milk converted into first grade 
cheddar, Gouda and Roquefort cheese.784 Farm butter makers were excluded particularly because 
they “were not considered assets to the industry.”785 
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While these incentives, particularly the figures involved, appeared attractive, the conditions 
which prospective beneficiaries had to meet were quite stringent. To qualify for these bonuses, a 
producer had to comply with the following prerequisites:  
i. That his herd has been milk recorded under the Southern Rhodesia Milk Recording 
Scheme. 
ii. That 25% of the cows recorded during the year have each produced a minimum of 125 lb. 
of butterfat in 300 days or less. This standard operated for the first year, and in the 
second year would be raised to 150 lb. of butterfat, and in the third and fourth years to 
175 lb. and in the fifth and subsequent years to 200 lb. of butterfat. 
iii. That his dairy premises were registered under the Dairy Act.  
iv. That his methods of feeding and management have been approved – the main factors here 
to be the condition of the young stock and the use of an approved bull.786 
The above conditions illustrate that improving the quality of dairy cattle and the conditions of 
production in general was an important aspect of the Dairy Division’s efforts to encourage 
farmers to increase the quantities of milk and cream output during the 1940s. While 
acknowledging that dairy cows were scarce, the first two conditions were definitely aimed at 
encouraging farmers to acquire more efficient dairy cows, while the last one would act as an 
inducement for farmers to improve their livestock feeding systems. Similarly, the third condition 
was a direct attempt to push farmers to improve their production methods, which would, in turn, 
result in them being registered under the Dairy Act.787 Thus, to the extent that the Dairy Bonus 
Scheme sought to extend incentives to farmers to increase cream and milk production while at 
the same time encouraging the adoption of more efficient dairy cows and more sanitary 
production methods, the Dairy Bonus Scheme should be viewed as a double barrelled reaction to 
war-time and post-war crisis which sought to improve both the quantity and quality of dairy 
products.  
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The scheme, however, was reviled by some farmers, who felt – as they enduringly did – that 
expansion could only be achieved through general price increases. All but one of the branches of 
the Rhodesia National Farmers’ Union (RNFU) argued that the price paid for cream was 
uneconomic; urging the DICB to “raise the prices to an economic level, without conditions” 
before adding that the government was placing farmers in a difficult position through the bonus 
schemes.788 It added that the council’s opinion was that: 
The (g)overnment would have been better advised to recognise that the cream 
producers, in common with those engaged in other branches of the farming 
industry had been under the burden of inadequate prices for considerable time and 
grant them the bonuses in the way of increased prices without obligations for two 
years so that they could be able to afford the improvements visualised in the 
scheme.789 
The Midlands branch went so far as to prescribe the actual price they desired, stating that the 
disaster of shortages could only be averted by: 
             The fixation of butterfat prices at 2/2d per lb. for the coming winter and 1/10 per lb. 
for the following summer, entirely irrespective of the bonuses and levies which are 
not favoured. Only after the placing of the industry on a sound economic basis as 
set out is the Branch prepared to consider the Dairy Bonus Scheme submitted by 
the Minister.790 
These arguments, however, did not consider that white farmers had, as already discussed in 
chapter 4 and 5, received significant state financial and technical assistance as well as support to 
cushion them from the vagaries of international prices. As Cory explained: 
              The price of cream had been advanced quite considerably but (the producers) had 
not been able to increase their output. The reason for this is that their whole basis 
was wrong and they were not working along the right lines.791 
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It should be noted that although nearly all branches of the RNFU detested the conditions set out 
in the Dairy Bonus Scheme on the basis of perceived low real prices, the Bulawayo Branch 
expressed reservations for entirely different reasons. Largely because the region was dominated 
by beef cattle ranching, the branch was only concerned about the conditions regarding the 
exclusive use of dairy cows for one to qualify. It reported: 
The meeting approves of the Dairy Bonus Scheme provided mixed farming is 
provided for, considering that the scheme as put forward applies only to a small 
percentage, who have, or can obtain genuine dairy cows and who are in a position 
to adopt dairy farming. The genuine mixed farmer with dual purpose cattle obtain 
the bonus, under a separate scheme, and should qualify by feeding his herd and 
young stock adequately; but should not be required to hand-rear, or record.792 
Considering that the Matabeleland region was generally regarded as the prime cattle region, and 
also that the region possessed the highest number of dual purpose cattle breeds – such  as South 
Devons and Shorthorns793 – the Bulawayo producers’ argument does, at face value, seem quite 
plausible. Their position, however, was rendered untenable by the fact that approved dual 
purpose cattle were eligible for the scheme, with only beef stock ineligible for both the Dairy 
Bonus Scheme and the Milk Recording Scheme. Possibly, they were angling to have their beef 
cattle accommodated into the scheme. Indeed, the chairman of the Bulawayo Cream Producers’ 
Committee’s claim that “too much stress is (being) placed on dairy regulations (yet) most men I 
know could produce first grade (butter) without keeping to the regulations” is a telling pointer to 
the attitudes accompanying the farmers’ resistance to the control mechanisms governing the 
industry.794 
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Once the scheme commenced in 1945, however, an increasing number of farmers began to meet 
the conditions set out as a result of the propaganda on farm management and the availability of 
financial assistance to improve their methods. By 1950, an appreciable increase in the number of 
farmers had become eligible to claim the bonus. Whereas only 18% of all registered cream 
producers could qualify for the bonus at its inception in 1944, 58% were deemed eligible by 
1950.795 Also, as illustrated earlier, the number of cows that entered the Milk Recording Scheme 
showed a significant upward trend. Commenting on the state of the industry in the wake of the 
Dairy Bonus Scheme, and indeed other reforms which had begun in 1938, the Minister of 
Agriculture, C.L. Robertson, reported with satisfaction: 
The (dairy) industry is now in the process of discarding the old primitive 
unhygienic practices of the past for the more up-to-date and efficient methods of 
the present. The majority of our farmers are now in possession of better milking 
cows, and better methods of feeding are now widespread...  796 
Although significant improvements in production methods and the quality of herds had been 
made by the late 1940s, the Minister’s statement, however, embellished the exact state of affairs 
in the industry. As late as the 1960s, the DMB was still complaining about the poor levels of cow 
productivity and low farm efficiency in comparison with major dairying countries in the 
world.797 
 
Sour Milk? The Milk Subsidy Committee and farmer contestations 
One of the most contested post-war interventions was the introduction of the Milk Subsidy 
Scheme in 1947. The devastating drought that ravaged the southern parts of the country in that 
year meant that dairy production in Matabeleland was at risk of falling further short of 
requirements. Aware that they had to buy considerable quantities of feed, and the generally high 
inflationary pressures throughout the country, dairymen and two processing concerns in 
Matabeleland pushed for a drought relief scheme specifically for their region. The Matabeleland 
Farmers’ Union warned that due to the acute and complex position, “whole milk supplies will 
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fail and the butterfat (producers) will go out of production, unless they are assisted”.798 As there 
were no fixed producer prices, the Milk Co-op added that it was handling low quantities of milk 
and cream as a result of low production levels, a factor which, it argued, was adversely affecting 
its own operational viability. It added: 
The present price of milk – or rather the price paid to the producer – is far too low 
and unless this could be appreciably increased production would be very 
materially curtailed. Handling costs at the Milk Co-op are apparently very high – 
higher in fact than they have ever been – and the payout to the producers is only 
about 1/5 d per gallon which is at least 4d  per gallon less than the current payout 
for any of the other similar undertakings in the Colony.799 
The Dairy Division approved the implementation of the Milk Subsidy Scheme from April 1947 
until the end of that year. Under this arrangement, a guaranteed price of 2/- per gallon was paid 
to suppliers of whole milk who could prove that they were receiving less for it in and around 
Bulawayo. Effectively, this meant that no subsidy was paid to producers already receiving 2/- per 
gallon or more.800 With these conditions, the majority of suppliers who were eligible were those 
supplying produce to the Milk Co-op and the Bulawayo Creamery, since other undertakings paid 
higher prices.801 Surprisingly, the authorities did not seek to investigate the circumstances that 
led to only a few concerns paying less than 2d per gallon for milk when others could pay more. 
 
Inevitably, the payment of the subsidy to some producers was reviled by farmers who had been 
deemed ineligible for the scheme. They argued that, to the extent that all farmers in 
Matabeleland (and beyond) were facing similar economic challenges, the scheme was 
discriminatory against farmers who did not send supplies to the two concerns. In any case, they 
argued, the milk deficiency was a national problem, which warranted a national approach. The 
sentiments expressed by J. Jameson, a Bulawayo-based farmer, reveal the fury among excluded 
farmers: 
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I fail to see the point in introducing a scheme to help farmers during the present 
drought, when in actual fact the scheme is only beneficial to a certain section of 
the farming community, some of whom regard dairy activities as a side line. I 
would further point out that the price of cattle has increased to all farmers. If I am 
not assisted under this scheme there is no object it trying to maintain a high 
standard of dairy farming. I certainly would not continue [M]ilk [R]ecording...a 
dual purpose herd would curtail my labours considerably.802 
Another Bulawayo farmer, Parsons, whose attempts to benefit from the scheme had been 
unsuccessful added: 
               I am feeling the effect of the drought as much as any farmer in the area. I buy all 
my cattle feed and in addition now have to buy water. I also have no grazing. I am 
unable to see why I am not entitled to a subsidy seeing its object is to ‘maintain 
supplies’ which can only be achieved subsidising every producer, whereas it 
appears to me that only suppliers of the Rhodesia Co-op Milk Company and 
Bulawayo Creamery benefit. If I am to send my milk to one of these institutions 
your Committee would be prepared to subsidise on all the milk produced. So I can 
only arrive at the conclusion that it is not the farmer who is being subsidised.803 
Dairy farmers from districts outside Matabeleland also felt short-changed by a scheme that only 
served a few farmers in one province. One farmer, T.W. Duff, from Marandellas in eastern 
Mashonaland contended that although the effects of the drought were mainly felt in 
Matabeleland, farmers in Mashonaland also needed a subsidy to purchase supplementary feed 
and to cover transport costs. He asserted that the scheme  
               as it currently operates serves to divide and discourage dairy farmers. We are 
producing butterfat and cream under the most difficult circumstances in other 
provinces and yet a select few are receiving preferential treatment in one district of 
the country.804 
That only two processing concerns had played a key role in pushing for the scheme, and that the 
Dairy Division did not examine their operations added credence to excluded farmers’ contention 
that, far from helping farmers to maintain supplies in the wake of the drought, the scheme ended 
up subsidising ‘inefficient’ concerns. The concerns’ owners’ claim that the increased handling 
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costs was a result of a reduction in the amount of milk received and not a phenomenon peculiar 
to the two concerns only. Hence, instead of cushioning farmers from the effects of drought, the 
Milk Subsidy Scheme as it functioned in 1947 served more to subsidise processing concerns than 
producers. Hence, it may be argued that the 1947 drought relief scheme did not achieve its 
intended objectives.  
 
Developments in the African cattle sector 
While efforts were made to improve the efficiency and productivity at white-owned dairy farms 
through improving the quality of herds and feeding systems, the African sector, which was 
systematically and purposefully underdeveloped, was further weakened by the introduction of 
destocking measures as part of the war-time beef exigencies. Unable to source sufficient beef 
supplies to feed the expanding white population, the government introduced measures aimed at 
coercing African farmers to sell their livestock cheaply on the colonial beef market. As early as 
1940, the Chief Native Commissioner instructed all Native Commissioners to organise cattle 
sales more regularly in both Reserves and the Native Purchase Areas and to intensify the scope 
of propaganda work aimed at encouraging Africans to dispose of their cattle.805 What really 
drove the Native Affairs Department was the inability of the white ranching sector to satisfy the 
beef demand at a time when there seemed to them to be “excessive herds of cattle in the African 
Reserves.”806 Similar measures were instituted in colonial Botswana, where dairying began to 
decline from the 1950s onwards as a result of war-time and post war demands. The leading cause 
for cattle losses in that colony was the re-introduction of beef exports to South Africa from the 
1950s onwards.807 
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African stock owners proved unwilling to sell their stock, however. This was due to blatant 
exploitation by cattle speculators and dealers who paid very low prices for African-owned 
cattle.808 This resistance led to the imposition of more coercive measures. The state enforced 
mandatory de-stocking measures in African areas which began with the recommendation by the 
Natural Resources Commission in 1941.809 Although the Commission’s recommendation for de-
stocking was cast as a panacea to the ecological deterioration in the Reserves, the immediate 
implementation of such measures at a time of acute beef shortages should not be attributed to 
mere historical coincidence. Explaining the link, the Commission of Enquiry into the Marketing 
of Cattle for Slaughter and Distribution and Sale of Beef in Southern Rhodesia in 1942 revealed 
the connection: 
It is deplorable that a colony which prides itself on its cattle industry should thus, 
have failed hitherto so lamentably in the Empire’s hour of need...instead (of 
Africans selling their cattle) witness is borne to the fact that thousands of native 
cattle are likely to perish this season through poverty...Meantime, it is strongly 
urged that regulations dealing with Native cattle framed by the Natural Resources 
Board should be brought into force without any further delay.810 
Thus the passage of the Natural Resources Act in 1941 heightened the systematic state-
sponsored reduction of livestock in reserves, purportedly because of the perceived environmental 
damage through overgrazing.811 While the scientific environmental effect of overgrazing may be 
proven, the report of the commission quoted above also succinctly demonstrates the state’s desire 
to ensure that Africans disposed of their livestock in the wake of war-time beef shortages. In any 
case, the state’s analysis of the environmental crisis in the reserves as being solely a result of 
African aversion to environmental considerations, and not the shortage of land caused by land 
alienation policies was long on prejudice and short on justice.  
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Compulsory de-stocking policy led to a massive reduction of the Africa herd. While there is little 
reliable information on the number of stock in African ownership during and shortly after the 
war, the impact of the programme may be understood when considering that the number of 
African cattle sold to the Cold Storage Commission increased from 27 000 in 1939 to over 
100 000 in 1945.812  This de-stocking programme, indeed, served as a harbinger of a more 
ruthless African cattle policy which was adopted under the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, 
which sought “to limit the number of stock in any area to its carrying capacity, and, asfar as 
practicable, to relate stock holding to arable land holding as a means of improving farming 
practice”.813 Although the measures were somewhat useful in easing the war-time and post-war 
beef crisis, they, from a dairying viewpoint, further reduced African ability to produce and 
market dairy produce on the formal market. State pre-occupation with easing beef shortages at a 
time when dairy products were also in short supply should be viewed within the context of the 
relatively more central role of beef in the Southern Rhodesian diet when compared to butter. 
 
It is important to note that de-stocking measures were carried out at the same time as African 
cattle ‘improvement’ programmes. Although efforts to help Africans to acquire cross-breeds had 
begun as early as 1912, when the African Cattle Clause – which aimed at ‘improving’ African 
indigenous cattle through crossing them with exotic breeds in order to create fewer but bigger 
cattle – was introduced, this policy had not been pursued with much keenness. This was because 
of state and settler fears that the success of such a programme would help Africans to 
successfully compete with settlers on the dairy and especially beef markets. 814  The 1940s, 
however, witnessed the return of the policy, but this time now focusing on creating a truly 
‘native beast’ through the emphasis of the bigger ‘Sanga’ cattle which had pre-existed the arrival 
of Europeans into the territory.815 This came about because of the understanding that pure exotic 
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breeds and cross-breeds died due either to disease or improper feeding.816 The ‘Sanga’ cow, thus, 
was one of the most common indigenous breeds in Zimbabwe at independence.817  From a 
dairying perspective, however, this policy did not have any meaningful impact. This was largely 
because the Sanga breed was encouraged among Africans largely for its size – which would 
affect its beefing qualities – and not its milking abilities. In any case, the regulations that had 
been passed in 1938, and undercapitalisation made it difficult for Africans in possession of these 
cattle to participate on the formal market. 
 
The colonial state also made token efforts to improve pasture management from the late 1940s 
onwards. A series of grazing surveys were made conducted in a number of reserves in 
Matabeleland, Midlands and parts of Mashonaland after which rotational grazing was introduced 
in the surveyed areas. By 1951, and in line with the recommendations of the Native Production 
and Trade Commission of Enquiry, the Inyathi Reserve in Matabeleland, the Charter district in 
the Midlands and Victoria, Zimuto and Gutu Reserves had been paddock fenced with a view to 
implement rotational grazing.818 Further, the Director of Native Agriculture reported that the 
Chilimanzi Reserve, which did not have adequate grass cover, was fenced in 1948, with the 
result that the land had not only been protected from erosion, but also could sustain more 
livestock.819 
 
The impact of pasture improvements on African milk production, however, was inhibited by one 
important factor: the improvements came on the backdrop of significantly huge cattle losses in 
the Reserves as a result of the on-going de-stocking campaign; hence the ultimate impact of 
pasture improvement was on the maintenance of smaller herds whose breeding had been 
focussed on the size of the cow. Indeed, despite these interventions, the Dairy Marketing Board 
(DMB), which had been established in October 1951, reported at the end of 1953 that only “three 
native producer are sending milk to creameries and milk depots in the Mashonaland districts, and 
perhaps a few more exist in Matabeleland.”820 Considering that limiting the number of cattle 
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Africans possessed in the African areas was a pivotal element of the colonial state’s African 
livestock policy, and also that the dairy industry became more sophisticated over time – 
requiring more capital and technology – it is not surprising that, by 1980, commercial dairying 
was generally the preserve of white large scale producers. Indeed, the DMB reported in 1979 that 
only one black producer was registered in the Mashonaland province, and none in other 
districts.821 For the post 1939 period, however, the further underdevelopment of African capacity 
to participate on the dairy market was less deliberate – it was a result of the prioritisation of 
easing beef shortages in war-time and post-war Southern Rhodesia over dairy products. The 
dearth in African commercial dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia by 1951, however, shows a 
major difference with colonial Kenya, a fellow settler state, where black small-holder production 
had begun to play a dominant role in commercial dairying by the 1960s.822 
 
Towards a new marketing system: Increasing dairy output and the origins of the Dairy 
Marketing Board 
Having outlined war-time and post-war developments, this chapter ends with a brief summary of 
the circumstances leading to the formation of the Dairy Marketing Board in 1952. As a result of 
state interventions to increase dairy output in the white dairy sector, the period between 1946 and 
1951 witnessed a tremendous increase in milk output. Indeed, supplies of raw milk rose by over 
3 million gallons from 7.2 million gallons of milk in 1946 to 10.1.million gallons in 1951.823 The 
expansion of dairy production inevitably warranted a corresponding expansion of the handling 
and distribution side of the dairy industry, particularly of whole milk which had become the 
major dairy product, as alluded to earlier in this chapter. The increase in milk supplies during and 
after the war meant that some creameries and dairies found themselves handling upwards of four 
times the quantities for which they had been originally designed.824 However, partly due to the 
smaller amounts of supplies they had become accustomed to handling, and largely owing to lack 
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of capital for expanding their capacity, co-operative and private creameries were unable to 
handle bigger volumes of cream and milk. In fact, as the volume of supplies began to increase 
from the 1940s onwards, some of them began to adopt a ‘closed shop’ system in which new 
producers were not allowed to supply, while old producers operated on a quota system.825 Thus, 
shortages in urban areas, especially in Salisbury where creameries and dairies were reluctant to 
accept supplies from new members, were not solely a result of inadequate production, but 
actually reflection of an inadequate processing and distributing system.826 
 
The Dairy Division commissioned two official enquiries – first in 1947 and then 1949 – to find 
ways in which the processing and distribution systems could be expanded. The 1947 Milk 
Subsidy Committee rejected the idea of vesting fresh milk distribution in municipal utilities. It 
believed that urban milk distribution should not be separated from, but should be integrated with, 
national milk processing and manufacturing in large multi-purpose plants.827 It recommended 
that a statutory milk commission (comprising representatives from farmers, creameries, 
consumers and government officials) be established which would initially concentrate on 
securing milk for the large cities where needs were most pressing. Thereafter, the government 
would compensate and take over existing milk handling enterprises with a view to expanding 
them and building new ones.828 In this way, a national milk lake would be created through 
nationalising all processing concerns. In line with developments in South Africa where the Dairy 
Control Board was already paying fixed producer prices, the Committee also advocated a long-
term producer price policy with payment according to the quality of milk produced.829 
 
The Parliamentary Select Committee of 1949 was tasked to investigate and report on possible 
measures to be taken to increase production and to improve the manufacture and marketing of all 
dairy products. It recommended the establishment of a Milk Marketing Committee to buy milk 
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from producers for distribution, an increase in producer prices to be met by government subsidy, 
payment of premiums on the basis of the quality of produced and the continuation of the 
importations of dairy cattle and stock feed.830 By and large, the recommendations of the two 
enquiries were adopted, and a non-statutory Milk Marketing Committee was established during 
the same year. It was charged with buying milk direct from the producers and selling it to 
distributors. It should be noted, however, that at this stage private creameries and dairies were 
still in business, with the result that some producers continued to patronise them. In fact, the 
Milk Marketing Committee largely handled produce from new comers into the industry who 
struggled to break into the creameries. 831  Hence, even after the establishment of the Milk 
Marketing Commission, private enterprise continued to dominate the processing industry. 
 
In a sweeping move across the entire agricultural industry, the government in 1951 passed the 
Agricultural Marketing Act, providing for the establishment of marketing schemes to regulate 
the marketing of agricultural products. This Act gave birth to the Agricultural Marketing Council 
(AMC) whose primary duty was to examine and report upon the marketing schemes and advising 
the Minister of Lands and Agriculture on issues to do with pricing, import and export of 
agricultural products.832 Within this framework, the Dairy Marketing Scheme was created and 
introduced with effect from the first day of October, 1952. Under this scheme, the Dairy 
Marketing Board was formed, leading to the abolishment of the DICB.833 Thus, the views of the 
1947 Milk Subsidy Committee, in favour of the progressive centralization in a public authority 
of the handling and processing of milk and milk products, finally carried the day in Southern 
Rhodesia by 1951.834 As part of the effort to stabilise the marketing and distribution of dairy 
products, the DMB took over most creameries, dairies and cheese factories that existed in the 
country. By 1959, all but one cheese factory at Chipinga in Manicaland had been taken over by 
the Board. Thus, the DMB became a vehicle through which the state could establish a virtual 
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monopoly in buying milk and butter from farmers, and in the processing and marketing of dairy 
products in Southern Rhodesia.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has assessed the impact of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath in 
the development of the dairy industry. It has demonstrated that although Southern Rhodesia had 
expressed a willingness to send supplies to Britain as part of its contribution to the Allied war 
effort, the rapid white population increase and accompanying expanding demand meant that the 
country had to focus on the emerging crisis first. Indeed, the population growth precipitated 
acute shortages of dairy products throughout the major urban settlements. The expanding 
domestic market radically altered the production patterns, as priority was given to the provision 
of the country’s fresh milk demand. However, with war making trans-continental trade unlikely, 
and South Africa unable to export butter, the only solution lay in increasing local production. 
This chapter has argued that although a number of ad hoc measures were taken to increase 
production in the short-term, the government did not lose sight of the fundamentals that had 
precipitated the passage of the Dairy Act in 1937. The implementation of reforms, however, 
drew much resistance from white farmers who felt that price interventions were the only remedy 
to war-time and post-war crisis. Indeed, the demands of the war and its aftermath were a blessing 
in disguise insofar as the need to expand production led to the intensification of reforms in the 
production methods and livestock management systems, which helped to increase farm output by 
1952. 
 
This chapter has also argued that the war-time and post-war period was characterised by the 
further underdevelopment of the African livestock sector. While previous chapters have shown 
that the assault on African dairy farming was premised on the desire to limit competition and the 
prejudices about African cleanliness, this chapter has shown that African capacity during the 
period under review was a result of state attempts to force Africans to dispose of their cattle in 
order to ease acute beef shortages. Indeed, de-stocking measures that were embarked on from 
1939 onwards may have contributed to increasing beef supplies, but this was achieved at the 
expense of African milk production. The cosmetic livestock ‘improvement’ programmes of the 
1940s and 1950s did little to rescue African participation on the colonial dairy market, not least 
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because they focused on increasing the size of African-owned cattle, and not milking abilities. In 
any case, without adequate capital to construct the requisite dairy infrastructure and to purchase 
dairy cows, African commercial dairy farming would not help to satisfy the rapidly expanding 
urban demand for milk on the colonial market. This chapter has also outlined the factors leading 
to the formation of the Dairy Marketing Board in 1952, which took over the distribution of all 
dairy products. Thus, the main argument borne in this chapter is that white dairy farming was 
considerably boosted by the war and its demand, while African commercial dairy farming was 
dealt a near-fatal blow.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined the social and economic factors that determined the development path 
of dairy farming in colonial Zimbabwe through the different stages of the colony’s development 
from the 1890s to 1951. It has discussed the role of the state and farmers (white and black) in 
shaping the industry, within the context of evolving socio-economic developments in the country 
and also the vicissitudes of the international markets in which the country participated for much 
of the period under review. Although mainly focusing on the economic factors, this thesis has 
also delineated the social, environmental and political determinants that influenced the 
development of the dairy industry. It has demonstrated that dairy farming emerged from its initial 
position as a peripheral industry, during the first three decades of colonial occupation, until it 
gradually gained relevance by the early 1950s.  
 
This study has sought to fill a narrow but deep historiographical lacuna in historical studies of 
Southern Rhodesia’s cattle industry which, to date, have evinced much greater interest in the beef 
industry. In telling the ‘dairy story’, however, this thesis has been engaged in a much broader 
conversation with wider debates in colonial Zimbabwe’s agrarian historiography in general. In 
demonstrating the progressive state-sponsored underdevelopment of African commercial dairy 
farming over time, it has shown that the old colonial narrative that depicted African 
underdevelopment as self-inflicted and presented the colonial state as benevolent is misplaced. 
However, it has further demonstrated that state policy did not affect Africans evenly, and neither 
were their responses uniform. Moreover, it has gone beyond the Africanist interpretations that 
have viewed the colonial state as a homogenous entity. It has cast more light on the growing body 
of work which disaggregate the state and its various interests in policy-making. Indeed, this study 
has shown that the different and often contradictory opinions and interests among state officials 
played an important role in policy-making and implementation.  
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In discussing the interaction between the colonial state and white farmers, this study has sought 
to add to the body of scholarly work that focuses on the development of agrarian policies in 
British colonies. Drawing from Gilmore’s study of the role of the state in the development of an 
initially unviable dairy industry in Australia, this thesis has shown that farmers benefitted from 
state patronage. As demonstrated in chapter 3, dairy farming was identified by the state as an 
important industry in state plans to attract settlers to Southern Rhodesia. However, this thesis has 
also shown that the relationship between farmers and the colonial state was not seamless. White 
farmers often felt that the government was not doing enough to protect their interests, particularly 
through the provision of higher prices and other financial incentives. Thus, the history of settler 
dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia is a history of contestation and negotiation between the 
government and farmers. Throughout the period under review, this contestation shaped and 
reshaped dairy policy. It has drawn from similar colonial contexts in countries such as Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa where strong dairy industries were developed during the colonial 
period. 
 
This thesis has also shown that the policy framework that was used in strengthening the dairy 
industry was inherently discriminatory against black producers. As chapter 3 and 4 demonstrated 
respectively, this discrimination was a result of state efforts to minimise African agrarian 
competition and the perceived unsuitability of indigenous people for dairy production because of 
long held prejudices about African cleanliness. Regarding the latter, the Dairy Division was at the 
centre of a debate within the settler community, including dairy farmers and consumers, and 
officials of the Dairy Division about African hygienic practices and their suitability for 
participation on the dairy market. As shown in chapters 4 and 5, the notion that African dairy 
producers were insanitary and slovenly played a significant role in settler demands for the 
elimination of African producers from commercial dairying. This was despite evidence showing 
that white farmers’ methods of production were equally poor, a fact that contributed to the 
country’s poor performance on the external markets. 
 
This marginalisation notwithstanding, some Africans took advantage of gaps in the system to 
positively produce for the market. In spite of the cattle and land losses and the formulation of 
policies that had the effect of excluding them from the mainstream dairy industry, a few Africans 
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mobilised capital and competed with white farmers on the market. Further, the exclusion of the 
majority led to the emergence of an informal market in which Africans traded in milk products on 
mining and farming settlements, in contravention of the Dairy Act. Indeed, by the 1950s, the rural 
sector was characterised by small-holder peasant producers who sold surplus milk within the 
rural sector, and on emergent peri-urban settlements.  
 
In explaining the complex evolution of the dairy industry in Southern Rhodesia, this thesis began 
by examining the interface between African milk regimes outside the colonial and largely 
capitalist dairy industry. As shown in chapter 2, milk had an important symbolic value in African 
social and political milieux. Nevertheless, as opponents of the ‘cattle complex’ theory have 
argued in respect of the value of cattle in African societies, the existence of milk customs and 
symbols did not preclude African cattle owners from utilising milk for economic purposes. In 
fact, African societies embraced the opportunities that came during the first two years of colonial 
occupation. However, unlike grain producers, milk producers did not flourish for long on the 
incipient colonial market. Besides issues pertaining to the high perishability of milk, the cattle 
losses that followed conquest and successive cattle diseases that affected the country between 
1896 and the early 1920s, severely curtailed African capacity to produce milk. Consequently, 
whereas the settler population largely depended on local African grain during the first two 
decades of occupation, most of its dairy requirements were supplied from South Africa. Besides 
the settlers and British South Africa Company’s (BSAC) fixation with finding gold deposits, 
efforts to establish a settler dairy industry were hampered by the same bovine diseases. Thus, 
neither the African nor the settler dairy sector was prosperous by the 1900s.  
 
The espousal of the White Agricultural Policy (WAP) in 1908 marked an important benchmark 
in the development of settler capitalist agriculture. As it had become obvious that Southern 
Rhodesia was not a mineral Eldorado, the BSAC shifted its attention towards commercial 
agriculture in order to realise profits from land, which it assumed to be its biggest economic 
asset. This would be achieved through attracting white settlers into the country by offering land 
at concessional rates, and stimulating settler agriculture. Although the Company’s official 
attempts to develop settler dairy farming started in 1910 with the arrival of a dairy expert from 
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England, prospective dairymen faced a battery of climatic, financial and environmental 
challenges that stood in the way of successful dairy farming in the fledgling colony.  
 
As demonstrated in chapter 3, although Southern Rhodesia had been identified as suitable for a 
livestock economy, most regions of the country did not receive adequate annual rainfall for the 
maintenance of dairy cows in comparison with most dairying countries in the world. The BSAC 
administration thus provided financial and technical assistance to white farmers, particularly in 
acquiring dairy cattle. Dairying, however, was an industry requiring a large outlay of capital and 
technical expertise, while offering very little short-term return on investment. Consequently, 
most settler cattle-owners opted to invest in the less demanding and more rewarding beef 
industry. Although dairy output increased so much that a national surplus was emerging by the 
time the BSAC gave up administering the colony in 1923, much of the butter and cream was 
derived from dairy-ranching – ranchers simply milked their beef cattle when beef prices were 
low. Indeed, the fortunes of beef production largely determined the performance of dairy farming 
during the time of the BSAC.  
 
The adoption of WAP in 1908 essentially meant that African agriculture had to be restricted to 
protect nascent white agriculture and create a labour reservoir in reserves. Although there was no 
official mention of the need to specifically eliminate Africans from the dairy industry, 
indigenous dairy production was significantly curtailed by land losses and displacements that 
followed the Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) and the introduction of increased rents on 
unalienated lands from 1908. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the movements of Africans onto less 
habitable environments in the reserves had a devastating effect on livestock and their owners’ 
livelihoods. However, not all Africans were adversely affected by the creation of reserves and 
the PLO. Some wealthier Africans, including some originally from South Africa and Botswana 
who had taken advantage of a clause in the 1898 Southern Rhodesia Orders in Council, which 
allowed them to buy land, purchased dairy cows and built dairy infrastructure, and competed 
with settler dairymen on the dairy market.  
The production of surplus butter from the 1920s onwards meant that Southern Rhodesia entered 
the regional and international markets prematurely. This development was not indicative of the 
growth of the industry; it was a consequence of the small domestic market for dairy products. 
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Thus, participation on the export market exposed the crude nature of the colony’s production and 
processing systems, which manifested themselves in the production and marketing of low quality 
butter. The end of the BSAC administration, and the subsequent arrival of self rule, under 
Coghlan, gave the white farming community renewed hopes that much more investment would 
be made in settler agriculture. However, despite the new political developments at home, the 
country’s agrarian performance continued to be profoundly influenced by the vicissitudes of the 
international markets. The country was exporting predominantly second and third grade butter at 
a loss and importing first grade butter, hence the state introduced the Dairy Produce Act in 1925 
with the aim of improving the quality of butter produced in the country. Modelled along 
Australian legislation, the Act focused on improving the processing aspect of the industry. A raft 
of measures was taken to ensure certain minimum standards were followed in the manufacture of 
butter and cheese and creameries and cheese factories. Dairy officers were employed by the 
department to ensure that grading and manufacturing standards were followed. However, as 
demonstrated in chapter 4, the 1925 legislation did not address farm production problems that lay 
at the root of the industry such as the dominance of dilettantes, the scarcity of genuine dairy 
cows and general lack of capital. Hence, interventions at the manufacturing levels inevitably 
failed to improve the quality of butter.  
 
While legislative intervention had largely ignored farm production processes, the mid-1920s 
were characterised by debates within the state and between the state and the white community 
about the suitability of Africans to participate in the dairy industry, as Chapter 4 showed. As part 
of the larger segregation debate that began during the 1920s, the position of African cream and 
milk producers came under increasing attack from the settler community, which viewed African 
producers as unsuitable for dairying, and thus responsible for producing low quality cream. 
Mobilising crude Darwinist arguments and racial prejudices that cast Africans as slovenly, 
sections of the white community called for the banishment of Africans from the dairy market. 
Until the mid-1930s, some farmers continued to lay the blame for the persistent production of 
low grade butter on African producers. These views, however, were confounded by dairy 
officers’ findings from the late 1920s onwards. Evidence from dairy officers’ reports proved that 
production methods and conditions were generally inadequate in both African and white sectors. 
The period covering the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, therefore, represented a missed decade in 
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the development of dairy farming in Southern Rhodesia. By not regulating for the improvement 
of farming operations, the regulatory framework espoused by the government proved inadequate. 
Similarly, settler farmers’ denial of the inadequacy of their operations and scapegoating African 
producers proved to be misplaced. Consequently, Southern Rhodesia continued to struggle on the 
international scene – exporting low grade butter at a loss while importing higher grades – 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
While Southern Rhodesian dairy farmers did not make profits from exporting during the 1920s, 
their position was aggravated by the outbreak of the Great Depression, whose effects on the 
farming community lasted until the late 1930s. The collapse of prices of agricultural products on 
the international markets had a telling effect on the dairy industry in Southern Rhodesia. As 
happened in other industries, the government established a statutory board – the Dairy Industry 
Control Board – to regulate the marketing of dairy products from 1931. While statutory boards in 
other industries (such maize and beef) used African producers to subsidise white producers on 
the export market through the levy system, the Dairy Industry Control Board signed a levy and 
bounty scheme with other countries in the region. With a small African dairy sector, the board 
joined the Central Industries Control Board, which included South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland 
and South West Africa (Namibia), which collected levies from the territories and paid bounties 
to help farmers with the ‘burden’ of exporting butter between 1929 and 1934. Although the 
board helped to stabilise producer prices, the interventions were, in the long term, inadequate as 
long as the quality of the article being marketed remained poor. 
 
With both legislative interventions of 1925 and 1931 unable to improve the fortunes of the dairy 
industry, the government commissioned a Committee of Enquiry in 1935 to engage with (white) 
farmers, creameries and officials of the Dairy Division on possible remedies. The commission 
found that, despite the denial of a section of white farmers, the principal cause of the malaise in 
the industry lay in the methods of production on farms. It observed that the industry was 
dominated by dilettantes whose main interests lay in beef, and recommended the passage of a 
new regulatory framework that would force all farmers to adhere to stipulated standards of 
production. Since the majority of dairy-ranchers specialised in farm butter production, the 
commission also recommended that there should be regulation limiting the amount of farm butter 
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produced on the farms. These recommendations culminated in the passage of the Dairy Act in 
1937, which brought farmers’ activities under increased state control. The main import of this 
legislation was that all commercial dairy farms were to be registered by the Dairy Industry 
Control Board (DICB). Registration could only be granted if the farm premises complied with 
mandatory standard infrastructural and sanitary requirements such as the use of milking sheds 
and inspected utensils. In the same vein, farm butter making was discouraged by the introduction 
of a quota system. 
 
The passage of the Dairy Act, however, was resisted, resented and ultimately contravened by 
some sections of both white and black farmers. Although its passage was followed by the 
availing of funds from the Dairy Division for the purchase of the requisite apparatus, white 
farmers felt that by coercing them to deliver their cream at creameries, the state was empowering 
creameries to short-change them through the payment of low prices. However, these complaints 
mainly came from producers who were reluctant to invest in dairy farming on a long-term basis, 
preferring to produce farm butter as a side-line to beef. Such producers found ways of delivering 
milk and cream from unregistered premises, or producing more farm butter than their allocated 
quota. This brought them into constant conflict with the Dairy Division.  
 
With very little state financial support, the majority of African producers were unable to meet the 
demands of the new regulations. Yet, commercial milk and cream marketing did not stop: 
producers who found themselves unable to send cream to depots and creameries resorted to 
selling fresh and sour milk in mining and peri-urban centres where a ready market existed. This 
development precipitated debates between different government departments on the Dairy Act, 
as discussed in chapter 5. While the Department of Health and the Natives Affairs Department 
(NAD) agreed, albeit for different reasons, that the regulations should be eased to accommodate 
African producers on condition that they do not sell to whites, officials of the Dairy Division 
thought that the regulations should be upheld uniformly. While exceptions to the Dairy Act were 
made to allow African milk sales on mining compounds, general African ineligibility to comply 
with the Dairy Act merely served to encourage the existence of the ‘informal’ dairy market.  
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The reform process that had begun with the passage of the Dairy Act faced a severe test after the 
outbreak of World War II (WW II) in 1939. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the outbreak of the 
war precipitated a number of challenges for the dairy industry. Although Southern Rhodesia had 
expressed a willingness to send supplies to Britain as part of its contribution to the Allied war 
effort, a looming internal shortage meant that the Empire’s needs were sacrificed as domestic 
matters took precedence. A sudden increase in the white population during the war, and during 
the few years following the cessation of hostilities, precipitated acute shortages of dairy products 
throughout the major urban settlements.  
 
The expanding domestic market radically altered dairy production patterns as priority was given 
to the provision of the country’s fresh milk demands. As food supply outstripped demand from 
the 1940s onwards, a food production drive was launched in 1942. Regarding dairy farming, 
however, government thinking was geared towards ‘guided expansion’ – indiscriminate 
production of huge quantities of milk and butter was discouraged, as the focus was on 
maintaining the reform programme that had begun in 1937. Hence, the Dairy Division 
encouraged farmers to increase production through improved farm efficiency, lowering 
production costs through purchasing genuine dairy cows, increased attention to cattle 
management systems and the adoption of more hygienic methods of production. Although 
farmers constantly called for higher producer prices, and other monetary incentives, the schemes 
that were introduced, such as the Dairy Bonus Scheme, were aimed at encouraging farmers to 
improve their herds and methods of production. The 1940s and early 1950s also witnessed the 
intensification of research into the science of dairy farming. Experiments on pasture research, the 
impact of different types of supplementary feeds were conducted, while loan facilities with easier 
terms of repayment were extended to approve farmers for the purchase of Friesland cows and 
bulls. 
 
The exigencies of war necessitated the adoption of ad hoc measures to deal with short-term 
demands, however. Chapter 6 has shown that besides the payment of much higher producer 
prices, regulations governing farm butter production were temporarily suspended in order to 
increase butter supplies in the major urban centres. This notwithstanding, WW II and the changes 
that came with it proved to be a blessing in disguise for white dairy farmers, and the industry in 
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general, since it hastened the reform agenda that that had begun in 1937. Indeed, by 1952, dairy 
output had increased so much that the distribution system was overwhelmed. 
 
While white dairy farmers benefitted from the programmes that were instituted during the 1940s, 
dairy output from African cattle-owners decreased considerably. This was because of 
developments in the beef industry where war-time meat shortages caused colonial authorities to 
coerce Africans to dispose of their livestock. The passage of the Natural Resources Act in 1941 
saw the introduction of a compulsory de-stocking policy in African reserves ostensibly to contain 
a developing ecological disaster in the reserves. However, as the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Marketing of Cattle for Slaughter and Distribution and Sale of Beef in Southern Rhodesia 
reported in 1942, the implementation of de-stocking measures was intended to increase beef 
supplies during and after the war. While this policy was important in easing war-time beef 
shortages, it served to reverse African dairying capacity. 
 
The introduction of livestock ‘improvement’ programmes of the 1940s and 1950s in African 
areas did not improve Africans’ ability to produce milk. This programme focused on improving 
the size of beast (and thus improve its beef capacity), and not its milking capabilities. Since the 
aim of the state was to decrease the number of cattle and increase the size of individual cows, the 
ultimate impact of the ‘improvement’ programme was that it precipitated a decrease in the 
number of milked cows. Consequently, by 1952, when the Dairy Marketing Board was 
established to handle the marketing of dairy products, the Southern Rhodesian dairy industry was 
characterised by rapidly increasing dairy output from a growing number of white farmers, and 
falling output from a fast decreasing number of African commercial dairy farmers. 
 
While this thesis has cast light on an agrarian sector that has previously been neglected by 
historians, there are four aspects of dairy farming that require further exploration. Firstly, as this 
thesis focuses on the pre-1952 period, prior to the establishment of the Dairy Marketing Board 
(DMB), a socio-economic history of dairy farming from 1952 onwards calls for further 
exploration. Although I have worked on the operations of the DMB in the marketing of milk 
between 1952 and 1980 in a separate study, there is a need for a more nuanced study on the 
broader social and economic issues that arose out the Federal period and the Unilateral 
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Declaration of Independence (UDI).835 Secondly, while this thesis has discussed issues of race 
and class in dairying, a gendered history of dairy farming is yet to be written. While the role of 
women in the history of dairy farming has received significant historical attention in England, 
particularly with Nicola Verdon’s study, very little has been done their position in Zimbabwe’s 
agriculture sector in general.836  Admittedly, this thesis found very little evidence of women 
involved in dairying but the gendered analysis of masculinity explored in Chapter 2 could be 
extended further. Moreover, oral history could uncover the role women in post-1951 history, 
particularly in post-colonial Zimbabwean dairy farming. Thirdly, for a labour-intensive industry 
like dairying, there is need for further research on the labour dynamics that played out in dairy 
farming. This is important because while white agriculture in colonial Zimbabwe largely 
depended on African labour, Africans were perceived to be organically unsuited to a hygiene-
sensitive such as dairy farming. Fourthly, although the development of the small-holder (and 
predominantly black) dairy sector during the first two decades of independence has been 
subjected to scholarly attention from agricultural scientists, there is need for further research on 
the role of the post-2000 land reform programme in the dearth in milk production, and its 
success/failure in promotion of small-holder dairy farming.837 
The role of professional historians in the making of public policy, as Gavin has observed, is a 
contested terrain.838 Yet, policy-makers who are not grounded in past experiences are more prone 
to repeat mistakes of the past. Even outside policy-making, as Rennie points out, “it is the past 
which forms the frames of reference by which [humans] perceive the issues that confront 
them.”839 Thus, history-sensitive agricultural authorities are in relatively better stead to formulate 
and implement sound policies for present and future generations. This is particularly vital in 
Zimbabwe’s case, where on-going efforts to resuscitate the dairy industry and the entire 
agricultural sector in general, in the aftermath of the land reform programme have yet to bear the 
                                                     
835
 See G. Hove, ‘Creating order and stability? The Dairy Marketing Board, milk (over)production and the politics of 
marketing in colonial Zimbabwe, 1952-1970s, Historia 58, 2, (November 2013), 119-156. 
836
 N. Verdon, Women and the dairy industry in England, c.1800-1939’, paper presented at the International 
Economic History Congress, Helsinki, Finland, 21-25 August, 2006.  
837
 For studies on post-colonial small-holder dairy farming, see J. Garwi, ‘The development and operation of Arda 
Rusitu small-scale dairy settlement scheme, 1985-1997: A case study of contract farming’, Honours Dissertation, 
University of Zimbabwe, 2008, and E.G. Muponga and D.M. Dube, ‘Small-holder dairy development programme in 
resettled and communal areas in Zimbabwe’, paper presented at the International Livestock Research Institute 
Conference, Harare, 24 June, 1998.  
838
 F.J. Gavin, ‘History and policy’, International Journal, 63, 1 (2007), 162-177. 
839
 R. Rennie, ‘History and policy-making’, International; Social Science Journal, 50, 156 (1998), 289. 
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desired result. As this thesis has shown, effective policy-making and implementation is not solely 
dependent on a top-down approach of an over-bearing state, but a product of interaction and 
(active and silent) negotiations between the state, farmers and other stake-holders.  
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